Response of The Salvation Army to child sexual abuse at its boys homes in New South Wales and Queensland
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Preface

The Royal Commission

The Letters Patent provided to the Royal Commission require that it ‘inquire into institutional responses to allegations and incidents of child sexual abuse and related matters’.

In carrying out this task, we are directed to focus on systemic issues but be informed by an understanding of individual cases. The Royal Commission must make findings and recommendations to better protect children against sexual abuse and alleviate the impact of abuse on children when it occurs.

For a copy of the Letters Patent, see Appendix A.

Public hearings

A Royal Commission commonly does its work through public hearings. A public hearing follows intensive investigation, research and preparation by Royal Commission staff and Counsel Assisting the Royal Commission. Although it may only occupy a limited number of days of hearing time, the preparatory work required by Royal Commission staff and by parties with an interest in the public hearing can be very significant.

The Royal Commission is aware that sexual abuse of children has occurred in many institutions, all of which could be investigated in a public hearing. However, if the Royal Commission were to attempt that task, a great many resources would need to be applied over an indeterminate, but lengthy, period of time. For this reason the Commissioners have accepted criteria by which Senior Counsel Assisting will identify appropriate matters for a public hearing and bring them forward as individual ‘case studies’.

The decision to conduct a case study will be informed by whether or not the hearing will advance an understanding of systemic issues and provide an opportunity to learn from previous mistakes, so that any findings and recommendations for future change which the Royal Commission makes will have a secure foundation. In some cases the relevance of the lessons to be learned will be confined to the institution the subject of the hearing. In other cases they will have relevance to many similar institutions in different parts of Australia.

Public hearings will also be held to assist in understanding the extent of abuse which may have occurred in particular institutions or types of institutions. This will enable the Royal Commission to understand the way in which various institutions were managed and how they responded to allegations of child sexual abuse. Where our investigations identify a significant concentration of abuse in one institution, it is likely that the matter will be brought forward to a public hearing.

Public hearings will also be held to tell the story of some individuals which will assist in a public understanding of the nature of sexual abuse, the circumstances in which it may occur and, most importantly, the devastating impact which it can have on some people’s lives.

In reaching findings, the Royal Commission will apply the civil standard of proof which requires its ‘reasonable satisfaction’ as to the particular fact in question in accordance with the principles discussed by Dixon J in Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336:

‘...it is enough that the affirmative of an allegation is made out to the reasonable satisfaction of the tribunal. But reasonable satisfaction is not a state of mind that is attained or established independently of the nature and consequence of the fact or facts to be proved. The seriousness of an allegation made, the inherent likelihood of an occurrence of a given description, or the gravity of the consequences flowing from a particular finding are considerations which must affect the answer to the question whether the issue has been proved to the reasonable satisfaction of the tribunal...the nature of the issue necessarily affects the process by which reasonable satisfaction is attained.’

In other words, the more serious the allegation, the higher the degree of probability that is required before the Royal Commission can be reasonably satisfied as to the truth of that allegation.

Private sessions

When the Royal Commission was appointed it was apparent to the Australian Government that many people (possibly thousands of people) would wish to tell the Royal Commission of their personal history of sexual abuse in an institutional setting when they were a child. As a consequence the Commonwealth Parliament amended the Royal Commissions Act 1902 to create a process called a ‘private session’.

A private session is conducted by one or two Commissioners and is an opportunity for a person to tell their story of abuse in a protected and supportive environment. As at 30 November 2014, the Royal Commission has held 2,724 private sessions, and more than 1,000 people were waiting to attend one. Many accounts given in a private session will, in a de-identified form, be reported in later reports of the Royal Commission.

Research program

The Royal Commission also has an extensive research program. Apart from the information we gain in public hearings and private sessions, the program will draw on research by consultants and the original work of our own staff. Significant issues will be considered in issues papers and discussed at roundtables.
This case study

This is the report of the public hearing that examined the response of The Salvation Army (Eastern Territory) to child sexual abuse in four boys’ homes.

The scope and purpose of the hearing was:

1. The response of The Salvation Army (Eastern Territory) to child sexual abuse in the following homes it operated:
   - Gill Memorial Home, Goulburn, NSW (‘Gill’).
   - Bexley Boys’ Home, Bexley, New South Wales (‘Bexley’)
   - Riverview Training Farm (also known as Endeavour Training Farm), Riverview, Queensland (‘Riverview’)
   - Alkira Salvation Army Home for Boys, Indooroopilly, Queensland (‘Indooroopilly’).
2. The movement between these homes of officers and staff accused of or found to have engaged in child sexual abuse.
3. The Salvation Army’s processes to identify, investigate, discipline, remove or transfer persons accused of or found to have engaged in child sexual abuse in the homes.

We selected this as a case study because:

- The Salvation Army is a large and faith based organisation charity
- The Salvation Army operated a number of boys’ homes in both NSW and Queensland up until the early 1980s
- The Royal Commission received reports of physical and sexual abuse from a number of individuals who had been at a Salvation Army boys’ home
- The Royal Commission is examining institutional responses to child sexual abuse in out-of-home care, and has released Issues Paper No. 4 ‘Preventing Sexual Abuse of Children in Out-of-Home Care’.
Executive summary

1 Salvation Army boys’ homes

The four Salvation Army homes in this case study provided homes for boys who were wards of the State, who suffered from family abuse or neglect or who were sent there by their parents where the parents were unable to look after them because of illness, ‘desertion’ of the father or both parents having to work. Boys were also placed there by courts after being convicted of a criminal offence. Some were there because they had been deemed to be ‘uncontrollable’.

Two of the homes we looked at were in Queensland and two in New South Wales. All of them closed down between 1977 and 1983:
- Indooroopilly (Queensland)
- Riverview (Queensland)
- Bexley (NSW)
- Gill (NSW).

All four homes were officially run by the ‘Eastern Territory’ of The Salvation Army, operating under licences from state child welfare agencies. However, managers at each home had a high level of autonomy and control.

During the public hearing, we heard from former residents who lived in the homes from the late 1950s until the early 1970s. We considered further documentary evidence in victim impact statements that former residents provided to The Salvation Army.

This evidence provided a graphic and shocking account of how boys had been treated.

All of the homes were run in a highly regimented and authoritarian way, with some providing limited education. Former residents told us of brutal sexual abuse at the hands of Salvation Army officers, at times accompanied by extreme physical punishment.

2 The experiences of the boys who gave evidence

The Royal Commission heard evidence from 14 men who as boys had been residents at the four boys’ homes operated by The Salvation Army. The former residents were able to provide us with a picture of conditions in the four boys’ homes from as early as the 1950s through to the 1970s.

The men told us of how they came to be boys in Salvation Army run homes and what life was like in them. Many gave accounts of the physical and sexual abuse they received at the hands of Salvation Army officers and staff. They told us about what happened when some of them attempted to tell the manager or other officers of the home about the abuse they had suffered. Others told us why they did not come forward to make a complaint. Many of the former boys told us of the devastating effects of their physical and sexual abuse throughout their lives.
Many of them had received payments for the abuse they suffered, either through the Redress Scheme operated by the Queensland Government, the claims process operated by The Salvation Army or through civil litigation.

The facilities at the four homes varied. They were often in poor physical condition. Former residents experienced cold and hunger. One government agency recorded that the buildings were in a poor state of repair. Gill was extremely cold in winter, yet officers turned off the old water heaters. At Riverview, the buildings were dilapidated and run-down.

The boys lived under a highly regimented timetable where they were called by a number and activities were scheduled to be performed at fixed times. Their tasks included latrine duty or work at a dairy, piggery, market garden or metal workshop.

The staff provided little emotional support. We heard of a ‘bear pit’ mentality at Bexley, where one boy was told just to ‘get on with it’ when informed that his mother had died.

Finding 1: There was sexual abuse of boys in each of the four homes by officers or employees of The Salvation Army from 1956 until the homes closed. The Salvation Army did not protect the boys from this abuse.

State laws at the time specified that corporal punishment in the homes was to be used as a method ‘of last resort’ and undertaken with either an approved cane or strap. It was never to be administered in front of other children.

Yet at all four homes public, regular and excessive physical punishment occurred, beyond these approved methods. There were ‘punishment parades’ at Indooroopilly and Riverview where boys were hit with a cane or strap in front of other boys.

Punishment was also brutal at times. At Riverview, one boy was dangled head first into a well. Another was tied to a tree with a chain attached to a metal collar. Others were put into a ‘cage’. One was forced to crawl around an oval naked holding a chicken in the air while others stood by laughing.

Harsh physical punishment often went hand in hand with psychological abuse. This included having to sweep the playground with a toothbrush, peel half a sack of potatoes and, in one case, a boy was forced to eat his own vomit. Boys who wet the bed were humiliated in public. Others were told that their parents did not love them. At times, boys were punished without a clear reason.

Finding 2: There was physical abuse of boys in each of the four homes by officers of The Salvation Army which was on occasion brutal. The Salvation Army did not protect the boys from this abuse.

3 Conditions at the homes

Finding 3: There was a culture of frequent physical punishment which was on occasion brutal in all four boys’ homes operated by The Salvation Army from 1956 until their closure, which encouraged fear of officers.

Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse childabuseroyalcommission.gov.au
We heard there was a close association between physical punishment and sexual abuse in the homes. Physical punishment caused boys to fear the officers and was used to coerce them into being sexually abused or into covering it up.

For example, one former boy told of being kicked unconscious when he refused to have sex with an officer. He said he awoke to find the officer raping him. Another said he was threatened if he did not give an officer oral sex.

Finding 4: Sexual abuse of the boys by officers or employees of The Salvation Army in the four homes was often accompanied by physical violence or the threat of physical violence.

Finding 5: Many boys in the four Salvation Army homes were sexually abused by other boys resident in the same home, often accompanied by violence or threats of violence.

The Salvation Army provided evidence that by 14 January 2014, it had received 157 claims of child sexual abuse. Of these, 115 relate to child sexual abuse of former residents of the boys’ homes. We heard directly from residents about abuse that occurred as far back as 1956, but there was documentary evidence of abuse dating back to the 1940s.

Finding 6: Over 100 claims of child sexual abuse were received by The Salvation Army which concerned boys’ homes.

Finding 7: In most cases, boys in the four homes who reported sexual abuse to the manager or other officer were punished, disbelieved, accused of lying or no action was taken.

Finding 8: Many boys in the four homes who had been sexually abused who gave evidence did not report the sexual abuse to anyone because they were scared of punishment by officers or did not think they would be believed.

Many of the survivors gave evidence that they suffered mental illness or problems as a result of the abuse they suffered. One suffered from a multiple personal disorder, others spoke of depression, panic attacks, nervous breakdowns, and being scared of staying in a dark and closed room. Several said they had attempted suicide. Two gave evidence that they were always thinking about or reliving the abuse. Two reported constant nightmares or screaming and thrashing in bed. One said he needed to have the door closed while he slept. One said he could not sleep in the same room as his partner and had learnt to sleep lightly because of his fear of being attacked while he slept.

Many survivors also said that they had trouble trusting or associating with others. They had difficulty connecting with or touching their partners and children, and some were overprotective of the latter because of the survivors’ fears that their children might be abused. Some survivors gave evidence that they were always filled with feelings of anger or hatred.

Two of the survivors who gave evidence reported having spent time in jail since their times in the homes. One said he had spent most of his adult life in jail, and that he had developed a heroin addiction to cope with the abuse.
4 Officers accused of abuse

This case study report also looks at the careers of five Salvation Army officers against whom allegations of sexual abuse at the homes were made:

- Victor Bennett (deceased)
- Lawrence Wilson (deceased)
- Donald Schultz
- John McIver
- X17.

Both Bennett and Wilson worked at all four of the homes at different times. Only one of these five men faced disciplinary proceedings about child sexual abuse at the time they worked in the homes.

We heard evidence that Bennett’s career in The Salvation Army boys’ homes was characterised by physical brutality. Former residents also said he sexually abused them and failed to act on reports of sexual abuse by others. The Salvation Army has since paid considerable compensation to former residents affected by Bennett’s conduct, but Bennett himself died without facing disciplinary action or criminal prosecution.

- Finding 9: Captain Victor Bennett received reports of child sexual abuse from ES, GY and FO and did not report the allegations to the police or to divisional or territorial headquarters of The Salvation Army.
- Finding 10: The Salvation Army accepted that Captain Victor Bennett sexually abused ES, EF and VF.
- Finding 11: Captain Victor Bennett engaged in brutal and excessive punishment of the boys under his care in the period 1960–1973 as manager of Indooroopilly Boys’ Home and as manager of Riverview Boys’ Home.
- Finding 12: Captain Lawrence Wilson frequently used cruel and excessive physical punishment against the boys under his care at Riverview, Gill, Indooroopilly and Bexley Boys’ Homes.
- Finding 13: The Salvation Army accepted that Captain Lawrence Wilson sexually abused Mr Carlile, GB, EX and ET.
- Finding 14: From 1957 to 1975, The Salvation Army did not keep records of Captain Lawrence Wilson’s performance as an officer, including of any allegations against him of child sexual abuse and whether or how they were resolved.
- Finding 15: The Salvation Army did not investigate allegations against Captain Lawrence Wilson in relation to Gill Memorial Home.
- Finding 16: In 1974 and 1975, senior officers of The Salvation Army at divisional and territorial headquarters were informed of allegations of inappropriate medical examinations which involved sexualised conduct and which Captain Lawrence Wilson
carried out. They did not investigate those allegations and no action was taken against Captain Lawrence Wilson.

- **Finding 17:** During Captain Lawrence Wilson’s service as an officer, The Salvation Army did not take any disciplinary action against him for the sexual or physical abuse of boys that occurred at Riverview, Gill, and Indooroopilly boys’ homes.

- **Finding 18:** The Salvation Army accepted that Captain Donald Schultz sexually abused GB.

- **Finding 19:** The Salvation Army and the Department did not refer the allegations of child sexual abuse against Captain Donald Schultz by GG and HN to the police for investigation.

- **Finding 20:** The Salvation Army put GB and other boys at risk of further sexual abuse by Captain Donald Schultz in 1973 by not removing him from his position at Indooroopilly after allegations of sexual abuse had been received.

- **Finding 21:** A senior member of The Salvation Army did not investigate allegations made by Major Randall of child sexual abuse about Indooroopilly Boys’ Home in 1975.

- **Finding 22:** Brigadier Leslie Reddie
  - did not adequately investigate allegations of physical abuse of HM
  - accepted Captain John McIver’s account without further investigation
  - supported the dismissal of the Majors Randall.

- **Finding 23:** In the period 1974–1976, Colonel Gordon Peterson received allegations of physical abuse of HM by Captain John McIver but did not start disciplinary proceedings or refer the matters to the police.

- **Finding 24:** The Salvation Army did not investigate allegations of excessive corporal punishment by Captain John McIver at Indooroopilly, notified to it by the Director of the Department of Children’s Services in May 1975, and took no disciplinary action against Captain John McIver at that time.

- **Finding 25:** Despite Captain X17’s conviction on two charges of indecent assault against a child in his care at Gill Memorial Home, senior members of The Salvation Army recommended that he be reinstated to the Soldier’s Roll six months after his dismissal. That recommendation was not accepted.

5 Oversight of government agencies

Our public hearing also examined the actions of government agencies in Queensland and New South Wales: the relevant children’s welfare departments and police forces.

In Queensland, the Department of Children’s Services licensed the Indooroopilly and Riverview homes and monitored the boys’ welfare. Although its staff were aware of severe punishments, sexual assaults and poor conditions, the department was slow to respond.
Finding 26: From at least 1973, senior officers of the Queensland Department of Children’s Services were well aware of frequent sexual activity between many of the boys at Riverview Boys’ Home, including occasions of rape.

We also looked into evidence from the Queensland Police Service about an alleged child prostitution racket in Brisbane. While police were aware that paedophiles were grooming boys near Indooroopilly in the 1970s, they could not confirm that boys from the home were involved.

In New South Wales, the Department of Child Welfare licensed the Gill and Bexley homes. Department staff regularly reported on the homes but rarely recorded allegations of child sexual abuse.

We conclude that abuse went unreported for several reasons, including limited interaction between visiting staff and boys, and that issues were not generally referred to the police.


Finding 28: In the 1970s, the reports by officers of the Department of Child Welfare about visits to Bexley and Gill:

- were cursory
- displayed a high level of generality
- reported on the general running of the homes rather than on the care of specific children
- only occasionally commented on the children’s care generally.

Finding 29: It is likely that several factors led to sexual abuse not being considered as a cause for the absconding from Bexley Boys’ Home in 1974, including limited contact between officers of the Department of Child Welfare and the boys, and the boys’ reluctance to mention such matters.

We also reviewed NSW Police’s current policies for responding to allegations of child sexual abuse. It keeps and uses important operational information about people of interest, but will not ‘cold-call’ victims in case the process re-traumatises them. After some confusion in 2008, NSW Police and The Salvation Army have set up lines of communication for reporting these matters.

6 The Salvation Army

To fully understand how abuse could have occurred at the homes over such a long period, the public hearing also considered The Salvation Army’s own administration, including:

- the role of managers at the homes
- the handling of any complaints that emerged
- training and turnover of staff
- the transfer of officers between the homes
- eventual apologies and redress.
Finding 30: Between 1965 and 1977, the four Salvation Army boys’ homes were each headed by a manager with a very high degree of control over the boys, the other officers and the staff at the home.

We conclude that The Salvation Army’s policies and procedures were inadequate to oversee managers who were, in some cases, involved in abuse.

Finding 31: Between 1965 and 1977, The Salvation Army’s policies and procedures for oversight of the managers in the four boys’ homes did not enable the prevention or detection of child sexual abuse or excessive punishment.

Because the managers dealt with all complaints (including complaints against themselves), few boys or staff came forward.

Finding 32: Between 1965 and 1977, the divisional and territorial headquarters of The Salvation Army had a practice of deferring to the manager of the boys’ home when a subordinate officer or resident complained about that manager.

Those who did come forward with allegations found that their complaints were unlikely to be believed and these were not referred to the police.

Finding 33: Between 1965 and 1977, The Salvation Army did not have clear policies for reporting allegations of criminal offences to the police.

Finding 34: Between 1965 and 1977 The Salvation Army did not have a system which allowed complaints of child sexual abuse against managers and staff at its four boys’ homes to be independently determined.

We also found that most officers began work in the homes with no child-specific training. As a result, many did not know how to handle suspicions of abuse or to help boys who had been abused. High turnover and staff shortages created more problems, as staff members were too busy to observe and respond to signs of abuse.

Finding 35: Between 1965 and 1977, The Salvation Army failed to provide sufficient appropriately trained staff in its four boys’ homes to ensure an environment suitable for the care and safety of children.

We looked at whether the regular transfer of officers between the four homes allowed for sexual abuse to continue. We conclude that the senior officers responsible for transfer decisions were often, but not always, unaware of allegations rather than deliberately trying to protect offenders.

Finding 36: Between 1965 and 1977, officers who were alleged or found to have engaged in child sexual abuse were transferred between the four boys’ homes.

In the majority of cases, incidents of child sexual abuse were not conveyed to those in The Salvation Army outside the four homes. The senior officer who considered transfers (typically the social services secretary) was simply unaware of allegations because of:

- the inadequate oversight and complaint systems
- the failure to investigate
- the lack of policies and procedures to deal with child sexual abuse.
1 Salvation Army boys’ homes

1.1 Homes in this case study

This case study looks at abuse that occurred in four boys’ homes run by The Salvation Army in New South Wales and Queensland.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principal name</th>
<th>Other name</th>
<th>Short name</th>
<th>Years of operation</th>
<th>State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indooroopilly Boys’ Home</td>
<td>Alkira Salvation Army Home for Boys</td>
<td>Indooroopilly</td>
<td>1898–1977</td>
<td>Qld</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riverview Boys’ Home</td>
<td>Endeavour Training Farm</td>
<td>Riverview</td>
<td>1922–1983</td>
<td>Qld</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bexley Boys’ Home</td>
<td>Charles Kolling Memorial Boys’ Home</td>
<td>Bexley</td>
<td>1915–1979</td>
<td>NSW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gill Memorial Home</td>
<td>Goulburn Boys’ Home</td>
<td>Gill</td>
<td>1936–1980</td>
<td>NSW</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Riverview ‘training farm’

Between 1965 and 1977, Riverview was home to about 50 and 60 boys at any one time. The boys were:
- wards of the State
- suffering from family abuse or neglect
- sent there by their parents.

Riverview also took boys placed by courts after being convicted of a criminal offence. Most convictions were for car theft and ‘break enter and steal’. A small proportion were convicted for ‘sex offences’. About a quarter of the inmates were likely to be Aboriginal.

Indooroopilly

Indooroopilly Boys’ Home was an ‘industrial school’ until 1947. According to research published by the Royal Commission, an industrial school was intended to teach children to be industrious, teach them the value of work and prepare them to support themselves in the future. There was also a hostel where older boys stayed.

Boys at the home attended the local State schools.

Gill

The Gill Memorial Home for Boys opened in 1936 and closed in 1980. The Salvation Army’s documents record that the home took boys where the parents were unable to look after them because of illness, ‘desertion’ of the father or both parents having to work. Other boys were placed there because they had been deemed to be ‘uncontrollable’ or were wards of
the State due to truanting or stealing. Occupancy varied from 65 to 80 boys at any one time in the 1930s and 1940s to 32 to 49 boys in the 1960s.

Bexley

The Salvation Army Home for Boys at North Bexley admitted boys who had been ‘abandoned’ or ‘relinquished’ by their parents. Before 1968, the home only admitted primary school-aged boys. High school boys went to Gill until 1968 when a public high school opened near the home. The boys then stayed at Bexley and went to that public high school. The home had a cottage dormitory for the younger boys.

Other inquiries

The Royal Commission is not the first government inquiry to examine The Salvation Army homes. Other inquiries included:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Report</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Focus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Abuse of Children in Queensland Institutions</td>
<td>Ms Leneen Forde AC</td>
<td>The incidence of abuse in children’s homes, including Riverview and Indooroopilly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Forgotten Australians: A report on Australians who experienced institutional or out-of-home care as children.</td>
<td>Senate Community Affairs References Committee</td>
<td>Conditions and abuse in a large number of homes, including those in this case study</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.2 Structure of The Salvation Army

The Salvation Army was founded in 1865. It first came to Australia in 1880. This was the same year it started giving ordained minsters the title of ‘officer’ and used titles of military rank. It was established in all states of Australia by 1891.

The Salvation Army has four levels of operation:

- international
- territorial
- divisional
- corps.

Today, The Salvation Army’s International Headquarters (IHQ) is in London, headed by General André Cox. IHQ mainly deals with strategic planning, acts as a resource centre, facilitates ideas and policies, and allocates resources.
At the next level are a number of territories. In Australia, The Salvation Army has two: 15

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Territory</th>
<th>Areas covered</th>
<th>Headquarters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>Victoria, Tasmania, Western Australia, South Australia and the Northern Territory</td>
<td>Melbourne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>New South Wales, Queensland and the ACT</td>
<td>Sydney</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A territorial commander heads up each territory, helped by a chief secretary (usually a colonel) and other secretaries. 16 At the time of the public hearing, the territorial commander of the Eastern Territory was Commissioner James Condon.

Leadership is structured according to rank. Officers generally progress as follows: 17

- **Cadet**: a soldier attending The College for Officer Training
- **Lieutenant**: graduate of two years cadet training
- **Captain**: five years of service and further advanced training
- **Major**: 15 years of service
- **Lieutenant-colonel and colonel**: appointed by the General
- **Commissioner**: appointed by the General but may hold a senior rank.

The Salvation Army’s children’s homes were divided by gender between 1950 and 1983. A men’s social services secretary at territorial headquarters oversaw the boys homes, with an equivalent women’s secretary for the girls homes.

The social services secretaries reported through the chief secretary to the territorial commander. The territorial social services secretaries, the chief secretary and the territorial commander were in Sydney. There was also a Queensland state social secretary located at divisional headquarters in Brisbane. 18

The managerial structure of the homes was generally as follows:

- The senior ranking Salvation Army officer in the home was the manager. He was usually a captain, although sometimes a major.
- The matron was often the wife of the manager. She had a limited managerial role that included cleaning, cooking and laundry.
- The second officer was the second highest-ranking Salvation Army officer at the home.
- ‘House parents’ were married and were low-ranking officers who lived in the dormitories with the boys.
- Other staff were cooks, laundry staff and farm hands.

The manager was responsible for the home. He received and dealt with complaints and disciplined residents. Managers were accountable to both the divisional and territorial headquarters staff. Headquarters staff had to inspect the homes they operated each year. However, managers had a very high level of control over the homes, which they exercised with only limited supervision by either headquarters.

The Salvation Army children’s homes also operated under government licences.
In New South Wales, the Child Welfare Department administered the Child Welfare Act 1939, which licensed ‘Places Established or Used for the Reception of Children apart from their Parents’.

Under the Act, a department officer could:

- inspect the homes to ensure they complied with the Act
- be accompanied by a medical practitioner, police constable or both, who could examine the children.

In Queensland, boys’ homes operated with a licence under the Children’s Services Act 1965. The Department of Children’s Services monitored the homes and determined whether to maintain or withdraw a licence.

Section 5 details how these agencies dealt with the homes.
2  The experiences of the boys

In this section we set out the evidence of former residents at the public hearing. Their accounts are set out under the home where they lived.

The Salvation Army did not question any of these accounts.

We notified individual Salvation Army officers who were still alive and who were the subject of allegations of sexual or other abuse and invited them to seek leave to appear. We received no applications from such persons before the close of evidence. Where it was impractical to notify some of these officers, we gave them a pseudonym.

2.1 Riverview

Raymond Carlile

Mr Carlile was a ward of the State and placed at Riverview for about three years from 1954 to 1957. He was aged seven to 11 years old. He and his brother were wards of the state because of domestic violence in their family.

Mr Carlile told us that every Wednesday night at Riverview there was a punishment line-up in the recreation room. Mr Carlile told us that, at the line-up, all the boys who had misbehaved were caned on their hands, feet, legs or buttocks. Other boys were made to watch. Once, Mr Carlile said he saw a boy pass out from Lieutenant Laurence Wilson’s punishment. Another time, he saw Wilson cane a young boy’s fingers even though they were bleeding. Wilson was a Probationary Lieutenant at Riverview Boys’ Home when Mr Carlile lived there. Wilson worked at all four of the homes.

Mr Carlile said that punishment at Riverview was not limited to the line-up on Wednesday nights. All Salvation Army officers meted out punishment. He said that the physical beatings by Salvation Army officers were frequent and often brutal. The Salvation Army officers used ‘anything they can get their hands on’.

For example, Mr Carlile saw Wilson and another officer going into a ‘frenzy of flogging’, belting any boy in sight with a strap. On his first day at Riverview, Mr Carlile said he was held back from going to school because the bruising on his body was so bad from the physical abuse.

Mr Carlile described one occasion when he was dangled head first into a well:

It started when we were playing a game of hide and seek one night … I felt someone grab me by the hair and pull me up on to my feet and gave me a hell of a slap …

It was one of the officers, I couldn’t see because they shone the torch in my eyes. He dragged me across to where all the boys were lined up outside the rec room, and the officers had torches there, and they kept on sort of just slapping me … [and] these two other officers took me around to the side, towards where this big well thing
was, and one of them said, ‘We'll get the rope’, and I immediately thought ... they're going to hang me ... I was terrified, absolutely really terrified.

Then they got the rope, they tied it around both feet, and they put me down inside this well, and I could hear someone screaming ... I didn't realise, but it was me that was doing the screaming in the well, and they eventually dragged me out of it. When they took me out, I was in so much fear that I'd messed myself and urinated myself and then they threw me on the ground and gave me a kick and a punch and said I was a filthy little beast ... 

Mr Carlile said that Wilson sexually abused him at Riverview on a regular basis until Mr Carlile left Riverview in 1957. 

On a separate occasion, Mr Carlile said that Wilson brought another boy to his bedroom and made Mr Carlile have sex with the other boy while Wilson masturbated himself. 

Mr Carlile did not report the physical or sexual abuse because several Salvation Army officers at Riverview told him that if he did say anything, this would lead to a worse beating.

After leaving Riverview, Mr Carlile went back to live with his mother. At that time, he did not know the difference between affection and abuse and could never let his mother touch him. His long-term effects included feeling suicidal, running away and inflicting physical pain on those around him.

Under the Queensland Redress Scheme, Mr Carlile received $14,000. He reported the abuse to The Salvation Army around 2004 and in 2010 received an ‘ex-gratia’ payment of $100,000.

The Salvation Army accepts that Raymond Carlile was sexually abused as a child by Salvation Army officer Lieutenant Lawrence Wilson at Riverview Boys' Home in 1957.

EG

The Children’s Services Department removed EG and his older brother from their family home and made them wards of the state. They were taken to Riverview. EG lived there from 1953, when he was five, until he was 11. He returned for about two years when he was 15.

EG remembers that at Dinmore Primary School, the boys from Riverview were ‘ostracised for being home boys’ and the teachers did not seem to pay them attention. EG never received any formal training in farm skills at Riverview.

EG also recalled a punishment line-up every week where the resident boys watched The Salvation Army officers punish boys. EG said that when a young boy at Riverview had wet the bed, that boy, while naked and wet, would be flogged with a cane or a leather strap to make the beatings more painful.

EG said he saw a boy tied to a tree in front of Captain Cowling’s house with a metal collar connected to a chain. Captain Cowling was the manager of Riverview. EG also said that Lieutenant Spratt often flogged the boys first for breaking the rules, and then reported the
boys to the manager who would again flog them.\textsuperscript{45} Spratt, as a lieutenant was the lowest ranking officer in The Salvation Army.

EG said that Spratt would ‘froth at the mouth when he carried out the beatings’. He often did not give the boys any reason for the flogging.\textsuperscript{46}

EG was not sexually abused by Wilson but said that he suspected Wilson sexually abused other boys at Riverview.\textsuperscript{47} On one occasion, Wilson enticed EG to come to his room and sit on his lap by offering lollies to EG.\textsuperscript{48} When EG tried to run away after receiving the lollies, Wilson grabbed EG, pulled his pants down and hit EG repeatedly with his leather slipper on EG’s backside.\textsuperscript{49}

In 1958, EG’s mother picked EG and his brother up from Riverview for the first time since they were admitted in 1953:

> And my mum went to pull me in close to her. I pulled away. I didn’t know who she was. And then when we got home from Riverview, after months, because mum had to – she had to get to know me again, you know, I had to get to know her. When we got home, my mother said to us, ‘Didn’t you ever get any of them letters or Christmas cards or birthday cards we sent you?’ … Anyway, when we told her that we never got any at all, she just walked in her room and shut the door. We knew she was crying.\textsuperscript{50}

In 2009, EG received $14,000 from the Queensland Redress Scheme.\textsuperscript{51} In 2010, he received a $60,000 ex-gratia payment from The Salvation Army.\textsuperscript{52}

FP

FP became a ward of the state around 1956 when he was eight. He spent most of his childhood in boys’ homes and orphanages in Queensland.\textsuperscript{53} He lived at Riverview from 14 to when he was 16.\textsuperscript{54}

Captain Cowling was the manager of Riverview for the time FP was there. FP said the boys did not like him.\textsuperscript{55} When Cowling went on leave, Captain Bennett took charge. Envoy Mann was another Salvation Army officer at Riverview. FP said that he hit boys with a stock whip.\textsuperscript{56}

During the day, FP’s chores included picking up bales of hay in the fields and taking them to the hay shed. He also took cases of fruit and vegetables to the kitchen.\textsuperscript{57} FP also buried animals when they died. On one occasion, FP was punished for not burying a dead animal deep enough. Three days after he had buried the dead cow, the carcass came back out from the ground. Because of this, FP says he received ‘one of the biggest floggings’ in his life from Cowling.\textsuperscript{58}

FP gave evidence that he had been told by the other boys at Riverview that Spratt had touched them in the showers.\textsuperscript{59} FP said Spratt touched his backside one time in the showers.\textsuperscript{60} FP said that on another occasion he saw Spratt touch another boy’s penis in the showers.\textsuperscript{61}
Over four years at Riverview, FP said GO and GU, two older boys at the home, routinely sexually abused him. The first time was at the saddlery on the farm when he was about 12. We heard that this happened at least six times.

When FP told other boys what had happened, GO and GU found out and beat him. FP was scared every time GO and GU approached him at Riverview. FP said that he was not the only boy there who GO and GU sexually abused.

FP did not report the sexual abuse to The Salvation Army officers because he knew that The Salvation Army officers would not believe him and he knew he would be flogged for ‘telling lies’. He also did not make any complaints about sexual abuse to the State welfare officers who visited the home because of fear of punishment by Salvation Army officers.

In 2008, FP received $40,000 from the Queensland Redress Scheme. In 2008, he received a further $40,000 ‘ex-gratia’ payment from The Salvation Army. Since 2008, FP has been organising reunions at Riverview for former residents, with The Salvation Army’s help.

The Salvation Army accepts that FP was sexually abused as a child by GO and GU, two older boys at Riverview Boys’ Home in the period 1962–1964.

The Salvation Army accepts that FP was physically abused as a child by Salvation Army officer Captain Cowling at Riverview Boys’ Home in the period 1962–1964.

EY

EY spent two years at Riverview from 1972 when he was 12. He also lived at other boys’ homes.

Captain Bennett was the manager of Riverview at the time. EY said Bennett disciplined boys in his office. Bennett made the boys bend across the table and he flogged them using a ‘cut-throat razor leather strap’. EY said that he often did not know the reason for the punishment. He said he can still recall Bennett’s ‘angry look when he was punishing the boys at Riverview’.

EY also told us that when he was about 12, he was sexually abused by an older boy of 16 or 17. EY initially did not know whether to say anything about this sexual abuse. Four or five days after it happened, EY built up the courage to tell Captain Bennett:

When I saw Captain Bennett come out of his house on my way to the hall for dinner, I thought that it was a good opportunity to talk to him in private. I walked up to him and I said, ‘Captain Bennett, something’s happened to me’. I thought I could have said something a little differently and specify what had happened, but it was embarrassing even to say anything to Captain Bennett at the time.

Captain Bennett replied, ‘If you don’t get over to the dining room something will happen to you’. This shocked me. I wanted to say something to Captain Bennett because I was so scared that something would happen to me again if nothing was done. But when I finally mustered enough courage to actually say something, there was no response or protection from Captain Bennett. After the response from Captain Bennett, I felt that I had no other choice but to run away.
In around 2007, EY received $21,000 under the Queensland redress scheme.  

The Salvation Army accepts that EY was sexually abused as a child by an older boy at Riverview Boys’ Home in 1957 in the period 1972–1974.

The Salvation Army accepts that, in the period 1972–1974, Captain Victor Bennett did not:
- take any steps to investigate or discipline the perpetrator or
- protect EY after EY reported sexual abuse by an older boy at Riverview.

EE

EE was sent to Indooroopilly in 1969 at the age of 10. Later that year he was transferred to Riverview at around the time Captain Bennett took over as manager.

EE gave evidence that he was punished by Captain Bennett when he broke a rotary hoe blade. He said Bennett ‘went ballistic’ and started punching EE with closed fists and kicking him with his boots on.

EE also gave evidence that punishment parades took place at Riverview in 1969.

EE spoke of Bennett once locking him and others in a ‘cage’. He said Bennett then walked into the cage and ‘bashed all of us’. EE also slept in the cage, where there were no beds or blankets. On another occasion, he said Bennett banged his head against the wall for ‘keeping secrets’ and being a ‘liar’.

EE said that a boy of 14 or 15 put his hand down EE’s pants and played with his genitals. The boy threatened EE and said ‘You tell anybody, or let anybody know that I’m doing this to you, and you watch out.’ Then EE said the boy made EE perform oral sex on him and masturbate him. EE said the sexual abuse took place more than 10 times and in different locations, including the piggery. EE said, ‘You had to fight to survive, because if you didn’t fight to survive, the bigger guys would pick on you, and try to molest you.’

The abuse he experienced has meant he has difficulty communicating with and trusting people. EE said, ‘if I get to know you I’ll let my window down. I have a window that I put up that protects me. ... [P]eople I don’t feel safe with, I get kind of scared and frightened and I do not like to hang around them.’

In 2009, EE received $29,000 from the Queensland Redress Scheme. Around 2008, EE told The Salvation Army of the abuse at Riverview and received an ex-gratia payment of $30,000.

The Salvation Army accepts that EE was sexually abused as a child by an older boy at Riverview Boys’ Home in the period 1969–1970.

EE also gave evidence that punishment parades took place at Riverview in 1969.

EE spoke of Bennett once locking him and others in a ‘cage’. He said Bennett then walked into the cage and ‘bashed all of us’. EE also slept in the cage, where there were no beds or blankets. On another occasion, he said Bennett banged his head against the wall for ‘keeping secrets’ and being a ‘liar’.

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The abuse he experienced has meant he has difficulty communicating with and trusting people. EE said, ‘if I get to know you I’ll let my window down. I have a window that I put up that protects me. ... [P]eople I don’t feel safe with, I get kind of scared and frightened and I do not like to hang around them.’

In 2009, EE received $29,000 from the Queensland Redress Scheme. Around 2008, EE told The Salvation Army of the abuse at Riverview and received an ex-gratia payment of $30,000.

The Salvation Army accepts that EE was sexually abused as a child by an older boy at Riverview Boys’ Home in the period 1969–1970.
ES was born in 1958 and lived in several children’s homes in Queensland, New South Wales and Victoria. While at Riverview, ES said he did not receive any schooling.

ES told us that Bennett physically and sexually abused him at Riverview. The physical abuse by Bennett occurred within a couple of days of ES’s arrival. ES said that he received punishment from Bennett nearly every day while he was at Riverview:

[Bennett] was just a bastard. I felt he had a hatred for me as soon as I got to Riverview. He took a disliking to me for some reason, and the fact I just wouldn’t do what they told me to do. He tried to break me.

ES gave one example of when he ran away. When caught, he soiled himself because he was so scared about returning. Bennett later laid ES on the ground outside and turned a hose ‘on full bore’ between his legs so that the water entered ES’s anus. While Bennett was doing this, he encouraged the boys watching to laugh along.

On another occasion when ES soiled his pants, he said Bennett made ES sit naked on a drum-like structure located under the verandah of the recreation room for a number of hours. The metal edge of the drum dug deep into ES’s backside and ES was in excruciating pain. Bennett told the boys that ES had soiled his pants and encouraged the other boys to laugh along.

ES gave evidence that Bennett humiliated him when one of Bennett’s chickens, which ES had been looking after, died. ES said Bennett made him take his clothes off and crawl around the oval naked holding the chicken up in the air. Boys stood around while ES was being punished and laughed at him.

ES also confirmed boys were locked up in a cage on the veranda, which had a steel floor. He said Bennett regularly locked him in the cage, sometimes for a couple of weeks at a time. Because it was so frequent, ES lost count of the number of times he was locked up. He said that Bennett ‘would take you in there and kick the living shit out of you [and] punched into you like as if you were a man’.

Once, when ES and another boy were locked in the cage at Riverview Bennett gave them an extra punishment of going down to the river to cut lantana. At the river, ES said he was sexually abused by GN, an older boy who was about 17 or 18 and physically bigger. When ES told Bennett about the sexual abuse, Bennett responded by sticking a towel in ES’s mouth and, ES said, anally penetrating him in his office.

The experience of ES also shows the relationship between physical and sexual abuse:

I started to get sent to the office for no reason and the Captain would show me his penis and play with mine. I was made to suck his penis while he ejaculated one time. I was gasping and crying so he hit me over the head and said he would cane me if I didn’t shut up. I remember on more than one occasion being made to bend over the desk with my pants down to be belted. He would touch my rectum. He put his finger
inside me one time and then played with my genitals. He then used the strap on my bare backside.\textsuperscript{109}

Caseworkers from the Department of Children’s Services came and spoke to ES each month.\textsuperscript{110} He said that a welfare worker talked to him while he was in the cage at least once.\textsuperscript{111} When he told Mr Lobban from the department what had happened and why he was in the cage,\textsuperscript{112} Mr Lobban had him transferred to Bulimba Hostel.\textsuperscript{113}

Once, after absconding from Riverview, ES was caught by the police. He told officers at Ipswich about the cage\textsuperscript{114} and what Salvation Army officers were doing to him.\textsuperscript{115} The police rang Captain Bennett to ask whether the allegations were true. When Bennett denied them, ES said the police took no further action.\textsuperscript{116}

Around 2010, ES contacted The Salvation Army through the support service Lotus Place and received a $70,000 ex-gratia payment.\textsuperscript{117}

The Salvation Army accepts that ES was physically and sexually abused as a child by Salvation Army officer Captain Victor Bennett at Riverview in the period 1974–1975.

The Salvation Army accepts that ES was sexually abused as a child by GN, an older boy at Riverview in the period 1974–1975.

The Salvation Army accepts that Captain Victor Bennett received reports of child sexual abuse from ES and on two occasions punished ES for reporting.

Other allegations about Riverview

In addition to the men who gave evidence, the Royal Commission received other accounts from men who lived at Riverview as boys. These were in the form of victim impact statements or police statements.

Another boy at Riverview, HP, said he recalled trying to defend his brother from being sexually abused by Salvation Army officer given the pseudonym X10.\textsuperscript{118} HP was sent to the recreation room where he was stripped and flogged with a belt by Spratt, Cowley and Mann. The other boys at Riverview were told to come and watch the punishment and HP said the experience was extremely humiliating.\textsuperscript{119}

HP described how Mann approached him in the toilets at the piggery at Riverview. He said that Mann tried to have sex with him and, when he attempted to escape, he was tripped and kicked until he was unconscious.\textsuperscript{120} He said he later awoke to find Mann penetrating his anus. HP said that Mann also tried to sexually abuse him at other times but was unsuccessful.\textsuperscript{121}

In a victim impact statement, GK said that he woke up in the middle of the night with Wilson on top of him and that Wilson anally penetrated him.\textsuperscript{122} Another night he said he woke to find Wilson’s penis in his mouth.\textsuperscript{123}

Another former Riverview resident, HQ, said that Salvation Army officer X10 took him back to X10’s room at night to sexually abuse him, including oral sex and masturbation.\textsuperscript{124}
HQ also alleged that X13, an older boy, sexually abused him. X13 first tried to abuse his brother but HQ woke up because of his brother’s screams and jumped on X13 to protect him. After that, HQ said that X13 returned to abuse both of them in the night.

### 2.2 Indooroopilly

**Wallace McLeod**

Mr McLeod was made a ward of the State when his father died in 1955. He went to Indooroopilly in December 1960 at the age of 12. In 1962, he was transferred to Riverview where he stayed until he turned 18 in 1966.

Mr McLeod spent two Christmases at Indooroopilly. He said officers took away from the boys’ lockers presents boys received for Christmas and never returned them. For example, a fountain pen and pencil set that Mr McLeod received from his grandfather was taken away by a Salvation Army officer and never returned.

Bennett was the manager at Indooroopilly during Mr McLeod’s time there. Mr McLeod described Bennett as a violent man and said he saw him grab boys as young as four years old by the shirt and punch them several times with his fist for no apparent reason.

Mr McLeod gave evidence of regular punishment by Bennett:

One of his frequently used punishments was to use a cane to hit boys, the end of which … had a split in it. When Captain Bennett swung the cane down he’d jump so that he would land at the same time as the cane made impact, which would give him maximum impact. The split would then pinch your skin which would result in blood blisters. This was a frequent punishment for things like not eating your meal or talking in the dormitory.

Mr McLeod said on one occasion Spratt grabbed him by the hair and bashed his head against a brick wall six to eight times. He said he did not know why. He recalls being hit 24 times by Cowling when he was at Riverview.

Mr McLeod recalled the ‘punishment parade’ at Indooroopilly in the recreation room where officers hit the boys on their buttocks in front of the other boys and staff. Mr McLeod said that, during one parade, he saw blood running down a boy’s backside when Mann flogged him with a strap made from a horse harness.

Mr McLeod recalled one flogging he received:

I was required by Salvation Army officers at Riverview to remove all my clothing from the waist down, including my underpants, and to bend over and touch my toes in order to be hit repeatedly. On one occasion I can recall counting the number of strikes I received in one flogging from Captain Cowling, I counted 24 hits to my backside.

Mr McLeod says he suffered a nervous breakdown in 1972. He did not tell psychologists about the abuse as he feared they would not believe him. Mr McLeod was diagnosed...
Mr McLeod received two payments from The Salvation Army: $20,000 in 2002 and $10,000 in 2007.\textsuperscript{140}

The Salvation Army accepts that Wallace McLeod was physically abused by Captain Bennett at Indooroopilly at times between December 1960 and June 1962.

The Salvation Army also accepts that Wallace McLeod was physically abused as a child by Captain Cowling and Envoy Mann, at Riverview in the 1960s.

\textbf{EF}

EF was a ward of the State until he turned 18.\textsuperscript{141} He lived in various homes from 1962 until 1966 when he went to Indooroopilly for about a year at the age of eight.\textsuperscript{142}

At Indooroopilly, EF said that the boys ate dried oats and dry toast for breakfast and Vegemite sandwiches for lunch. At dinnertime, they had burnt sausages and half-cooked potatoes while the officers ate roast chicken and drank wine.\textsuperscript{143}

He said that boys often had to complete physical and menial chores. At Indooroopilly, EF was given latrine duty, which involved emptying toilets with a bucket and without any other cleaning equipment. He dug holes at the back of the building to empty the buckets.\textsuperscript{144}

EF also recalled that the boys at Indooroopilly attended punishment parades. Bennett was the manager at the time, and EF said he was the only officer who could discipline the boys. They lined up at the front of the hostel and were called out by Bennett who hit them with a cane, strap or pieces of wood on the back of knees, sometimes producing blood and bruises.\textsuperscript{145}

EF ran away from Indooroopilly many times and said Bennett abused him on his return. EF said that on one occasion when he ran away, the police picked him up and he told the police about the abuse at Indooroopilly and that he was too scared and afraid to go back.\textsuperscript{146} He said the police did not take the matter further. When other Salvation Army officers visited Indooroopilly, Bennett told the boys that they were not allowed to have any contact with the visitors.\textsuperscript{147}

EF told us of another instance of physical humiliation at Indooroopilly:

\begin{quote}
On a day in the middle of winter in 1966, I was stripped down naked by Captain Bennett who then tied besser block bricks to my legs and threw me in the pool at Indooroopilly. Every time I tried to climb out of the pool, Captain Bennett pushed me back in. At the time I could not swim, but I managed to somehow get to the other end of the pool and pull myself out. I recall that the other boys saw what Captain Bennett did to me that day. On other occasions, I saw Captain Bennett throwing other boys with besser block bricks tied to their legs, into the pool.\textsuperscript{148}
\end{quote}
EF told us that Bennett hit the boys at Indooroopilly with his hand, a piece of wood or ‘anything he could get his hands on’. He said that sometimes the canes had nails at the end of them.

EF said Bennett arranged for boys to fight, and he and the other Salvation Army officers would prevent other boys from breaking up a fight.

EF said Bennett both physically and sexually abused him.

When EF told a Salvation Army officer at Indooroopilly about the sexual abuse by Bennett the officer said that his hands were tied and he could not do anything to prevent it. The officer said he could not do anything because he was worried about the consequences it would have on his own employment.

EF stated that boys who complained about the abuse and treatment at Indooroopilly were characterised as liars by Bennett, and retribution for reporting abuse included further physical and sexual punishment. EF said, ‘I concluded that it did not matter if I reported the abuse to Salvation Army officers at Indooroopilly. It also did not matter if I ran away from Indooroopilly and reported the abuse to non-Salvation Army officers, because I thought no one would believe me’.

EF told us he was robbed of his childhood, does not socialise much and does not easily trust people: ‘I spend 90 per cent of my time at home, looking at the four walls that surround me. I cannot show affection or feelings. The feeling that I know, and have, is hatred.’

EF received $11,000 from The Salvation Army, $25,000 from the Uniting Church for abuse at its Stewart House, and $30,000 from the Queensland Redress Scheme.

The Salvation Army accepts that EF was physically and sexually abused as a child multiple times by Salvation Army officer Captain Victor Bennett at Indooroopilly in 1966.

GB

We also heard of GB’s experience at Indooroopilly through a victim impact statement to The Salvation Army that was tendered in the public hearing. On his very first day, Wilson told GB to get into his swimming trunks to go to the pool. Schultz is said to have pushed GB into the pool but dragged him out when he started to sink and took him to the shower block. Schultz then allegedly pulled GB’s trunks down and performed oral sex on him, before digitally penetrating GB’s anus.

After dinner that day, Wilson called GB to his office, made him kneel down and allegedly told him to ‘suck him off’. Wilson said, ‘If you don’t do things, it will come down hard on you’, and GB said he complied.

GB said that abuse by Wilson happened regularly when he was at Indooroopilly. He said Schultz abused him on another occasion.

During his time at Indooroopilly, Wilson often subjected boys to ‘medical inspections’. Majors Clifford and Marina Randall who were the house parents recounted the routine of Wilson’s ‘sick parade’, during which Wilson physically inspected boys in private in a
dedicated room. Sexual abuse did take place according to GB, whose victim impact statement used the third person:

Captain Wilson, who always seemed to know if ... boys had been penetrated, took GB into his office and made him drop his pants to his ankles. He made him bend over the desk. Wilson spread his buttocks apart and he said ‘Whose [sic] been at you?’ He was suggesting that the other boy’s [sic] were the ones who penetrated GB. He seemed to enjoy the suggestion that it was the other boys. He would then insert his finger into GB’s anus and say ‘yes, you’ve been got at!’ He was always asking if the boy’s [sic] were ‘fucking each other’. The other boys could witness all of this from the dormitory. Wilson closed the blind of the office and with GB still standing with his pants around his ankles, and bent over the desk, he would bang GB’s head face down into the desk. He would tell GB not to move and then he would penetrate GB and have intercourse with him. This abuse by Capt Wilson happened on a regular basis until the day GB left the boy’s [sic] home.  

The Salvation Army accepts that GB was sexually abused as a child by Salvation Army officers Captain Lawrence Wilson and Donald Schultz at Indooroopilly in 1973.

EX

A document from former Indooroopilly resident EX alleged that, on his first day in 1972, Wilson came into his room and put his hand under the blanket, down EX’s pyjamas, and touched EX’s penis and testicles. EX did not tell anyone because he was scared and there was no one he could tell.

On another occasion, Wilson told EX to come in early from playing and to do extra chores for misbehaving. EX said that Wilson took him into his bed, made him strip, and put EX’s hand on his penis. EX pulled away, and told Wilson to leave him alone. EX alleged that Wilson then put EX’s penis in his mouth. After this incident, Wilson came to EX’s bed after the lights went out, sat on the edge of the bed, put his hand under the blanket and allegedly played with EX’s genitals while he touched his own penis.

EX recounted Wilson severely beating him, including on bare buttocks while he was stretched across Wilson’s desk.

The Salvation Army accepts that EX was sexually abused as a child multiple times by Salvation Army officer Captain Lawrence Wilson at Indooroopilly in 1973.

Other allegations about Indooroopilly

In addition to the men who gave evidence and the statements referred to above, the Royal Commission received other accounts from men who lived at Indooroopilly.

EB said he was raped and sustained beatings and other physical abuse by Wilson. He also reported emotional abuse and Wilson repeatedly telling him he was ‘useless’ and ‘worthless’.
HQ and his brother said that they were abused by the Salvation Army officer given the pseudonym X13. They reported X13’s abuse to Smith, but HQ said nothing was done.172

GE alleged Wilson flogged him with a strap while he was forced to hold a 'push-up' position naked, and subsequently sexually abused him, including oral sex and anal penetration.173

FI also alleged sexual abuse by Wilson at Indooroopilly, including being touched on the genitals and brushed up against. FI reported being flogged on the buttocks until he was ‘black and blue’.174

GG’s allegations included Schultz kissing GG and other boys, examining his testicles, getting into bed three times with GG and touching GG’s penis while in bed.175

HN said he reported to the department’s childcare officer on 5 July 1973 that Schultz touched his ‘private parts’ outside the clothing he was wearing.176

GY reported to Bennett that his brother HI was taken away from the home by a man and a woman and repeatedly sexually abused. GY said that Bennett said nothing to HI. HI was never sent to the couple again.177

FO, another boy at Indooroopilly from 1969 to 1973, alleged that he was sexually abused on several occasions by a man. FO ran away from Indooroopilly and was brought back by a police officer, who informed Bennett of the allegations of sexual abuse. Bennett then severely beat FO for ‘lying’.178 FO was also at Riverview from 1972 to 1973 where another boy sexually abused him. He said when he informed Bennett of the abuse occurring to him and other boys, Bennett labelled him a ‘troublemaker’.

EK alleged that McIver sexually abused him at Indooroopilly in 1974. EK said he was masturbated, required to perform oral sex on McIver and anally raped by him. EK says that he suffers from a number of psychological injuries because of this abuse.179

2.3 Gill

GH

In early 1966, GH’s grandmother took GH and two of his older brothers to a courthouse in Goulburn. GH went to Gill in 1966 after he turned five and left in 1977 at 15.180 He was one of the youngest boys there and his number was ‘73’181 During his time at Gill, there were different managers: X3, X11, and Captain Wilson.182

According to GH, there was emotional abuse at Gill. He said that X11 punished him when he wet the bed. We heard that X11 rubbed GH’s face into the wet bed sheets, made him parade in front of other boys, and made him have a cold shower in winter.183 GH also said that X11 frequently caned him for wetting the bed or other minor infractions.

Other punishments included making GH sweep the playground with a toothbrush, peel half a sack of potatoes, clean 50 pairs of shoes, clean the pigeon cage and wash the bus. When another boy vomited at the table after eating junket and prunes, GH said X11 made the boy eat his own vomit.184 GH recalled X11 carried his cane everywhere, including the showers, and once hit him on the penis with it.185
In about 1968 or 1969, GH said an older boy at the home sexually abused him in the locker room. GH was so terrified he made sure never to be alone with the older boy again.\footnote{186} GH did not tell anybody about what had happened because he was too scared to do so. GH said that he was scared of being singled out, because he was used to getting caned if he went for help or complained about something.\footnote{187}

GH recalled a photographer who was neither employed nor associated with The Salvation Army, coming to Gil. He took GH and other boys to a creek bed in a secluded bush area near Bungonia Gorge or Braidwood. The photographer made the boys undress and took photos of them naked. The photographer told the boys, ‘Don’t tell anybody, you’re my special people; this is our special place. And I [have] got pictures to remember you by’.\footnote{188}

GH left Gill in March 1977 and was made a ward of the State until he turned 18. He lived in a house staffed by Salvation Army officers next to Gill and looked after himself until leaving school in December 1977.

In 2006, Captain Chris Witts contacted GH and requested a victim impact statement about his time at Gill. GH later received a $60,000 ex-gratia payment from The Salvation Army and was offered counselling sessions and payment for a holiday in crisis accommodation for men.\footnote{189} GH later received an extra $10,000 less $1,500 in legal fees.

GH is an active Salvationist today and said that The Salvation Army helped him many times, including finding work. He still suffers from anxiety and depression and has suicidal thoughts.\footnote{190} GH also said he has been diagnosed with obesity, asthma, bipolar disorder, sleep apnoea, post-traumatic stress disorder, stress-related illness and psoriasis because of the abuse at Gill.

The Salvation Army accepts that GH was subjected to cruel and harsh treatment as a child by Salvation Army officer Captain X11 at Gill in the period March 1966 and January 1968.

The Salvation Army accepts that GH was sexually abused as a child by an older boy at Gill in the period 1968–1969.

The Salvation Army accepts that GH was sexually abused as a child by Salvation Army officer Captain X11 at Gill in the period 1966–1970.

**Mark Stiles**

Mr Stiles was admitted to Gill at the age of 12 in 1971. His mother could not look after him.\footnote{191} He stayed there for about a year.

Gill was in the south of the State and cold in winter. Despite the cold, Mark Stiles told us that The Salvation Army officers turned off the old hot water heaters because they were apparently too expensive to run. The boys at Gill were constantly hungry.\footnote{192}

Each boy at Gill was also assigned chores. Mr Stiles’ chores included filling the furnace with the previous day’s garbage. He usually did this without wearing shoes and wearing only shorts and a t-shirt, even on very cold mornings.\footnote{193} Mr Stiles also helped the cook to move stock.
Captain Wilson was the manager for the duration of the time that Mr Stiles was at Gill. Mr Stiles gave evidence that Wilson physically hit him and many other boys. Lieutenant X17 was also at Gill at the same time.

Stiles gave evidence that Wilson was ‘a vicious, hateful man and in my experience, the cruellest man I have ever met’. Mr Stiles saw Wilson hit a boy who had scars all over his chest from a burn. The boy had a wound on his chest that leaked and wept. Mr Stiles said he saw Wilson hit the boy with an open palm and a full swing of his arm on multiple occasions.

Mr Stiles saw Wilson hit and kick an 8-year-old boy ‘down the dining room’ because the boy had dropped his fork, even though he had only arrived at Gill the night before.

Mr Stiles described Wilson as follows:

He liked people to live in fear of him. Every day someone would be the recipient of his physical abuse. He would hit us with his open palm, a ruler, a strap or with his belt. However, I never saw him punch anybody with a closed fist, but he often hit with an open hand, repeatedly. One day he accused me of stealing matches and he hit me around the back of the neck and the ear, hitting me all the way from the playground to the kitchen, which was around 200 paces.

In my experience I could not rely on any of the other officers to intervene to protect me. Captain Wilson had ultimate authority at the home, and I believe that the other officers were scared of him. Wilson was the authoritarian, so dished out most of the physical beltings. He hit me in the ribs with an open palm once and years later the doctor told me I had had a broken rib.

Within four to six weeks of Mr Stiles’ arrival at Gill, he said that X17 started sexually abusing him. He said the abuse occurred at least four days a week and continued until two weeks before he left Gill in December 1972. On one occasion, Mr Stiles said he was dragged out of bed by X17 at around 3.00 am for making noise. He was then made to scrub the toilets in the bathroom with a toothbrush. X17 then fondled him and then penetrated him.

Mr Stiles said that during the period of time in which X17 was sexually abusing him, he and another boy escaped from Gill. The police later picked them up. Mr Stiles told the police officers that Wilson had been physically abusing the boys and said that X17 had been sexually abusing him. Mr Stiles said the police officer hit Mr Stiles across the neck and side of the head and took Mr Stiles and the other boy back to the home. When he returned, Wilson hit Mr Stiles on the head, chest and upper body with his open palm for ‘telling lies’. Mr Stiles absconded for a second time and was picked up by the police. He did not tell the police anything about the abuse because of the severe beating he had received previously.

Mr Stiles considered he could not report the abuse to any Salvation Army officers. For the duration of his stay, Mr Stiles did not see any other Salvation Army officers from the Sydney headquarters, nor did he see or speak to any welfare officers from the Department of Child Welfare.

Mr Stiles said he did not report the sexual abuse by X17 because he was too scared to do so as X17 was a very physically powerful man. He was also dissuaded from reporting because boys who complained at Gill were called liars or troublemakers.
Mr Stiles says that he does not have much capacity to make decisions and has been ‘second-guessing’ himself all his life. He said that he has failed in so much in his lifetime because of what happened at Gill.211

The Salvation Army accepts that Mr Stiles was physically abused as a child by Salvation Army officer Captain Lawrence Wilson at Gill in the period 1971–1972.

Other allegations about Gill

In addition to the men who gave evidence, the Royal Commission received other accounts from men who lived at Gill as boys.

FT was at Gill from 1968 to 1976. He said both Captain Wilson and X17 sexually abused him there.212 Documents before the Royal Commission indicated that X17 called FT to an office to tell him of a death. FT recalled:

I was very upset and he put his arm around me and kissed me on the forehead. He then put his hand between my legs and began to fondle my genitals. I broke away from him and he grabbed me and took me into a back part of the office ... and he pulled my pants down and again started to fondle my genitals. He then told me to turn around and I felt his erect penis pushing up against my backside. At that time I broke away from him and pulled my pants up.213

FT said he ran from the room and into a toilet block. X17 then took him into an area between the locker room and shower room where he kicked him with ‘these large army boots’ he wore until FT fell to the floor and was further kicked.214

EJ was at Gill from 1970 to 1974. EJ alleged that he was forced to perform oral sex on X17 and that X17 touched his genitals and thighs.215

EO described X17 to The Salvation Army in 2004 as being ‘the molester of the home’ and himself as ‘[X17’s] toy boy’.216 EO said that X17’s sexual abuse was ‘constant and frequent’.217 EO said the sexual assaults occurred in various rooms and when he was in bed. He reported being brutally beaten and caned, sometimes for no apparent reason.218

EV also alleged that X17 touched his genitals once while he was at Gill between 1971 and 1973, and he saw X17 and a boy engaged in a sexual act.219 FY lived at Gill from 1966 to 1974 and said he was physically punished by X17 for trying to bring attention to the sexual abuse.220

FE lived at Gill from 1973 to 1976 and alleged that X17 once performed oral sex on him. He also reported that X17 touched his penis through his clothes, and later made similar advances but was rebuffed. 221
In about April 1974, FV’s mother and stepfather left their children. The police found the children and took FV and his brother FX to Bexley. FV arrived in 1974 when he was 12 or 13 and lived there for two or three years.

Wilson was the manager at Bexley when FV was there. Within the first few days of FV arriving at Bexley, Wilson came into the recreation room at Bexley where FV was laughing and told FV to stop. FV did, but when he started laughing again Wilson punched him with a clenched fist to the side of FV’s head and knocked him off his chair. FV then said Wilson grabbed him by the hair, dragged him out into the hallway and kicked and caned him.

According to FV, Wilson had a variety of different canes of different thicknesses and used certain canes depending on what the boy had done. Throughout the time that FV was at Bexley, Wilson normally did not hide the physical abuse and did not care who saw the beatings.

A month after arriving at Bexley, FV’s younger brother FX told FV that another resident boy had raped him on the first night they arrived at the home. Around this time, FV said he was himself sexually abused by Wilson. We heard that Wilson called FV into his office in the night, made FV play with his genitals, perform oral sex on him, and then Wilson had sex with FV. FV said that Wilson sexually abused him on two further occasions while he was at Bexley.

FV gave evidence that Captain Wilson arranged for boys at Bexley to visit people outside the home. Wilson told FV to go with a man and a woman for the weekend, and introduced him to a woman in her 30s who was wearing a Salvation Army uniform. FV went with the couple to a two-storey house in Punchbowl near the railway station. FV said that the woman sexually abused him. When FV returned to the home, he told Wilson what had happened. FV said that Wilson replied that they were ‘good people’ and caned FV up to 18 times.

About two weeks later, around July or August 1974, FV was again called into Wilson’s office. He was told to go with another, older man to his property, which was a poultry farm. The man took FV into his office in the house while his wife and children were in the house. FV said the older man told him to sit on his lap, then started playing with FV’s penis and told FV to play with his erect penis. The man took FV back to Bexley after speaking to Wilson. That night Wilson again caned FV.

Around September 1974, FV was called into Wilson’s office again, this time to meet two women. He was taken this time to a house near a beach. FV said each woman sexually abused him. While FV wanted to run away on the first day, he did not because he did not want Wilson to cane him again.

FV told us:

People say to us, ‘Why did you not tell anyone?’ I think it is about time people started to look for a new line to ask because I cannot answer the question myself. No
one would believe a home boy over a Salvo officer. We were told this by them while it was happening to us. 

The experience at Bexley left FV ‘an empty shell with no real heart who [could not] properly love his [own] family’. FV said he is angry all the time and continues to carry the mental pain from the bashings he received. He is overly protective of his children but when they cuddle him he purposely tickles them so they move away.

Wilson was later the subject of criminal charges for sexual offences against FV and others at Bexley but was acquitted. FV and a number of other Bexley boys started (separate) civil proceedings against Wilson and The Salvation Army. While The Salvation Army did not support the captain, it relied on a defence under the Limitations Act 1969 (NSW). The plaintiffs agreed to settle, and FV received about $50,000 of the $100,000 settlement after legal fees were paid.

The Salvation Army accepts that FV was physically and sexually abused as a child by Salvation Army officer Captain Lawrence Wilson, manager of Bexley Boys’ Home in 1974.

The Salvation Army accepts that FV was sexually abused as a child by people outside the home in 1974 while Salvation Army officer Captain Lawrence Wilson was the manager of Bexley Boys’ Home.

ET

ET lived at Bexley from February 1965 at the age of five until December 1975. During that time, Bexley was managed by a number of managers including X4 and Wilson.

While he was at Bexley, both Wilson and Captain John McIver hit ET with the cane and ET often had bruises on his body.

ET gave evidence that Wilson used a very thick bamboo cane or his fist to hit the boys. ET said Major X4 also hit him on the hand with the cane. ET said McIver hit boys ‘anywhere he could’ with the cane, and ET often had bruises on his body because of the beatings.

ET said he was sexually abused by Wilson and by older residents at Bexley. ET remembered an occasion in 1968 when he was nine years old. HA was 14 at the time and physically much bigger. HA and another older boy coaxed ET and a boy to follow them to the toilet block at Bexley. ET said HA touched his genitals and performed oral sex on ET and the other younger boy while the second older boy kept watch. Another older boy at Bexley who was two years older than ET also constantly demanded ET masturbate him.

At the end of 1973, ET recalls HA’s younger brother GI also putting his penis into ET’s mouth. GI left Bexley temporarily in 1973 but returned at the beginning of 1975. On his return, ET said GI continued to have sex with him as well as with other boys. GI made ET perform oral sex and masturbate each other. ET gave evidence on how GI’s abuse escalated through time:

GI would ask me if there was a boy I was friends with, or having sex with, and GI would go and have sex with him. GI made [another boy] and I have sex together –
and GI watched the whole thing. I masturbated [the boy] and gave him oral sex and then GI performed oral sex on both of us.\(^{260}\)

In 1974 Wilson, purportedly as part of a ‘medical examination’, had ET strip off his clothes and then touched his genitals.\(^{261}\)

In 1974, when ET was about 15, Wilson became the manager at Bexley. Wilson told the boys that he was a male nurse and it was his responsibility to give every boy a full physical medical examination.\(^{262}\) At first ET and the older boys refused. However, one day Wilson demanded that he have a ‘full and thorough physical’.\(^{263}\) ET said he went to Wilson’s office where he was stripped down and Wilson touched ET’s penis.\(^{264}\)

At about that time, Wilson asked ET to bring young boys in from the playground for a medical examination. ET said he brought one boy to Wilson’s office, where Wilson received the boy and closed the door. ET heard the boy crying and begging for Wilson to stop.\(^{265}\)

ET saw men and older boys from around 1972 inside the dormitory. According to the home’s rules, they should not have been there. They were friends of either the older boys or the officers, and they came in through the fire escape stairs.\(^{266}\) The door did not have any alarm system and anyone could come in and go out of the dormitory.\(^{267}\)

In 1972, when ET ran away from Bexley, he was picked up by the police and taken to the Hurstville Police Station. ET told the police about abuse at the home.\(^{268}\) However, as far as ET knew, nothing happened.\(^{269}\)

ET did not report what happened with Wilson during the ‘medical examination’ in Wilson’s office to anyone.\(^{270}\) ET did not report sexual abuse by other boys at Bexley to anyone because he was scared of retribution by those boys.\(^{271}\) There was also no regular meeting at which ET could talk to any Salvation Army officers about the abuse.\(^{272}\)

ET started civil proceedings against Captain Lawrence Wilson and The Salvation Army. In 2002, ET accepted a settlement of his claim against The Salvation Army for $88,000 and received $43,000 after paying legal fees.\(^{273}\)

The Salvation Army accepts that ET was physically abused as a child multiple times by Salvation Army officer Captain Lawrence Wilson at Bexley in the period 1974–1975.

The Salvation Army accepts that ET was physically abused as a child multiple times by Salvation Army officer Captain John McIver at Bexley in the period 1968–1971 and 1972–1974.

The Salvation Army accepts that ET was sexually abused as a child multiple times by other boys resident at Bexley in the period 1968–1975.

The Salvation Army accepts that ET was sexually abused as a child on one occasion by Salvation Army officer Captain Lawrence Wilson at Bexley in 1974.
Kevin Marshall

Kevin Marshall lived at Bexley from 1966 to 1974 because his mother could not look after him. Around 1969, Mr Marshall’s younger brother joined him at Bexley for about three months.

Mr Marshall was at Bexley at the same time as Wilson, Captain X5 and McIver.

In February 1967, shortly after Mr Marshall arrived at Bexley, his mother committed suicide. When the manager and McIver told the six-year-old boy of his mother’s death, he was told to ‘stop crying, get on with it.’ Mr Marshall said he was distraught but the officers did not give him a chance to grieve.

Mr Marshall told us there was a ‘bear pit mentality’ at Bexley. The boys were on their own, isolated and without a sense of community. Supervision was minimal, even during the night. The managers ruled over the boys with fear because of the constant physical punishment and the threat of physical punishment.

While the cane was used for disciplinary reasons at Bexley, constant physical punishment and threat of physical punishment led to the managers ruling over the boys with fear. Mr Marshall said that X5 demeaned and slapped Mr Marshall frequently, including in front of the other boys. Mr Marshall recalls being punched and slapped by Major X4 around his head and shoulders, and being knocked down to the ground.

Mr Marshall gave evidence that psychological abuse accompanied the physical abuse at Bexley. He once heard X4’s wife tell him and other boys, ‘Your parents do not love you’, and ‘That is why you are here, so don’t look for them’. When X5 slapped the boys at Bexley, ‘he would single you out, make you stand there, hold your arm up, … watch your face, look at your eyes; [he] really tried to break your spirit’.

Mr Marshall said X5 sexually abused him shortly after he arrived at Bexley in 1966. He said that X5 fondled his genitals and touched his buttocks when Mr Marshall lined up naked at the shower blocks at Bexley. He said this happened dozens of times until X5 left Bexley around 1967.

Mr Marshall told us one lay resident employee, who lived between the two dormitories, sexually abused him in 1967 or 1968. Mr Marshall suspected that he was not the only boy at Bexley to be sexually abused by the lay resident employees working at the home. He saw the older boys at Bexley taking the younger boys into the lay resident employee’s rooms in exchange for lollies or special attention from the employees.

Mr Marshall gave evidence that boys at the home were preyed on by some of the older boys at Bexley. Around 1968 and 1969, older boys used physical force to hold Mr Marshall down and fondle his penis. He said the frequency of abuse by older boys increased after the dormitories were converted into small cubicles around 1970 or 1971 as there was less chance of being caught by the officers.

We heard that another boy at Bexley, GW, moved his bed so that he could sleep next to Mr Marshall, saying that he wanted to touch, masturbate and have oral sex with him. Mr Marshall constantly declined the advances, but said GW touched Mr Marshall’s penis.
often in the middle of the night. Mr Marshall was forced to stay awake at night and started sleeping on the floor to make sure he was safe.

Around 1973 or 1974, Mr Marshall was aware that a group of strangers were coming into the home at night. He said he saw them speaking with Wilson in the home. Wilson allowed people to come in and visit boys under the guise of looking after them.

Wilson also organised out-of-home visits and camps for Mr Marshall and the other boys. On one camp, Mr Marshall said an old man came in to the cabin and watched Mr Marshall getting changed, then touched his penis. Mr Marshall also said he once went to a Sunday evening visit after church with two other boys from Bexley. While they were there, an older boy went into a nearby room for at least an hour. The next day, the older boy told him that he had had sex with a female soldier.

Mr Marshall did not report the abuse because he said he was isolated at Bexley and did not know whom he could trust. He understood that if he reported anything, he would not be believed by the officers. Instead he would be told that he was a liar, labelled a troublemaker and punished.

As a result of the abuse at Bexley, Mr Marshall cannot sleep in the same room as his partner. He warns people not to come in when he is asleep, and is terrified what he would do someone he cared about if they did. He is always hyper-vigilant and this has increased since the birth of his child.

The Salvation Army accepts that Kevin Marshall was:

- physically abused as a child multiple times by Salvation Army officers Major X4 and Captain X5 at Bexley in the period 1966–1974.
- sexually abused as a child by a lay employee who worked at Bexley in 1967 in 1968.
- sexually abused as a child by a lay employee who worked at Bexley in 1967 or in 1968.
- sexually abused as a child by two older resident boys at Bexley in 1968–1969.

EP

EP was admitted to Bexley around 1973 when he was about seven. EP said that Wilson raped him in Wilson’s office within a few months of arriving. This happened several times while he was there.

He reported to The Salvation Army that X12, the cook at the home, and other boys sexually abused him. The unidentified cook was later sacked after EP reported the abuse. EP also asserted that Wilson beat him and threw him downstairs, giving him a serious head injury.

EP also spoke of older boys in his victim impact statement:

The older boys [at Bexley] were constantly tampering with the younger boys. This happened all the time and it was quite open, as soon as lights went out. At first it was horrifying but after a while you have to give in because you get too many
bashings and you get suffocated and abused by the boys and by Wilson as well and eventually you have to give in and eventually it becomes part of your life.\textsuperscript{317}

EP started to sniff petrol around the time he was first sexually abused by Captain Wilson. When he was nine, he attempted suicide after being sexually abused by an older boy:

I was confused. I wanted to be dead at the time; I didn't see any hope. My parents were not visiting me and when they did, Wilson was watching me. You were on the defensive all the time; you were on the lookout all the time. You could never sleep through the whole night, you'd lie there waiting for someone to come and get you; even now I still can't sleep. There you'd get visited in the night, so you were scared, you couldn't fall asleep. I'd force myself to stay awake. Wilson got me out of bed at night sometimes. Sometimes, it was strangers who came up the fire escape. Some of the older boys went out at night stealing cars and older men came in at night. There was no supervision.\textsuperscript{318}

EP started proceedings against The Salvation Army in 1997 and settled for $140,000 in 1999.\textsuperscript{319}

Other allegations about Bexley

EQ was at Bexley when Wilson was manager. He alleged that Wilson sexually abused him, and that he was paraded naked with other boys in front of men in Wilson's office and in the shower.\textsuperscript{320} EQ also alleged he was forced to masturbate another boy. EQ said this abuse was reported to Salvation Army officers at the time, but he was not believed and was beaten for making the allegation.\textsuperscript{321}

Wilson is also alleged, at Bexley, to have touched FR's genitals and inserted his fingers inside FR's anus and then masturbated FR.

FX was also at Bexley during 1974 and alleges that he was sexually abused by Wilson and by X12.\textsuperscript{322}

EA alleged that he witnessed Wilson sexually abusing other boys in the dormitory, and was aware that 'old man X6' who lived in a caravan on the grounds was sexually abusing other boys. EA also reports physical and emotional abuse by Wilson through excessive and unjust corporal punishments.\textsuperscript{323}

GA alleged that McIver both physically and sexually abused him at Bexley from 1968 to 1971.\textsuperscript{324}

GA also told his counsellor that McIver was brutal: GA was required to take his pants down and bend over a table to be whipped on both the legs and the back. He developed welts and bleeding on his legs that became infected.\textsuperscript{325} Afterwards, GA said McIver told him that he would 'beat the life' out of him if he told anyone.\textsuperscript{326}

GD said McIver was one of the officers who sexually abused him at Bexley. GD said that his arm was broken during a physical attack after he resisted a sexual advance by an unknown person.\textsuperscript{327}
FT gave a detailed statement to NSW Police in July 1996 that included allegations of physical abuse by McIver at Bexley between 1968 and 1972. McIver was said to have thrown FT onto a concrete walkway when he found the boy in a prohibited area. FT recalled McIver caning the boys for punishment and said he saw him hit boys on the hands, body and legs.

2.5 Conclusion

The Salvation Army accepted that boys were sexually abused while in its care. The abuse was perpetrated by one or more of the following:

- a Salvation Army officer
- an older boy
- a person outside of the Home in circumstances where The Salvation Army sent the boy to that person
- lay employees.

The Salvation Army accepted that boys were physically abused while in its care. The abuse was by a Salvation Army officer.

- Finding 1: There was sexual abuse of boys in each of the four homes by officers or employees of The Salvation Army from 1956 until the homes closed. The Salvation Army did not protect the boys from this abuse.

- Finding 2: There was physical abuse of boys in each of the four homes by officers of The Salvation Army which was on occasion brutal. The Salvation Army did not protect the boys from this abuse.
3 Conditions at the homes

Former residents told us of the poor physical conditions they experienced at the homes.

There is other evidence of poor conditions at the homes. Mr Schmidt of the Department of Children’s Services and Ipswich City Council noted that the drinking water at Riverview was at times taken from a contaminated river:

During dry spells when the tanks are empty, the whole Centre depends on river water … The out-buildings housing cows and pigs are supplied with river water and on some occasions when the boys neglect to carry their drinking water to these places of work they drink straight from the river water taps. Major Bennett mentioned that there is no filtering of this water. It was pumped direct from the river and a short way upstream the river receives effluent from the Dinmore Meatworks and the Hardboard factory, not to mention the other usual deposits found in the Bremer River.331

The buildings at Riverview were also in a poor state. A July 1980 internal memorandum to the Director of Children’s Services recorded that Riverview closed in 1977 because:

the regime was antiquated, inadequate, inappropriate and indefensible, not only in terms of the methods used in handling the children but also because the buildings were run-down, in a poor state of repair and altogether quite unsuitable.332

The Salvation Army’s territorial commander, Commissioner James Condon, accepted the former residents’ accounts of the organisation and operation of the four homes. In Commissioner Condon’s words to us, the ‘senior leadership of the day allowed too many managers to run harsh, overly regimented, dispiriting, and even brutal homes’.333

Corporal punishment was regulated by the State

During the period examined by the case study, State legislation regulated corporal punishment in licensed homes. In New South Wales and Queensland, the manager of each home was responsible for corporal punishment, although he could authorise others to administer it.

In New South Wales, the Child Welfare Act 1939 allowed limited corporal punishment in exceptional cases but every effort was to be made to enforce discipline without it. 334 Corporal punishment was to be inflicted only with a cane approved by the Minister, by an officer or instructor appointed by the superintendent, and in his or her presence. It was not to be meted out in the presence of other inmates, and not to be used on boys under 16 or girls under 15.335

A superintendent was also required to keep a punishment book and record the details of each punishment.336 Striking, cuffing, shaking, or any form of physical violence other than that permitted in the Act was prohibited by law.337
In Queensland, the *Children’s Services Regulations 1966* outlined how punishment could be administered in boys’ homes like Riverview and Indooroopilly. The Regulation stated corporal punishment was:

- the last method of punishment for misconduct and ‘every effort should be made to enforce discipline without the use of corporal punishment’;\(^{338}\)
- to be used ‘as seldom as possible and only when absolutely necessary for discipline’.\(^{339}\)

It was to be administered by a leather strap, approved by the director or an officer of the Department of Children’s Services, applied over the child’s ordinary cloth trousers. As in New South Wales, it was not to be administered in front of other children,\(^{340}\) and it was to be recorded in a punishment book that the department could inspect on demand.\(^{341}\)

Clearly, these regulations were not adhered to in the four homes.

The Chief Executive Officer of the NSW Department of Family and Community Services, Ms Maree Walk, gave evidence of two instances of excessive punishment concerning Gill recorded in the 1970s. Mr Kimberley, the then Goulburn Departmental district officer, told the manager of Gill of allegations of violence against him. Mr Kimberley interviewed three of the boys and noted that the children had injuries including ‘a two inch by half inch bruise on his right knee, a bruise on his thigh’, slightly broken skin on his left arm, and a ‘six inch long red mark on his back’. Another boy had ‘a four inch mark on his leg and a bruise on his hip’.\(^{342}\)

When Mr Kimberley spoke with the manager, ‘he admitted that he may have been somewhat indiscriminate in the use of the cane’, but claimed this had only happened because the boys had ‘refused to accept punishment in the prescribed manner’.\(^{343}\) The manager could ‘see the dangers in extreme forms of punishment and will restrict discipline in future to the proper manner’.\(^{344}\)

Mr Kimberley recommended no further action be taken,\(^{345}\) and a senior officer accepted the recommendation.\(^{346}\) Ms Walk indicated that if such assaults occurred today they would be referred to the police.\(^{347}\)

In March 1977, a school counsellor at Goulburn High School reported to the department that Lieutenant X14 had allegedly physically abused two boys at Gill.\(^{348}\) The allegations were that X14 had slapped one boy across the legs, kicked him in the ‘anus’ and ribs, and hit him in the head and legs. X14 had slapped the second boy, picked him up and thrown him on the floor, kicked him in the ribs and hit him on the legs.\(^{349}\) Mr Kimberley reported that when the boys told the manager, he told them ‘not to tell anybody else as it might be reported to the Police who might tell the “Welfare” and he did not want “the Welfare” to know’.\(^{350}\)

Mr Kimberley spoke with the manager who told him that X14 had a history of such violence when he was under pressure. He suggested to the manager that X14 be removed immediately. The manager agreed\(^{351}\) and followed up with the social services secretary who said he would do so urgently.\(^{352}\)

However, about two months later X14 was still at Gill and, in fact, had been left in charge of the home for the day. X14 had apparently ‘lost his temper again’ and was involved in caning, other than on the hand, one of the two boys involved in the earlier incident.\(^{353}\)
In oral evidence, Ms Walk agreed that the fact that X14 had remained at the home, had been given control of the home for the day, and had again severely caned one boy for a second time, was ‘the worst possible outcome in terms of that boy’s experience’. X14 did then leave his position within a number of days.

The State of NSW accepted in its submissions that in the 1970s the practice of the Department of Child Welfare was to raise excessive physical punishment in The Salvation Army home with the manager of the home, but not to refer matters which may have constituted a criminal assault to the police. However, it noted that this was the culture of the time and violence was widespread.

Queensland Department of Children’s Services files from the time also reveal frequent and excessive corporal punishment at Indooroopilly. One departmental officer remarked that the punishment was ‘excessive, unjust and humiliating’. By 1976, a childcare officer observed:

For the last two years it has been frequently and consistently reported that corporal punishment, repressive methods and the lack of nurture at Alkira are of extreme concern. The normal behaviour for Alkira is absconding, truancy and stealing. ... How desperate do the children have to become?

Finding 3: There was a culture of frequent physical punishment which was on occasion brutal in all four boys’ homes operated by The Salvation Army from 1956 until their closure, which encouraged fear of officers.

Finding 4: Sexual abuse of the boys by officers or employees of The Salvation Army in the four homes was often accompanied by physical violence or the threat of physical violence.

In relation to Riverview, the Forde Inquiry found the following in its final report:

There were also reports of sexual abuse between residents at Riverview. One former resident from the early 1970s told the Inquiry that older boys would sexually assault younger boys. In November 1973 a senior childcare officer wrote a number of reports on Riverview, raising concerns about homosexual activities. One report stated the belief that:

The physical conditions at Riverview, the staff situation, the program for boys and the symptom of discontent amongst the boys contributed to abscondings and homosexual assaults. ... There are, in fact, two or three known incidents of outright rape including a very bad incident two or three months ago. This usually happens with a big boy standing over a younger, smaller and more immature boy.

The same senior childcare officer stated that ‘as far as homosexuality is concerned, it seems that about 50 per cent of the boys are known to have actively taken part in homosexual activity while at Riverview’.
These issues were highlighted when the department reviewed sending boys from Westbrook to Riverview. A 1973 memorandum suggested:

There are real worries and real dangers about sending any boys there. The lack of adequate and suitable staff, the danger of rape and other homosexual assaults and the shambles that this whole place looks causes obvious problems. Practically every boy [who] has been placed at Riverview lately, and certainly everyone that has been placed there from Westbrook, has absconded in short time.360

> **Finding 5:** Many boys in the four Salvation Army homes were sexually abused by other boys resident in the same home, often accompanied by violence or threats of violence.

Taken together, the evidence shows that boys in the four Salvation Army homes faced sexual abuse from multiple people: officers and lay people, adults from outside the home and older boys within it. The impact could be devastating.

The Salvation Army provided a detailed schedule of all cases of child sexual abuse it had received up to 14 January 2014. The schedule lists 110 separate claims files. Commissioner Condon indicated that The Salvation Army had received 157 claims involving child sexual abuse, 115 of which concerned boys’ homes.

Major Peter Farthing of The Salvation Army admitted that the Royal Commission hearing had ‘brought a great deal of disgrace and shame’ to the organisation.361

The Salvation Army submitted that the ‘the claims of sexual abuse represent less than 1% of children who were in The Salvation Army’s care’ and that sexual abuse was not ‘widespread’ in the homes. That approach, which is based on complaints from those who have been prepared to come forward to The Salvation Army, is not accepted. The sexual abuse occurred in all four of the homes over the period from 1956 until the homes were closed. It is likely that many who were sexually abused as boys have not come forward to The Salvation Army. The sexual abuse in the homes was clearly devastating for the lives of the boys concerned, and The Salvation Army’s approach in submissions to minimising that experience is not in keeping with its public apologies.

> **Finding 6:** Over 100 claims of child sexual abuse were received by The Salvation Army which concerned boys’ homes.

> **Finding 7:** In most cases, boys in the four homes who reported sexual abuse to the manager or other officer were punished, disbelieved, accused of lying or no action was taken.

> **Finding 8:** Many boys in the four homes who had been sexually abused who gave evidence did not report the sexual abuse to anyone because they were scared of punishment by officers or did not think they would be believed.

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Report of Case Study No. 5
4 Officers accused of abuse

This section focuses on the careers of five Salvation Army officers against whom allegations of sexual abuse at the homes were made:

- Victor Bennett
- Lawrence Wilson
- Donald Schultz
- John McIver
- X17.

We look at when any allegations against these officers came to light and how they were dealt with. We found that, despite the large number of allegations made well after the conduct occurred, there were only a few contemporaneous complaints.

To better understand the allegations raised by former residents, we asked The Salvation Army for any documents that recorded allegations of child sexual abuse against its officers. Virtually no personnel records exist which record complaints or reviews of the officers’ performance. It appears this is because limited records were kept at the time.

Major Peter Farthing, a senior officer of The Salvation Army was responsible for The Salvation Army’s response to the Royal Commission, told us there was no formal process for reviewing the performance of managers. Further, the managers did not regularly report to divisional or territorial headquarters about the homes other than on finances and the number of boys living in each home.

The Salvation Army had a process of transferring many managers and officers in January of each year. However, while Major Farthing said this was a formal process, it did not involve written consideration of performance or whether a person should be transferred. As a result, the Royal Commission did not receive written evidence of why a particular officer may or may not have been transferred at a particular time.

There were no written records of complaints against Bennett or Wilson who were the subject of a considerable number of allegations of physical and sexual abuse.

However, we were able to consider formal responses to allegations against Schultz and X17 when those outside The Salvation Army became aware of allegations. The Queensland Department of Children’s Services investigated allegations against Schultz. Allegations against X17 made to the Department of Child Welfare and NSW Police led to him being charged and convicted.
4.1 Victor Bennett

Victor Bennett worked at all four of the boys’ homes in this case study.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Appointment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1948–1951</td>
<td>Started career at Gill after finishing training college</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951–1957</td>
<td>Worked in non-children related positions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957–1960</td>
<td>Transferred to Bexley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960–1969</td>
<td>Manager of Indooroopilly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969–1974</td>
<td>Manager at Riverview</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We heard oral evidence from Wallace McLeod, EE, EF, ES and EY who had direct experience of Victor Bennett. The evidence was that Bennett was quick to punish and did so in an excessive and sometimes sadistic way. Further documentary evidence was available from HI, FO and ED. Three of these former residents – ES, EF and ED – said Bennett sexually abused them.

In addition, Bennett received reports of child sexual abuse and did not report them.

- **Finding 9:** Captain Victor Bennett received reports of child sexual abuse from ES, GY and FO and did not report the allegations to the police or to divisional or territorial headquarters of The Salvation Army.
- **Finding 10:** The Salvation Army accepted that Captain Victor Bennett sexually abused ES, EF and VF.
- **Finding 11:** Captain Victor Bennett engaged in brutal and excessive punishment of the boys under his care in the period 1960–1973 as manager of Indooroopilly Boys’ Home and as manager of Riverview Boys’ Home.

Lieutenant-Colonel Ed Dawkins of The Salvation Army reflected on his association with Bennett when Bennett was at Indooroopilly. He told Major Farthing that ‘[Bennett] was too rough and tough with boys. His goals may have been good, but wrapped in harsh treatment’.³⁶⁶

The Salvation Army has since paid considerable compensation to former residents for claims of abuse by Victor Bennett:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Compensation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>HI received $120,000 as an ‘ex-gratia’ payment³⁶⁷</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>FO received $40,000 as an ‘ex-gratia’ payment³⁶⁸</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>ED received $80,000 as an ‘ex-gratia’ payment³⁶⁹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Further claims by FM, EE and ES lead to payments of $70,000, $30,000 and $70,000 respectively</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Records from the Department of Children’s Services show that its officers were aware of excessive punishment at Indooroopilly and Riverview, including when Bennett was there. However, we saw no indication in any documents that The Salvation Army ever disciplined Bennett for any acts of child sexual or physical abuse, or he that he was ever the subject of a criminal charge.

4.2 Lawrence Wilson

The Salvation Army Eastern Territory accepts that Wilson was its most serious child sex offender. As with Captain Bennett, Wilson served at all four of the homes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Appointment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1957–1959</td>
<td>Started as a Probationary Lieutenant at Riverview after Officers Training College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>Short time at Indooroopilly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Transferred to Sydney</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Left The Salvation Army and worked for the NSW Department of Child Welfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>Returned to The Salvation Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970–1973</td>
<td>Manager at Gill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Manager at Indooroopilly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Manager at Riverview</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Royal Commission received allegations of child sexual abuse by Wilson of 17 separate boys at the four homes: Raymond Carlile, EG, GK, FF, FT, GE, GB, EB, FI, EX, ET, EA, EQ, EP, FR, FV and FX.

Raymond Carlile said Wilson sexually abused him at Riverview in 1957. GK also alleged sexual abuse by Wilson at Riverview in 1957 or 1959.

On 6 January 1961, Wilson was summarily dismissed from The Salvation Army for ‘engaging in sexual relations with his then fiancé’.

After his dismissal, Wilson worked for the Department of Child Welfare as a child welfare officer at its boys’ homes. His personnel file reveals that he was reprimanded a number of times for using ‘unnecessary force’ with inmates, including a small boy. In 1964, Wilson was also noted to have tried to mislead a more senior officer about his ‘medical experience’.

Wilson’s work for the department came to an end when he was stationed at Berry Training Farm in December 1965 and he was severely reprimanded for violence against a child. He and his wife immediately resigned. A departmental officer noted that Wilson had a ‘marked degree of immaturity’ in handling children and his re-employment as a house parent would not be recommended.
 Shortly after their resignations, Captain Wilson and his wife were re-accepted into The Salvation Army in January 1966. His wife’s application for re-acceptance is dated the same date their resignation was communicated.\textsuperscript{377} 

Despite Wilson stating that he worked for the Department of Child Welfare on his application form, there was no record of any contact with the department and no record that The Salvation Army knew of his poor work history. Major Farthing accepted it was ‘very unlikely’ that his previous employer was asked about his performance.\textsuperscript{378} He agreed that the process was inadequate and admitted that The Salvation Army still does not ask for references from a previous employer.\textsuperscript{379} 

The detailed personnel file on Wilson in the Department of Child Welfare stands in contrast to The Salvation Army’s lack of personnel records for him.

Major Farthing also said that in 1964 and 1965, Major Brian Holley had received information about Wilson ‘interfering with a boy or boys’. There was no entry on Wilson’s ‘file’ according to Major Farthing.\textsuperscript{380} The information was passed to the territorial headquarters but was not properly investigated. Major Farthing thought that the failure ‘was probably the worst decision The Salvation Army Eastern Territory has taken in all its history’.\textsuperscript{381} 

The Wilsons served at the Glebe Corps and then at Lithgow, where concerns were raised about Wilson. A former policeman contacted The Salvation Army to ‘express his concern that the Army’s name should not be muddied locally because of the extreme behaviour of Captain Wilson’.\textsuperscript{382} Other parents raised concerns about the way he ran his scripture class and the divisional commander agreed that ‘his ebullience and lack of sensitivity do make these reports credible’.\textsuperscript{383} The concerns do not appear to involve sexual abuse.

The Salvation Army transferred Wilson from the Lithgow Corps on 27 August 1970 and appointed him as the manager of Gill.\textsuperscript{384} 

Wilson is said to have sexually abused two boys at Gill: FF and FT.\textsuperscript{385} 

During a visit to Gill by The Salvation Army men’s social services secretary around 1972, a Salvation Army officer serving on a committee for Gill told Lieutenant-Colonel George Carpenter about Wilson’s general conduct, including rumours of child sexual abuse that were circulating in Goulburn.\textsuperscript{386} 

Major Farthing says that he could not locate any investigation of this report.\textsuperscript{387} He accepted that the failure to investigate and report was partly because there was no policy or procedure at the time that specifically applied to such reports, and partly because there was over-reliance on the good character of senior individuals within The Salvation Army.\textsuperscript{388} 

In January 1973, Wilson was transferred from Gill to Indooroopilly as manager.\textsuperscript{389} There are no records to indicate whether the transfer occurred because of the rumours about Wilson or whether it was an ordinary rotation of staff. The Royal Commission received allegations that Wilson sexually abused EB, EX, FI, GB and GE at Indooroopilly.

Clifford Randall, who was a house parent at Indooroopilly from late 1973, said that Wilson made out that he was a nurse, carrying a doctor’s bag, and said he was medically trained.\textsuperscript{390} Wilson told Mr Randall that he inspected the boys’ anuses and encouraged Mr Randall to do
likewise, but he refused. Mr Randall said the boys told him that they were sexually abused during these ‘medical inspections’. We are satisfied that Captain Lawrence Wilson falsely represented that he had medical qualifications partly to obtain access to boys at Indooroopilly to sexually abuse them.

Mr Randall informed divisional commander, Brigadier Leslie Reddie that ‘he would have the boys down there to examine them for his own pleasure’, and told him about the anal and ‘special’ examinations. However, Brigadier Reddie told Mr Randall that Wilson was the manager and ‘he called the shots’. Mr Randall also informed Colonel Peterson about Wilson’s sexual abuse of the boys, his practice of medical examinations and inspecting the anuses of boys, and FG’s allegations against Schultz. Mr Randall heard nothing further from Colonel Peterson and there was no investigation or disciplinary action.

In January 1974, Wilson was transferred to Bexley to replace Captain John McIver as manager. McIver assumed Wilson’s role at Indooroopilly. During the year he was at Bexley, Wilson is alleged to have sexually abused ET, FV, EP, EQ, FR and FX. In addition, Kevin Marshall gave evidence of being sexually abused by various boys and men at Bexley when Wilson was manager, including when he was sent on a camp that Wilson organised.

In 1975, Wilson left Bexley and did not serve again in a boys’ home. Major Margaret Clarke, who worked as a secretary in territorial headquarters in the 1970s, told Major Farthing that Wilson had been moved at the time of the normal rotation because he had been interfering with boys.

Although there was no documentary evidence about the reasons for Wilson’s removal, there were subsequently recorded concerns about Wilson’s behaviour. When he was at the Mackay Corps in 1976, the divisional commander wrote to The Salvation Army’s field secretary saying:

I do not think it right that we should take [Wilson] out of an appointment where, according to both his Senior and Y.P. Inspection Forms, every aspect of the work is showing a down grade – and appoint him to a situation [in] which the Corps is thriving ...

When in 1977, the field secretary expressed a view that Wilson lacked ‘balance’, the territorial commander replied that he was ‘not unfamiliar with the difficulties we have experienced with this Officer in the past and the nature of the problems’.

In November 1977, senior members of The Salvation Army received a complaint from the Cairns Corps that stated, ‘I feel we are dealing with a very sick man, namely Captain Laurie Wilson’. There were further reports of his erratic behaviour in 1977 and 1978. In April 1978, the field secretary said that ‘It is obvious that we have to move Captain Wilson out of Cairns – and FAST!’

An attempt in 1981 by Wilson to serve as a police chaplain ended abruptly: the chief secretary commented that ‘It was inevitable that the Captain’s Senior Chaplaincy with the NSW Police Force would come to an unhappy and sudden end’.
In submissions, The Salvation Army said that senior officers ‘constantly underestimated his pathology, as he posed as a counsellor, a doctor, an expert on drug addiction, a hospital chaplain’. 403

When Wilson was denied a promotion to Major, the chief secretary told the field secretary that Wilson ‘has been a considerable problem to the administration almost for the whole of his career’ and that they would ‘then wait for his next move’. 404 Wilson resigned as an officer in September 1982, having never been the subject of any disciplinary action for the sexual or physical abuse of children. 405

In 1994, victims of Wilson began to come forward, and criminal charges were laid against Wilson for buggery, common assault and indecent assault against ET, FV, FR and EP while at Bexley. 406 The Salvation Army declined to help Wilson with his legal costs. 407

In May 1997, Wilson was committed for trial on charges of buggery, act of indecency and assault against EP (at Bexley) and FT (at Gill). 408 On 28 October 1998, Wilson was also charged with offences relating to treatment of ET, FV and FR at Bexley. 409 In late November 1998, on Wilson’s application, Wilson’s trial on the earlier charges was vacated so that all charges against him could be heard together. 410

On 3 April 2000, Wilson’s trial started, and on 11 May that year he was acquitted of all charges. 411 A Salvation Army’s legal representative said ‘we were surprised’ by the acquittal. 412 Wilson is now deceased.

EP, ET and FV were also plaintiffs in separate civil proceedings against Wilson brought between 1997 and 2000. Each claimed against Wilson and The Salvation Army for acts of abuse that included neglect, false imprisonment, assault, battery and trespass, and negligence. 413 This time, The Salvation Army funded part of Wilson’s defence. 414

The approach taken by The Salvation Army appeared to be that it would not actively support either Wilson or EP. 415 However, internal documents reveal that:

- it would take a passive approach while Wilson adopted an aggressive approach
- EP’s criminal record could be brought up and an attack mounted on his credibility.

The Salvation Army was also concerned about other cases involving ‘methods of care’ within the homes and that a ‘total PR strategy [had] to be considered’. 416 The defensive position may be contrasted with the surprise expressed at Wilson’s acquittal on the related criminal charges. 417

Despite the litigation strategy, The Salvation Army settled each of the three claims: ET accepted $88,000, FV $100,000 and EP $140,000 including costs. 418

To date, The Salvation Army has paid out over $1.2 million to those who have reported sexual abuse by Wilson. 419 The payments made with respect to those who have come forward with allegations of child sexual abuse by Wilson in the four Salvation Army boys’ homes are set out in the table below.

The Salvation Army has also received allegations of sexual abuse by Wilson from FT, EA and FR but, as yet, has not made any payments. 420
Finding 12: Captain Lawrence Wilson frequently used cruel and excessive physical punishment against the boys under his care at Riverview, Gill, Indooroopilly and Bexley Boys’ Homes.

Finding 13: The Salvation Army accepted that Captain Lawrence Wilson sexually abused Mr Carlile, GB, EX and ET.

Finding 14: From 1957 to 1975, The Salvation Army did not keep records of Captain Lawrence Wilson’s performance as an officer, including of any allegations against him of child sexual abuse and whether or how they were resolved.

Finding 15: The Salvation Army did not investigate allegations against Captain Lawrence Wilson in relation to Gill Memorial Home.

Finding 16: In 1974 and 1975, senior officers of The Salvation Army at divisional and territorial headquarters were informed of allegations of inappropriate medical examinations which involved sexualised conduct and which Captain Lawrence Wilson carried out. They did not investigate those allegations and no action was taken against Captain Lawrence Wilson.

Finding 17: During Captain Lawrence Wilson’s service as an officer, The Salvation Army did not take any disciplinary action against him for the sexual or physical abuse of boys that occurred at Riverview, Gill, and Indooroopilly boys’ homes.
4.3 Donald Schultz

Donald Schultz worked at several Salvation Army centres before joining Indooroopilly in 1973.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Appointment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Graduated at College for Officer Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964–1973</td>
<td>Worked in a variety of Salvation Army urban and regional centres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1973</td>
<td>Placed at Indooroopilly, serving under Captain Wilson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1973</td>
<td>Transferred following allegations of child sexual abuse uncovered by the Department of Children’s Services</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In March 1973, Schultz’s successor at a regional centre raised concerns about Schultz being homosexual and that he was fearful that Schultz’s position at Indooroopilly was both ‘a dangerous and explosive situation’. The response from the Chief Secretary of The Salvation Army was to note that such ‘charges’ are very difficult to prove and that Colonel Griffin should advise the notifier to ‘be very careful indeed’. The allegation was later put to Schultz who denied it.

GB’s evidence in a victim impact statement to The Salvation Army was that both Wilson and Schultz sexually abused him at Indooroopilly.

Two residents at Indooroopilly, GG and HN, alleged that in July 1973, Schultz had sexually abused them. GG’s father reported the allegations to the Department of Children’s Services and to The Salvation Army.

When these allegations against Schultz first surfaced in 1973, officers from the department interviewed him with the agreement of Brigadier Geddes of The Salvation Army. Schultz admitted that he got into bed with the boys, said that he loved them and that he felt GG get sexually aroused, but he denied touching him on the genitals.

The officers were unwilling to conclude, without a direct admission by Schultz, that the allegations were correct. The investigating officer said he was particularly concerned that Captain Wilson had spoken with Schultz before the interview and compromised the process. Nonetheless, they were concerned Schultz had not been frank at interview and recommended to Brigadier Geddes that he be replaced.

Notably, the officers discouraged the boys’ parents from reporting the matter to the police. The allegations were found to be unsubstantiated, but Schultz’s removal from Indooroopilly was recommended.

The Salvation Army conducted its own internal inquiry and determined that Schultz should not continue to work in the home. Brigadier Geddes considered that, despite the department’s findings and ‘discretion’, ‘fairly quick action was warranted’.

However, Schultz was allowed to remain at Indooroopilly for another six weeks because Brigadier Geddes could ‘hardly think Captain Schultz will allow himself to be indiscreet in this manner again’. The decision posed an ongoing risk to GB.
Commissioner Harry Williams wrote to the chief secretary and said that there was ‘enough material here to warrant a decision that the Captain should not continue in Social Services’. Schultz was transferred in September 1973.

A former officer of the Department of Children’s Services, Ms Janice Doyle, became Indooroopilly’s ‘childcare officer’ in 1974. Ms Doyle was initially responsible only for Indooroopilly, but she was soon promoted to oversee Riverview as well.

We asked Ms Doyle about the department’s handling of the 1973 allegations against Schultz. Ms Doyle said that discouraging the family from contacting the police was contrary to her practice at the time. She said her practice was to report such matters to her superiors and refer them to the police. She said when she was there in 1974 and 1975 she would not be involved in investigating an incident, and that the practice was not to do even a preliminary investigation.

Major Clifford Randall and his wife Marina Randall replaced the Schultzes at Indooroopilly at short notice in that month. When they started, Captain Wilson told Mr Randall:

I needed to move Schultz out of Queensland and back to New South Wales in a hurry, otherwise he would have ended up in jail.

FG later told Mr Randall that Schultz had sexually abused him. Mr Randall gave evidence that he raised the sexual abuse of FG with Wilson. He said that as a result of FG telling him about the abuse, FG received a ‘belting by Wilson’.

Captain Schultz worked at a number of Salvation Army facilities after Indooroopilly, where further allegations of unlawful or inappropriate sexual conduct towards adults arose.

Police records reveal that, in 2006, Schultz was formally cautioned for indecent treatment of a child, namely masturbating a 15-year-old boy and performing oral sex in a public park. Schultz had no criminal record when the Queensland courts considered the matter.

GB started legal proceedings against The Salvation Army over his treatment by Schultz, and ultimately settled for $100,000. The Salvation Army referred the allegations made by GB and GG to the police when GB and GG came forward in 2005.

Schultz is now living in care due to dementia.

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**Finding 18:** The Salvation Army accepted that Captain Donald Schultz sexually abused GB.

**Finding 19:** The Salvation Army and the Department did not refer the allegations of child sexual abuse against Captain Donald Schultz by GG and HN to the police for investigation.

**Finding 20:** The Salvation Army put GB and other boys at risk of further sexual abuse by Captain Donald Schultz in 1973 by not removing him from his position at Indooroopilly after allegations of sexual abuse had been received.
4.4 John McIver

John McIver worked at two of the four boys’ homes in this case study.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Appointment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968–1971</td>
<td>Worked at Bexley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972–1974</td>
<td>Became manager at Bexley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974–1976</td>
<td>Replaced Captain Wilson as manager of Indooroopilly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Transferred to Salvation Army’s aged care facility in Dee Why, NSW\textsuperscript{440}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Promoted to major</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Captain McIver was the manager at Bexley when ET, FV and Kevin Marshall said they were the subject of child sexual abuse.

Captain McIver became the manager at Indooroopilly in January 1974 when Major Clifford and Major Marina Randall were house parents there. Each gave evidence to us and neither was challenged on the evidence set out below.

Mr Randall witnessed firsthand McIver punishing boys with a strap across the buttocks or a cane or ruler across the hands.\textsuperscript{441} He saw McIver flick the strap between boys’ legs to hit them on the testicles.\textsuperscript{442} Mr Randall reported the beatings to Brigadier Reddie, the divisional commander.\textsuperscript{443}

In early 1975, the Randalls reported sexual abuse at Indooroopilly to Colonel Gordon Peterson, the territorial social services secretary in Sydney. They also reported McIver’s excessive physical abuse.\textsuperscript{444}

Major Clifford Randall gave evidence that after he alerted headquarters, the complaint was referred back to McIver as manager of the home.\textsuperscript{445} McIver then accused Major Randall of being disloyal, saying that ‘everything has got to stay within the house’,\textsuperscript{446} and that any complaints should have gone to him first.\textsuperscript{447} There was no further action from the territorial headquarters.

In May 1975, Mr Randall witnessed McIver whipping HM’s genitals with a strap by having HM stand with his legs apart and whipping him up between his legs. HM reacted violently to the punishment and McIver restrained HM by pushing him up against a wall, bruising his face and dislocating his shoulder.\textsuperscript{448} When the Randalls tried to take HM to hospital, McIver refused use of the car, and instead forced HM’s arm back into its socket himself, causing the boy great pain.\textsuperscript{449}

McIver then gave the Randalls 48 hours to pack up and leave.\textsuperscript{450} The Randalls appear to have earlier expressed a desire to leave before that date, but the timing of their departure was determined by their objection to McIver’s treatment of HM.

Mr Randall called Brigadier Reddie to complain. The Brigadier said, ‘I have the truth from the Manager, nothing has happened. You are telling lies and we want you off the property’,\textsuperscript{451} and told them that they were ‘troublemakers’.\textsuperscript{452}
Three months later, the Randalls saw Colonel Peterson at an event in Port Kembla and told him what happened at Indooroopilly. Colonel Peterson informed the Randalls that the number of boys at the home had gone from 63 to less than 10, as the Department of Children Services had refused to send any boys there until McIver was moved.453

Brigadier Geddes was also at this meeting and pressed the Randalls about the claims relating to Salvation Army officers at Indooroopilly.454 Mr Randall recalled that ‘by the end of the meeting Colonel Peterson sat there with tears in his eyes and said, ‘I’m sorry I didn’t believe you’.’455 He apologised to the Randalls and offered them another appointment, which the Randalls declined.456

McIver was moved out of Indooroopilly at the next annual ‘field change’ in January 1976 but no other disciplinary action was taken. 457

In October 1974, the Department of Children’s Services received a complaint from the mother of an Indooroopilly resident that her 10-year-old son had welts on the back of his legs from being hit with a leather strap.458

In addition, HS told the department that McIver had burnt him on his leg with a cigarette, and that the cook at Indooroopilly had kicked one boy in the ribs and ‘poured detergent down a boy’s throat as a disciplinary measure’. McIver acknowledged that both had occurred.459

At this time, Ms Doyle, then an officer of the Department of Children’s Services, was helping the department to introduce ‘casework’ principles – examining underlying reasons for behaviour – which she had experienced while working in the UK. She said that these principles were part of the department’s ‘professionalisation’, which included social work approaches and qualifications for staff.460

At Indooroopilly, Ms Doyle met the home’s manager, Captain John McIver, and found that he frequently used corporal punishment. She considered this to be, in many cases, ‘excessive and extreme … unnecessary and inappropriate’.462 She expressed serious concern about his approach to managing the boys, as he was not inclined to examine the underlying reasons for their behaviour.462 While he engaged in casework meetings, she said he defaulted to corporal punishment whenever a boy ran away or truanted from school.463

The department’s director eventually wrote to Brigadier Leslie Reddie, divisional commander of The Salvation Army, with concerns about an officer, understood to be McIver. The letter did not mention McIver or any of the allegations against him. No reply was received from Brigadier Reddie.

Ms Doyle agreed that this letter was a ‘soft way’ to criticise McIver’s conduct. She said ‘the institutions were a little fiefdom unto themselves who [sic] operated exclusively for their own personal patronage’.464

However, the admonishment in the letter was, of itself, a ‘rare event towards any governing authorities’.465 Ms Doyle thought that, at the time, the public would have likely seen the excessive punishments at Indooroopilly as strong but not inappropriate.466
In June 1975, a childcare officer wrote a memo to the director, revealing:

As the Child Care Officer for Alkira since late February, 1975, I am of the opinion that the Institution is presently incapable of providing a satisfactory standard of care for the boys already there and for any who may be considered for placement in the near future ... Furthermore I feel that the type of child care practised can be characterised in general as being inflexible, excessively punitive and authoritarian. With the exception of the houseparents who have recently resigned, the residential staff appear overall to have been unable to provide the consistent warmth, care and understanding of individual needs that is an essential precondition for any positive development in the boys placed there. On a number of occasions it has been necessary for me to speak with the Superintendent, Captain McIvor [sic] about his and his deputy’s attitudes towards punishment in general and corporal punishment in particular.467

At the same time, the department was aware that a number of boys from Alkira had absconded.

In October 1975, a supervising childcare officer wrote a memo about two further incidents of physical abuse by McIver. In one case, FG attempted to grab McIver’s hand during an incident where he was being hit with a leather strap. McIver bashed FG’s head into the wall. McIver denied the allegation that this had been deliberate.468 The other instance involved a boy who had approached the department with an earache after McIver had twice hit the boy with a closed fist across his ear.469

In November 1975, the Director of the Department of Children’s Services wrote to The Salvation Army about:

... some discussion with Captain McIver who is not all that easy to deal with and who questions the knowledge basis of Child Care Officers when it comes to dealing with the sort of boy who he has in his Home. Captain McIver’s approach to young people is one of the reasons why this Department has been reluctant to place boys at ‘Alkira’.470

In the same month, the director also raised concerns with the Under Secretary of the Department of Community and Welfare Services and Sport about placing any more boys at Indooroopilly.471

Captain McIver retired in 2004. The Salvation Army told him of allegations against him in 2013.472 Major Peter Farthing as Secretary for Personnel (and Lieutenant-Colonel Cairns who succeeded him) put a number of the allegations to McIver. He is reported to have denied them all.473

In 2013, McIver was referred to the Officers Review Board and on 30 January 2014, during the hearings of the Royal Commission, his officership was suspended.474 Commissioner Condon said that his decision to suspend McIver came after he heard the accounts of violence in the hearing and received a phone call with further allegations against McIver.475

On 19 June 2014, after the public hearing had concluded, McIver was dismissed as an officer of The Salvation Army.
The Salvation Army has paid ‘ex-gratia’ payments of $40,000 to GA, $40,000 to GD and $65,000 to EK in relation to abuse by Captain McIver. 476

McIver is retired from The Salvation Army. He has been notified of the allegations made against him and denied them.

- **Finding 21**: A senior member of The Salvation Army did not investigate allegations made by Major Randall of child sexual abuse about Indooroopilly Boys’ Home in 1975.
- **Finding 22**: Brigadier Leslie Reddie
  - did not adequately investigate allegations of physical abuse of HM
  - accepted Captain John McIver’s account without further investigation
  - supported the dismissal of the Majors Randall.
- **Finding 23**: In the period 1974–1976, Colonel Gordon Peterson received allegations of physical abuse of HM by Captain John McIver but did not start disciplinary proceedings or refer the matters to the police.
- **Finding 24**: The Salvation Army did not investigate allegations of excessive corporal punishment by Captain John McIver at Indooroopilly, notified to it by the Director of the Department of Children’s Services in May 1975, and took no disciplinary action against Captain John McIver at that time.

### 4.5 X17

**X17 accused of sexual abuse at Gill**

Captain X17 worked at both Bexley and Gill, but the evidence we heard related to his time at Gill.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Appointment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>Placed as a probationary lieutenant at Bexley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>Returned to Bexley for a year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Transferred to Gill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Promoted to captain477</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We received written allegations of child sexual abuse against Captain X17 from FT, EJ, EO, EV, FE and oral evidence from Mark Stiles about when he was at Gill.

In February 1974, a freelance photographer who used to visit Gill was told by the boys that X17 ‘had been involved with 2 boys … involving both oral and anal sex’. 478 The photographer told officers of the Department of Child Welfare, who investigated, and the matter was later passed onto the police.
During the investigation, HV disclosed to department officers that X17 had asked HV to come to his room, where X17 put a blanket on the floor and said, ‘Do you really like me? Do you mind me cuddling you and that sort of thing? Or do you just say that to make me happy?’ About that time, X17 is said to have inserted his thumb into HV’s anus. Departmental notes record that X17 also suggested anal intercourse with the comment that ‘it might hurt’.

Again during the investigation, another boy was asked if X17 had ever done anything to him and replied, ‘Yes, I hate it.’ However, there ‘were no elaborations made and the matter was not pressed’.

X17 was arrested and charged before the Goulburn Court of Petty Sessions on 20 March 1974. On 28 May, he was committed to stand trial on two counts of indecently assaulting HV.

On 21 March, the day after X17 was arrested, The Salvation Army social services secretary wrote to the chief secretary to confirm that a Salvation Army officer, Major X4, had secured bail for X17 and that:

> It appears that there has not been actual sexual intercourse but the report is that since November last year there have been repeated acts of indecency up to a fortnight ago, at which time the processes of indictment began without our knowledge. Major [X4] reports that the police have been most helpful and they regret the manner in which the affair has been handled and share our wish that the matter had been dealt with without it having to be treated as a criminal offence. Being a criminal offence means that the police are powerless to stop all the usual processes of law but they have assured Major [X4] arrangements are being made for all details of the case to be withheld from the press …

> Major [X4] … has offered to accommodate Captain [X17] during the period of remand. This will give us the opportunity of assessing whether intervention can be arranged through the Justice Department or whether we have to arrange for legal representation to see the case through the Quarter Sessions … Captain [X17] confessed that he has not been involved in this way other than at Goulburn but that he has been battling with this problem since he was 17 years old.

On 21 March 1974, The Salvation Army’s most senior officer, the territorial commander of the Eastern Territory, wrote to the NSW Minister of Justice about X17’s arrest to say that ‘Any action which will minimise publicity and not hinder our work in the Home would be appreciated’. By this stage, X17 had been suspended. The territorial commander indicated he would be dismissed if he pleaded guilty, but that employment and ‘spiritual comfort’ should be given. There is no indication of what measures were taken to help his victim, HV.

The following week, the territorial commander met with X17 and noted that, ‘He admits to occasional homosexual acts with adults over the years’. Arrangements were to be made for employment, psychiatric care, assumption of responsibility if he was ‘bound over’, and defraying the cost of his legal representation. On the same day, X17 was dismissed from The Salvation Army.
The Salvation Army later requested, through X17’s lawyer, to both close the court and to have the trial shifted to a court outside of Goulburn because of the ‘possible harmful effects a local trial might have on The Salvation Army Boys’ Home at Goulburn’.  

On 9 August 1974, X17 pleaded guilty to two charges of indecent assault before the Court of Quarter Sessions at Campbelltown. Sentence was deferred and X17 entered into a good behaviour bond of $200 on condition that he ‘submit to the supervision and guidance of Major X4 of The Salvation Army’. 

On 26 November 1974, the social services secretary wrote to the chief secretary:

Since it is over six months since [X17’s] dismissal as an officer, and Major [X4] who has been caring for him assures me of his deep repentance and subsequent proof in his conduct, I would recommend his restoration to the Soldier’s Roll.

The chief secretary and the field secretary agreed but the recommendation was rejected.

To date, The Salvation Army has paid $250,000 to those who alleged that X17 sexually abused them at Gill. However, The Salvation Army did not take any substantive steps to help HV, who had been sexually abused by X17 at Gill.

In 1996, the NSW Police considered charging X17 over the allegations of sexual abuse of FT. Medical evidence was provided to police and the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) that X17 was seriously ill and at risk of developing ‘Category 4 AIDS’. Police sought the advice of the DPP, and in March 1997, a DPP solicitor advised the he was not prepared to start proceedings in light of the evidence and X17’s ongoing medical condition.

Finding 25: Despite Captain X17’s conviction on two charges of indecent assault against a child in his care at Gill Memorial Home, senior members of The Salvation Army recommended that he be reinstated to the Soldier’s Roll six months after his dismissal. That recommendation was not accepted.

### 4.6 Other allegations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officer/Employee accused</th>
<th>Home</th>
<th>Year(s) of sexual abuse</th>
<th>Child</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant X9</td>
<td>Indooroopilly</td>
<td>1965–1968</td>
<td>GZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant X10</td>
<td>Indooroopilly</td>
<td>1952–1956</td>
<td>GS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant X10</td>
<td>Riverview</td>
<td>1956–1969</td>
<td>GK, GL, HB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Envoy Norman Mann *</td>
<td>Riverview</td>
<td>1957–1971</td>
<td>HH, GX, GV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant Neville Spratt *</td>
<td>Riverview</td>
<td>1966–1968</td>
<td>GL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Years</td>
<td>Code(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auxiliary Captain</td>
<td>Riverview</td>
<td>1969–1970</td>
<td>HL&lt;sup&gt;505&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norman Kanofski *</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Envoy Edward Lloyd *</td>
<td>Riverview</td>
<td>1974–1977</td>
<td>HD&lt;sup&gt;506&lt;/sup&gt;, HK&lt;sup&gt;507&lt;/sup&gt;, HF&lt;sup&gt;508&lt;/sup&gt;, GP&lt;sup&gt;509&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant X11</td>
<td>Gill</td>
<td>1965–1968</td>
<td>GQ&lt;sup&gt;510&lt;/sup&gt;, HE&lt;sup&gt;511&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X12</td>
<td>Bexley</td>
<td>1970s</td>
<td>FV&lt;sup&gt;512&lt;/sup&gt;, EP&lt;sup&gt;513&lt;/sup&gt;, HC&lt;sup&gt;514&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Officer has died.
5 Oversight by government agencies

5.1 Department of Children’s Services in Queensland

The Indooroopilly and Riverview homes kept a punishment book as required by the Children’s Services Regulations 1966 (Qld), clause 23. The book was intended to record:

- the name of each boy and the nature of their punishment
- the name of the officer giving the punishment.

Ms Doyle said that she checked the Indooroopilly book from time to time and discussed it with Captain McIver. She indicated that, apart from once, she did not ask the boys about how the strap was applied to them.515

The use of this book was a very limited tool for controlling excessive punishment. Another department childcare officer, Roy Short, wrote in a memorandum in June 1975:

Indooroopilly is presently incapable of providing a satisfactory standard of care for the boys already there and for any who may be considered for placement there in the near future ... The type of child care practised [there] can be characterised in general as being inflexible, excessively punitive and authoritarian.516

Mr Short, who also appeared as a witness, concluded that ‘the staff in general has lacked the essential abilities to provide consistent care, nurture and understanding ... ’ He said his colleagues shared this view.517

Departmental staff had concerns about boys absconding and prostitution

Mr Short recorded that

‘On 13 March HT absconded again, but this time to Sydney. The police believe that he is still there and that his fare to Sydney was provided by the organisers of a male prostitution ring with whom it is believed he is still associating’.

He considered Captain McIver’s casework decision about HT ‘as having extremely destructive consequences for this child’.518 In a related memorandum on the same day, Mr Short wrote:

For about eight months now, various boys have been involved to differing degrees in a male prostitution racket. This involvement came to a head recently when two boys absconded to Sydney with the assistance of the organisers of the racket. One boy has since returned and the other is still believed to be in Sydney ...

The department published photographs of HT in Brisbane and Sydney newspapers.519 However, he was never found and did not return to Indooroopilly. Later records show that HT now lives in New South Wales.520
Like Mr Short, Ms Doyle was aware of concerns about a ‘male prostitution racket’ and spoke with police officer Mr David Jefferies (then of the Juvenile Aid Bureau).\footnote{521} Asked what action the department took to protect the boys, Ms Doyle said:

- the department would have heeded the advice of the police
- it would have informed the manager of Indooroopilly
- Ms Doyle would have ‘spent a lot of time with children, encouraging them not to go there, and talking to them about why they were going and what was happening’.\footnote{522}

Section 5.2 examines the role of the Queensland police in this episode. However, after so many years, we could not determine the nature of the ‘racket’, nor the involvement of the Indooroopilly boys.

**Department knew of frequent sexual activity and poor conditions at Riverview**

Meanwhile, at Riverview, department staff were aware of frequent sexual activity among the boys. In November 1973, one officer concluded that concerns about the home included not only the high absconding rate, but also:

- the incidence of homosexual assault, including ‘frank homosexual rape’
- the inadequacy of adult influence, supervision, guidance and counselling.\footnote{523}

Senior Childcare Officer Don Smith recorded in a memorandum that there were concerns about ‘the incidence of homosexual assault including straight out rape and stand-over tactics’.\footnote{524} Mr Smith stated that ‘about 50% of the boys are known to have actively taken part in homosexual activity while at Riverview’.\footnote{525} He reiterated that there were cases of ‘outright rape’, including ‘a very bad incident two or three months ago’.\footnote{526}

However, it appears these concerns were not widely communicated even within the department. Ms Doyle said that she was not told about the incidents at Riverview and she was shocked when she learned about Mr Smith’s memorandum in the witness box.\footnote{527}

To add to their concerns, department staff knew the home was in a deplorable, run-down and dangerous state and was unsuitable as a facility for the care of boys. Ms Doyle expressed shock at the conditions when she first went to Riverview in 1975.\footnote{528}

\begin{quote}
\textbf{Finding 26:} From at least 1973, senior officers of the Queensland Department of Children’s Services were well aware of frequent sexual activity between many of the boys at Riverview Boys’ Home, including occasions of rape.
\end{quote}

In relation to the high frequency of sexual activity and sexual abuse at Riverview, Mr Smith said that ‘the only answer seems to be the provision of adequate staff supervision coupled with an ongoing educational program for the boys’.\footnote{529} He concluded that:

- Riverview was understaffed
- staff were overworked and underpaid
- the budget was insufficient so the boys were unsupervised and unstimulated, and care was inadequate

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minimum standards were not being met and staff vacancies should be immediately filled.530

Ms Doyle was asked why the department did not remove the licence for Riverview, given its clear concerns. She said that the responsible Minister was reluctant to move against an institution run by any religious organisation, whether it was the Anglicans, the Catholics or The Salvation Army.531

Similarly, Assistant State Social Secretary Brigadier Geddes’ referred to the ‘discrete’[sic] way the department had dealt with accusations of child sexual abuse against Captain Donald Schultz, and added:

I feel that the high regard in which The Salvation Army is held in Government circles is responsible for the sympathetic handling of the situation.532

Other issues also affected the department’s approach to the homes. In a 1970 ministerial memorandum, the director wrote:

If the department was not in such urgent need of accommodation for boys in care and control I would not hesitate in recommending that the licence ... should be cancelled ... . The Salvation Army are well aware of conditions [at Riverview] and I have continuously been urging them to proceed with rebuilding.533

Ms Doyle accepted, as a consequence, that action was not taken that should have been taken with respect to particular institutions, including those run by The Salvation Army.534

She said that the department’s attitude was that everything should be done to help the relevant church before removing its licence. She thought the department reacted too slowly to concerns about Riverview.535

According to Mr Short, the number of boys placed at both homes fell from 1975 because of the conditions.536 By December 1976 there were only nine children left at Riverview.537 The home closed the following year.

Only six boys were at Indooroopilly by 1980, but there was still a ‘particularly high rate’ of offending and absconding.538 Ms Doyle gave evidence that the number of boys was crucial to the viability of the homes because they were financed ‘per head’.539 Fewer boys meant less government support.

Ms Doyle indicated that the department was not deliberately attacking those institutions by not referring boys there, but rather there was a ‘big systems change’ at the time.540 She summarised the reasons for the closure of many homes in a file note from 8 January 1981:

The factors that became obvious from looking at the closure of [Riverview], Kalimna and [Indooroopilly] are –

   The inability of The Salvation Army to change programme to meet the needs of children available for placement.

   The inability of The Salvation Army to provide adequate staff to implement a changed programme.
The inability of The Salvation Army to change its financial management in accordance with financial changes occurring at various times.\(^{541}\)

Ms Doyle agreed that her reference to an inability to ‘change programme’ included an inability to change the residential care model from one involving excessive physical punishment and harsh treatment.\(^{542}\)

The Department of Children’s Services responded to concerns about the conditions at the two homes by gradually restricting the number of boys placed there until they were eventually closed some years later.

The State of Queensland accepted that the response of the Department of Children’s Services was slow.\(^{543}\)

### 5.2 Queensland Police Service

To examine reports that Indooroopilly was connected with a child prostitution racket in the 1970s, we heard evidence from representatives of the Queensland Police Service. They also explained the nature of the service’s child protection practices around this time.

David Jefferies, a retired Assistant Commissioner of Police, had worked in the Juvenile Aid Bureau of the Queensland Police Service from 1968 to about 1989.\(^{544}\) These bureaus were established in 1963 but grew slowly, so there was only a small number of them in Brisbane by the early 1970s.\(^{545}\) Today, over 540 detectives state-wide work in child protection investigation units or CPIUs.

In the mid-1970s, Mr Jefferies became aware of ‘allegations that four paedophiles were grooming and offending against boys at various places, including certain Brisbane suburbs and at the Gold Coast’.\(^{546}\) Indooroopilly was one of those suburbs.\(^{547}\) Mr Jefferies said that he:

\[\text{understood from information obtained that there were boys who sold newspapers at the intersection of Moggill Road and Centenary Highway of an afternoon nearby the home … A signal had been arranged so that if the boys left a particular brick upright at that location, they would be available that evening. If they left the brick horizontal, they would be unavailable.}\]

\[\text{The Indooroopilly home was on Moggill Road, next to this intersection, but Mr Jefferies could not be sure that the newspaper sellers were ‘Alkira residents’.}\]

Nor could he be certain that HT was involved in the activities of suspected paedophiles in the Kenmore/Indooroopilly area in 1975.\(^{550}\) He received information around that time that a ‘millionaire’, JA, flew boys from Brisbane (or part of Queensland) to Sydney.\(^{551}\) But he could not say categorically that those boys came from the Indooroopilly home.\(^{552}\)

Mr Jefferies never spoke with Captain McIver, nor any other Salvation Army officer, about ‘suspected paedophiles preying upon boys at Indooroopilly’.\(^{553}\)

He could not recall whether he spoke about the matter with:

- Ms Janice Doyle or Roy Short of the Department of Children’s Services\(^{554}\)
The public hearing also heard from Detective Superintendent Cameron Harsley who leads the Child Safety and Sexual Crime Group, State Crime Command. He said he could not find any documents relating to HT, or any other documents about boys being taken from Indooroopilly to Sydney (or being helped to travel there) for sexual activity with adults.

Detective Superintendent Harsley said that if an allegation of child sexual abuse in an institution was made now, the matter would be referred to a regional Child Protection Investigation Unit (CPIU) or dealt with by the Child Safety and Sexual Crime Group.

If the complaint concerned a state-run institution, the welfare and protection of the alleged victim would be considered ‘paramount’ and the child might be moved to a different facility.

The alleged offender would be interviewed outside the workplace and, if there was enough evidence, charged and prosecuted. If bail were to be allowed, the conditions would restrict access to the child who complained.

Detective Harsley also described the difficulties in investigating historical claims of child sexual abuse. One problem is the applicable law as, for some offences, prosecutions must be started within six months of the offence occurring. Another problem is proving the offence without corroborative evidence.

The Royal Commission will be considering in detail the operation of the criminal justice systems in Australia.

### 5.3 Department of Child Welfare in New South Wales

To learn about the licensing arrangements in New South Wales, we heard evidence from Maree Walk, then Chief Executive of Community Services, a division of the Department of Family and Community Services (successor to the Department of Child Welfare). She had reviewed records relating to the Bexley and Gill homes, and told us the following.

From 1969, two types of licences were granted for children’s homes:
- a ‘licence to control’ for those people who had control over income, expenditure and staffing
- a ‘licence to conduct’ for the person responsible for the children’s day-to-day care and supervision.

When an application was made, a department officer would investigate and recommend that the Minister either grant or refuse the licence.

For The Salvation Army homes in New South Wales, a senior member of the Army held the licence to control, and the relevant manager held the licence to conduct. Captain Lawrence Wilson held the licences to conduct for Gill in 1971 and Bexley in 1973.

Wilson’s licence applications were available from departmental files. His 1970 application for Gill revealed he had worked at several department-run homes, including the Berry...
Training Farm. The report recommending acceptance of his application referred to his experience working at Daruk, Yasmir and Berry, and his ‘years of experience with boys’.

What the report did not refer to was the department’s personnel file on Wilson. The file included a recommendation that he not be employed after violent episodes towards boys at Berry. This called into question whether he was ‘a fit and proper person’ to conduct or control a childrens home.

Ms Walk admitted that the two licences were granted despite material on Wilson’s file. She said it was not clear ‘that it was custom or practice for us to look for the personnel files of previous employees’. She said it was likely that Wilson’s file was ‘overlooked by departmental officers reviewing his applications’, and there is nothing to suggest that it was the practice of the department to check the experience and qualifications of the applicant. Given the adverse recommendation against him, this was a significant omission.


Ms Walk also gave evidence about department staff visiting Bexley and Gill and reporting on the homes. The visits generally happened each quarter and reports were written afterwards. Ms Walk accepted that the reports:
- were cursory
- displayed a high level of generality
- reported on the general running of the homes rather than on the care of specific children
- occasionally commented on the children’s care generally.

Ms Walk said she would have expected specific allegations of excessive punishment or criminal acts to be recorded in the reports. However, allegations of sexual and physical abuse against Captain McIver at Bexley were not recorded. Ms Walk agreed, and we accept that it is most likely, that department staff were not told of abuse by McIver.

Finding 28: In the 1970s, the reports by officers of the Department of Child Welfare about visits to Bexley and Gill:
- were cursory
- displayed a high level of generality
- reported on the general running of the homes rather than on the care of specific children
- only occasionally commented on the children’s care generally.
It is also notable that visits by department staff do not feature in the boys’ memories of the homes. GH, a resident at Gill, stated that:

- the ‘welfare officers were never there’
- he had ‘never had any visitations by the welfare’
- he had never spoken with them about physical or sexual abuse
- he ‘didn’t even know they existed’, when asked if there was any way of contacting them.  

Mark Stiles, another Gill resident, did not remember seeing or speaking with a welfare officer during his time there. Similarly, Kevin Marshall did not recall ever having seen a welfare officer while at Bexley. He said that if he had been asked whether everything was all right, he would have answered, ‘Everything is fine’.  

Ms Walk said it appeared that there was not much interaction between the boys and the welfare officers.  

In late 1974, there was a large rise in absconding from Bexley when Captain Wilson was the manager. The Royal Commission received allegations that Wilson had sexually abused ET, FV, EP, EQ, FR and FX. We examined the records from the time to determine if there was a relationship between the two and what the department knew.

A district officer reported:

- ‘a sharp rise in the number [of] abscondings’ since the change in management in January 1974 – as many as 59
- ‘a number of serious problems [that] have evolved concerning morale and general behaviour of the charges’.  

The officer stated that the tone and morale among the boys seemed very cold and was becoming progressively worse.  

He tried to get to the bottom of the rise in absconding, questioning a number of the boys at Bexley and visiting local police stations. He was concerned about the handling of problems, observing that Wilson ‘at times, has misjudged the relevant facts and was, on one occasion in particular, trying to escape his responsibility to a particular case’.  

Although the officer could not determine a specific cause, he felt there was ‘lax supervision’ and the home was run in a ‘slap-happy’ manner. He also felt that the department had an obligation to intervene, investigate and possibly bring its concerns to the attention of The Salvation Army.  

Ms Walk accepted that ‘one of the contributing factors to that level of absconding may have been, if those allegations are true, that some of the boys were being sexually abused by the manager’. However, she also said that there was no evidence that the department or its staff were aware of any sexual abuse at Bexley. Further, she stated that it did not appear that there had been much interaction between the officer, as a visiting welfare officer, and the individual children.  

From its investigation, the department did not identify physical or sexual abuse as reasons for boys running away. Instead, it attributed the problem to ‘a lack of supervision, caused by
a lack of staff. It left the issue to the manager who succeeded Wilson to resolve. Ms Walk expressed ‘enormous regret … to see these big indications from young people about something that is not right and the response of the welfare department being this’.

**Finding 29:** It is likely that several factors led to sexual abuse not being considered as a cause for the absconding from Bexley Boys’ Home in 1974, including limited contact between officers of the Department of Child Welfare and the boys, and the boys’ reluctance to mention such matters.

Department and Salvation Army dealt with some matters without police input

In 1977, the department became aware of allegations that Lieutenant X14 was physically punishing boys at Gill. The manager already knew X14 had a history of violence towards children. Despite a recommendation that he be removed from the home, X14 stayed for two months after the allegations arose. During that time he was even put in charge, and assaulted another boy. Ms Walk accepted that this was ‘the worst possible outcome in terms of that boy’s experience’.

Ms Walk said that these sorts of physical assaults would today be referred directly to the police, rather than being raised with The Salvation Army. However, she said she was not surprised that this action was taken at the time, since ‘physical abuse of children, not just in the homes but in the community generally, was quite widespread’.

Ms Walk said that, at the time, ‘there would have been an agreement or a sense that severe physical abuse like this of a child in a home would not be reported to the police’. It is not necessarily the case that sexual abuse allegations were dealt with in the same way, but the example shows that some criminal matters were dealt with by the department and The Salvation Army without involving the police.

The State of New South Wales observed that many of the problems highlighted in this public hearing have been addressed in more recent developments in policy and legislation. Policies now cover mandatory reporting of child abuse, Working With Children Checks, reporting of physical and sexual violence to the police, and oversight and accreditation of out-of-home care for children.

Each of these matters will be the subject of further inquiry by the Royal Commission.

5.4 **New South Wales Police Force**

In this public hearing, we focused on the response to child sexual abuse when it happened. However, NSW Police also gave us information about the way The Salvation Army now passes on allegations, including those about abuse from many years ago.

Speaking about current practice, Detective Inspector Jacob, Manager of the Sex Crimes Team, Sex Crimes Squad, said that they do not ‘cold-call victims who haven’t engaged with the police’ other than in exceptional circumstances. This practice is based on advice from experts that it must be the victim’s choice to engage.
The police recognise there is a risk of re-traumatising victims of sexual abuse if they bring to victims’ notice matters from many years ago that the police have received from a third party. One ‘exceptional circumstance’ might be where an investigation was on foot, and a victim had identified another victim who might be able to help with that investigation.604

Detective Inspector Jacob also spoke of a NSW Police initiative that enables victims to report the circumstances of a crime without engaging formally in a police investigation.605 The ‘Sexual Assault Reporting Option’ is ‘used for therapeutic purposes for victims and for giving them an option, as well as intelligence potential for police.’606 The matters reported are entered on the Computerised Operational Policing System (COPS) system and available to all police officers with access to that system.607

There have been some problems with the communication of the ‘no cold-call’ policy to The Salvation Army. In 2008, Major Peter Farthing wrote to the police commissioners in NSW and Queensland about several complaints of sexual abuse that The Salvation Army had received against Wilson.608 The letters included a list of complainants and described the alleged abuse.609 Major Farthing explained:610

I have not enclosed the complete statement [of the complainants] at this stage out of respect for those who have made the complaint but the statement does highlight the severity of the sexual abuse. It is our thinking that the claimants might prefer to make their own choice as to whether they provide you with a detailed statement.

Around that time Major Farthing told the complainants that he had written to the police and said, ‘My assumption is that if the police decide to proceed with this, they will contact you. It would be then your choice whether you wish to cooperate with them in this matter or not.’611

However, in a reply to Major Farthing, Detective Inspector Jacob said that the Child Protection and Sex Crimes Squad would keep the details confidential, and that NSW Police would not start any investigations into the allegations. He added, ‘This will remain the case until the complainants choose to report any alleged crime(s) to us. In the absence of any such reports by these complainants, no further action will be taken by us at this time.’612

Major Farthing, however, did not then write to the complainants to pass on this information.613 The NSW Police did not ask The Salvation Army to tell the complainants to contact the police directly, although Detective Inspector Jacob said that he ‘meant to’ ask Major Farthing to do so.614

As the squad promised to keep Major Farthing’s information confidential, it was not entered in the COPS system.615 However, Detective Inspector Jacob later clarified that the information would in fact be available to the police through another information system called TRIM.616

As it turned out, Wilson died shortly after the exchange of correspondence between Major Farthing and Detective Inspector Jacob, and any investigation would have been too late for prosecution.
6.1 Managers and oversight

In each of the four homes, officers and staff reported to a manager, and the manager to the men’s state social services secretary. The manager had primary responsibility for the residents and staff, looking after discipline, complaint reporting and accountability.

Each manager was to run his home in line with The Salvation Army’s *Orders and Regulations for Social Work*. Specific requirements were set out in a chapter titled ‘Work Amongst Boys’ and included:

- no more than 50 boys living in the home
- officers referring to boys by their names rather than numbers
- punishments being as few as possible
- officers being patient with the boys’ ‘waywardness’.

However, Commissioner James Condon, territorial commander, agreed that many of these regulations were breached. He said he was surprised that the breaches occurred in an era of ‘strict regimentation’.

One of the main breaches related to punishment. The manager’s control over the residents was authoritarian and often enforced with physical punishment, although this was meant to be a last resort.

Policy required that the manager carry out all punishment. However, it appears that other officers frequently punished the boys. Further, some managers and staff engaged in acts of violence that went far beyond permissible corporal punishment by the standards of the day. Major Farthing observed, ‘Harsh, even cruel punishment was too often tolerated by managers, or perpetrated by managers’.

The use of violence created a sense of fear in the boys, so they were both unwilling and unable to report abuse they had suffered.

The manager’s relationship with officers and junior staff was also authoritarian. Evidence from retired officers was that, as lieutenants, they were ‘dogsbodies’ with no say in the home’s operation.

> **Finding 30:** Between 1965 and 1977, the four Salvation Army boys’ homes were each headed by a manager with a very high degree of control over the boys, the other officers and the staff at the home.

Processes for inspections and reporting

Between 1965 and 1977, The Salvation Army had a policy for inspecting its homes. This too was outlined in *Orders and Regulations for Social Work*, which required annual inspections by the state social services secretaries. 
One part of the inspections involved assessing the condition of the residents, including:

(i) The inspection of the actual food supplied, clothing, sleeping accommodation, and general arrangements for health and comfort.

(ii) Inquiry concerning their morals. The Inspecting Officer can only gain an idea of these by conversing with the inmates themselves.624

Inspecting officers had to write reports and keep journals that summarised all the interviews they had at the homes.625 However, staff and many former residents gave evidence that they did not experience regular inspections, or that they were not allowed to approach the visiting officers.626

The officers’ reports and journals were not available to the Royal Commission.627 When we asked Major Farthing how he knew that annual inspections took place, the major said that he received anecdotal evidence from retired executive officers and their personal assistants, but that he had not seen any documents.628

No other detailed records were kept of the homes or individual boys. Files only briefly touched on entry and exit from the homes, visits and corporal punishment (considered above).

This meant there was no close understanding of the boys, other than what individual officers could remember. Further, as Major Clifford Randall agreed, there was no requirement for:

- officers to report in writing to the manager
- the manager to report in writing to the divisional or social services secretary, apart from statistics about the number of the boys and the home’s finances.629

Although the Orders and Regulations for Officers gave general guidance for managing and disciplining officers and soldiers, there were no policies or procedures to formalise reporting and oversight.630

Major Farthing agreed that formal reporting and inspection from 1950 to 1980 was inadequate and The Salvation Army fundamentally failed to monitor each of the four homes.631 This meant that:

- the role of the social services secretaries in overseeing the managers was limited632
- managers had great control over the homes and headquarters had little influence
- inspections did not pick up the level of child sexual abuse that was taking place.

Commissioner Condon observed that The Salvation Army allowed managers to run harsh, overly regimented, dispiriting and even brutal homes.633 He connected these conditions with the abuse that occurred:

“In those repressive environments, evil and damaged people were able to get away with child sexual abuse for too long. I think that is The Salvation Army’s greatest failure.”634

The Randalls also gave the Royal Commission detailed evidence about their experiences at Indooroopilly between 1973 and 1975. They said that when they told state and territorial
headquarters about allegations relating to Captain Lawrence Wilson and Captain John McIver:

- neither Brigadier Reddie nor Colonel Gordon Peterson investigated the allegations other than to communicate with the manager
- neither captain faced any disciplinary action.

Finding 31: Between 1965 and 1977, The Salvation Army’s policies and procedures for oversight of the managers in the four boys’ homes did not enable the prevention or detection of child sexual abuse or excessive punishment.

6.2 Complaints system

Under The Salvation Army’s regulations and practice, the manager had the central role in determining all complaints about the boys’ care and discipline, including child sexual abuse. In theory, a boy or junior staff member could complain to the manager, but this was neither advertised nor encouraged.

If complaints arose during an inspection, the manager had the right to be notified and to respond, even if a complaint was about him.

In the case of the Randalls, this meant not only that their complaint to Colonel Peterson was conveyed back to Captain McIver, but also that the manager’s account was accepted over theirs without further investigation.

Senior officers and managers were often believed over more junior staff who reported misconduct. No apparent conflicts of interest were acknowledged.

Major Farthing agreed that it was a rare complaint that was raised with divisional or territorial headquarters. He also agreed that the focus on individual managers resolving complaints showed an ‘over-reliance on the character and decision-making ability of individuals within the hierarchy at The Salvation Army’.

Finding 32: Between 1965 and 1977, the divisional and territorial headquarters of The Salvation Army had a practice of deferring to the manager of the boys’ home when a subordinate officer or resident complained about that manager. Those who did come forward with allegations found that their complaints were unlikely to be believed and these were not referred to the police.

While the regulations did encourage complaints to be brought to the attention of the inspecting officer (who ‘should be approachable by all concerned’), this was simply unlikely to happen.

Commissioner Condon acknowledged that in practice complaints were stymied by a culture of fear of punishment in the homes. He also agreed that the arrival of an officer in

Report of Case Study No. 5
Salvation Army uniform, whom the boys would have associated with the manager, was likely to have been a substantial hurdle to them making complaints.\textsuperscript{642}

The annual inspections by senior officers were, therefore, an inadequate way to discover incidents of child sexual abuse or excessive physical punishment.

Boys were generally in a vulnerable position. They had no ‘right of appeal’ beyond the manager and, while welfare officers interviewed them from time to time, there was ‘no formal pathway to take a complaint outside the home’.\textsuperscript{643}

When abuse was reported, we have seen that the boys were often disbelieved\textsuperscript{644} or physically punished for coming forward.

Commissioner Condon gave evidence that written policies for the homes were scant:

There were no written policies for responding to allegations of child sexual abuse. It was not until 1988 that the territory first adopted such policies. That year saw the release of an internal Social Department memo titled, ‘Statement of Policy and Procedures for investigation of reports involving staff use of inappropriate forms of discipline or punishment, or being involved in any form of abuse or assault of a child in care’.\textsuperscript{645}

At the time of sexual abuse allegations arising at the four boys’ homes in this case study, The Salvation Army had no clear policies for reporting allegations of criminal offences.

The public hearing heard specific examples of managers and senior officers resisting the involvement of the police or welfare department. For example, officers were concerned that allegations against X17 of sexual abuse were in the hands of police, although he was ultimately convicted.

Without an adverse finding on a personnel file, or a referral to the police, those who later oversaw these officers did not necessarily know of previous allegations of physical or sexual abuse.

\textbf{Finding 33:} Between 1965 and 1977 The Salvation Army did not have clear policies for reporting allegations of criminal offences to the police.

\textbf{Common warning signs were missed}

Ms Walk said that children will generally only report child sexual abuse to someone they trust.

She said that if children were unable to establish these relationships – because of structural issues and culture – they would feel isolated and powerless.\textsuperscript{646} At the four homes, the fear engendered in the boys and the disbelief that met their complaints undermined the efficacy of the rudimentary complaints process in the homes.

Other warning signs of possible child sexual abuse do not appear to have been investigated. Many of the boys resident in the four homes recounted hearing other boys crying and
screaming inside officers’ rooms. Wilson’s ‘medical parades’ appear never to have been investigated. The use of a ‘cage’ or room for solitary confinement of children at Riverview appears to have occurred without concern being formally expressed within The Salvation Army.

**Finding 34:** Between 1965 and 1977 The Salvation Army did not have a system which allowed complaints of child sexual abuse against managers and staff at its four boys’ homes to be independently determined.

### 6.3 Staff training and numbers

The ability of The Salvation Army and its officers to prevent and respond to child sexual abuse was also affected by staff training.

Officers and staff generally transferred to the homes from elsewhere in The Salvation Army, without going through a selection process or background check.

Those who attended the College for Officer Training and were then assigned to a home did not take any specific courses on child care, although they ‘would have had a couple of days [study] on ... children’s work’.

Major Farthing thought that limited time was spent on ‘social work’ at the college, but he said that this was inadequate preparation for the homes. He felt that many officers were not trained properly, even though relevant courses were available from the Department of Community Services and officers from Salvation Army girls homes attended them.

The Salvation Army said that new officers were put to work without any (introductory) training. The on-the-job training that did occur put a strain on incumbent officers and kept them from their other duties. There was no practice of having staff meetings where issues could be raised or improvements discussed.

This meant that staff were unlikely to have more than a general awareness of behaviour that might have indicated child sexual abuse. They were not taught:

- how or whether to investigate suspicions of abuse
- how to help a boy who had been abused.

The Salvation Army had no child protection policies to guide them.

Moreover, turnover was high, and staff were transferred in and out of the homes generally in January each year. Staffing was an issue that recurred in numerous accounts.

In 1947, for example, six officers cared for around 75 to 80 boys at the Gill home. Departmental file notes on Indooroopilly and Riverview indicated that there were not sufficient numbers of adequate and suitable staff. Notes for Bexley recorded a high rate of absconding in 1975 based on inadequate staff numbers.

We heard that officers generally lived in the homes and were expected to supervise boys from the morning to the evening, sometimes up to 14 hours a day.
These staff shortages meant The Salvation Army had a far more limited capacity to care for individual boys. It is reasonable to conclude that limited numbers had an impact on the ability of the staff to observe and respond to child sexual abuse.

Finding 35: Between 1965 and 1977, The Salvation Army failed to provide sufficient appropriately trained staff in its four boys’ homes to ensure an environment suitable for the care and safety of children.

6.4 Transfer of officers

The five officers accused of abuse discussed in Section 3 had worked in more than one of the four homes. Two of them, Bennett and Wilson, had worked in all four.

However, the evidence we heard revealed that, because the complaints process was absent or inadequate, allegations against the five officers were not considered when they were being placed in homes. In most cases, those in The Salvation Army who decided to transfer these officers were not aware of the complaints against them.

Commissioner Condon gave evidence that Salvation Army officers were, historically, moved from ‘town to town as often as once or twice a year, because they were viewed as evangelists rather than as settled pastors’. This changed in later years but ‘during the 1940s–1970s it remained normal for them to be moved every two to four years’. 657 Officers who had completed a year or two in one boys’ home ‘might be transferred to another, simply because that was the normal practice’. 658

Major Farthing’s evidence on this point was consistent with Commissioner Condon’s. 659 Normally, officers would be transferred in January and no record was kept of the reasons for the transfer. 660

Major Farthing said there was no policy of moving ‘offenders between boys’ homes’, nor was there a policy of moving offenders to non-child related roles. 661 He added: 662

Was there ever a time when senior people at territorial headquarters knew someone was a child sex offender and they moved them? Not to my knowledge. No knowledge of that ever happening – not to another boys’ home.

However, Major Farthing acknowledged that such a transfer did occur in Wilson’s case: ‘I guess with Wilson, we did know. We had that report and he was moved to another home.’ 663

The lack of child protection policies meant that when complaints against Wilson arose in 1964–1965, 1972 and 1974–1975, there was no formal investigation. We only know of the complaints from people who learnt about them second hand, and we did not receive any written records from the time.

There was no evidence that could lead us to find that Wilson was transferred to Gill in 1970, Indooroopilly in 1973 or Bexley in 1974 because he had allegedly sexually abused children in his care.
This pointed to a more fundamental problem: the lack of adequate and formal investigation meant that Wilson was able to move from home to home without hindrance. Sixteen former residents of those three homes later made allegations of abuse against Wilson.

Schultz was moved out of the division of social services that included boys’ homes after ‘suspicions’ were acknowledged about him, although allegations of child sexual abuse were not established to The Salvation Army’s satisfaction.664

McIver also stopped working as the manager at Indooroopilly after numerous allegations of excessive physical punishment (but not sexual abuse). He did not work again in boys’ homes. Because of the timing of the transfer, it could be inferred that he was removed from his position because of the allegations.

However, in the majority of cases, incidents of child sexual abuse were not conveyed to those in The Salvation Army outside the four homes. The senior officer who considered transfers (typically the social services secretary) was simply unaware of allegations because of:

• the inadequate oversight and complaint systems
• the failure to investigate
• the lack of policies and procedures to deal with child sexual abuse.

Finding 36: Between 1965 and 1977, officers who were alleged or found to have engaged in child sexual abuse were transferred between the four boys’ homes.

In the majority of cases, incidents of child sexual abuse were not conveyed to those in The Salvation Army outside the four homes. The senior officer who considered transfers (typically the social services secretary) was simply unaware of allegations because of:

• the inadequate oversight and complaint systems
• the failure to investigate
• the lack of policies and procedures to deal with child sexual abuse.

6.5 Apologies and redress

Claims process is examined in the second Case Study concerning The Salvation Army

This case study focused on the experience of the boys who were sexually abused at The Salvation Army’s homes and the responses at the time to allegations of child sexual abuse.

In the second case study concerning The Salvation Army, we examine The Salvation Army’s response to claims by former residents and others who came forward many years later to report the abuse they had suffered.
The claims process, also known as ‘restorative justice’, is explored at length in that case study. However, it is worth noting here that The Salvation Army has taken significant steps to respond to allegations against its officers and staff.

**Response to claims has changed over time to offer ‘support and justice’**

The Salvation Army has developed its current approach to child sexual abuse claims over time. Major Farthing told us that when people first started to come forward with ‘complaints of abuse’ in the mid-1990s, The Salvation Army’s policy was to be compassionate but not admit wrongdoing: ‘We won’t say sorry and we won’t make a payment unless the person can prove in court that the offence took place.’ Major Farthing added, ‘As I understand, that was on legal advice.’

Major Farthing said that approach started to change from about 1995:

> We got rid of the lawyers who were advising us that way, and the secretary of personnel at that stage said, ‘No, we’re not going to do that. We’re going to start engaging with people.’ So they began to meet with people, and they set up a process where we had an independent contact person who would go and meet with the person with a view to bringing about some degree of justice and healing, and they would offer counselling support.

Commissioner Condon gave evidence that The Salvation Army now adopts a ‘restorative justice approach to assist people who come to [it] with complaints of sexual abuse and other mistreatment’.

Elements of this approach include inviting ‘all who were harmed to get in touch’ with The Salvation Army, offering professional counselling, apologising to the person and providing an ‘ex-gratia’ payment.

**Salvation Army has apologised in context of national apologies**

One major element of The Salvation Army’s response has been public and national apologies. These have occurred in the context of apologies to those, known as the ‘Forgotten Australians’, who were placed in orphanages and similar institutions by state governments and religious organisations.

On 25 September 1999, after the Forde Inquiry, The Salvation Army (Eastern Territory) jointly signed an apology with the State of Queensland, the Anglican Church, the Catholic Church and others. The apology reads, in part:

> We sincerely apologise to all those people who suffered in any way while resident in our facilities, and express deep sorrow and regret at the hurt and distress suffered by those who were victims of abuse.

That apology was given in the context of apologies for government-run institutions given by the Premier of New South Wales on 19 September 2009, and by the Prime Minister on 16 November 2009 after the *Forgotten Australians* report by a Senate Committee.
On 7 December 2010, The Salvation Army publicly apologised to ‘former residents of any of its children’s homes who experienced abuse of any sort during the period up until the early 1990s’.671

At Old Parliament House in Canberra, General Clifton expressed The Salvation Army’s regret that some children ‘did not benefit from their experience and were not well cared for by our staff’. He went on:

We acknowledge that at certain times in our history, the atmosphere in some homes was rigid, harsh, and authoritarian. Many children did not experience the gentleness of love that they needed. Some children suffered abuse and deprivation. As a result their stories are full of hurt, rejection, discouragement and a failure to realise potential.

As the International Leader of The Salvation Army, I express to all Australian care leavers, our deepest sorrow for these failures and hurts. The Salvation Army offers you our heartfelt apology. To you all, we say 'Sorry.'

That greater love was not given when you were so vulnerable – we are sorry.

For any harsh words, violent actions or abuse – we are sorry. These should never have happened.

For when you tried to speak out and you were not listened to or believed – we are sorry.

That the process of being placed in care meant for some that you lost family and extended family – we are sorry.

For those who did not find the support you needed as you grieved for your losses – we are sorry.

To our Indigenous care leavers, for the loss of culture and connection to your land – we are sorry.

For those who could not navigate the pain of their life experience and are no longer with us – we are deeply sorry.

To your families, your wives and husbands, your children, your partners, who have also suffered because the deprivations of childhood can impact on adulthood relationships – to you we say sorry.

The Salvation Army acknowledges that you were not to blame for what you experienced. We are now listening to your life stories.672

General Clifton thanked Jim Luthy, President of the Care Leavers Australia Network (CLAN), for having the courage to write to him and initiate the idea that culminated in the gathering at Old Parliament House. He acknowledged CLAN’s support.673 Mr Luthy also spoke and, on behalf of many former residents of the boys’ and girls’ homes, expressed his strong criticism of The Salvation Army and the way the homes operated.674
On 8 February 2014, the current General of The Salvation Army, Andre Cox, echoed the words of General’s Clifton’s apology in a letter to the Chair of the Royal Commission, Justice Peter McClellan.675

And in his evidence to the Royal Commission, Commissioner Condon also expressed remorse:

Once again I want to express our unreserved apology to all who were harmed in any way at all. We are so sorry for every instance when children were sexually abused by our personnel, or while in our care. We are so very sorry for each instance where they felt unable to complain or for when they did, they were not believed. It is our firm resolve to do what is right by care leavers who were abused.676
7 Systemic issues

This case study highlights:

- training and supervision of staff working with children
- mechanisms for handling complaints of sexual abuse from children
- oversight of staff and institutions working with children in out-of-home care
- reporting of physical and sexual abuse to child protection authorities
- reporting of physical and sexual abuse to the police
- record keeping in non-government institutions.
APPENDIX A: Terms of Reference

Letters Patent dated 11 January 2013

ELIZABETH THE SECOND, by the Grace of God Queen of Australia and Her other Realms and Territories, Head of the Commonwealth:

TO

The Honourable Justice Peter David McClellan AM,
Mr Robert Atkinson,
The Honourable Justice Jennifer Ann Coate,
Mr Robert William Fitzgerald AM,
Dr Helen Mary Milroy, and
Mr Andrew James Marshall Murray

GREETING

WHEREAS all children deserve a safe and happy childhood.

AND Australia has undertaken international obligations to take all appropriate legislative, administrative, social and educational measures to protect children from sexual abuse and other forms of abuse, including measures for the prevention, identification, reporting, referral, investigation, treatment and follow up of incidents of child abuse.

AND all forms of child sexual abuse are a gross violation of a child’s right to this protection and a crime under Australian law and may be accompanied by other unlawful or improper treatment of children, including physical assault, exploitation, deprivation and neglect.

AND child sexual abuse and other related unlawful or improper treatment of children have a long-term cost to individuals, the economy and society.

AND public and private institutions, including child care, cultural, educational, religious, sporting and other institutions, provide important services and support for children and their families that are beneficial to children’s development.

AND it is important that claims of systemic failures by institutions in relation to allegations and incidents of child sexual abuse and any related unlawful or improper treatment of children be fully explored, and that best practice is identified so that it may be followed in the future both to protect against the occurrence of child sexual abuse and to respond appropriately when any allegations and incidents of child sexual abuse occur, including holding perpetrators to account and providing justice to victims.

AND it is important that those sexually abused as a child in an Australian institution can share their experiences to assist with healing and to inform the development of strategies and reforms that your inquiry will seek to identify.

AND noting that, without diminishing its criminality or seriousness, your inquiry will not specifically examine the issue of child sexual abuse and related matters outside institutional
contexts, but that any recommendations you make are likely to improve the response to all forms of child sexual abuse in all contexts.

AND all Australian Governments have expressed their support for, and undertaken to cooperate with, your inquiry.

NOW THEREFORE We do, by these Our Letters Patent issued in Our name by Our Governor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia on the advice of the Federal Executive Counsel and under the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, the Royal Commissions Act 1902 and every other enabling power, appoint you to be a Commission of inquiry, and require and authorise you, to inquire into institutional responses to allegations and incidents of child sexual abuse and related matters, and in particular, without limiting the scope of your inquiry, the following matters:

a. what institutions and governments should do to better protect children against child sexual abuse and related matters in institutional contexts in the future;

b. what institutions and governments should do to achieve best practice in encouraging the reporting of, and responding to reports or information about, allegations, incidents or risks of child sexual abuse and related matters in institutional contexts;

c. what should be done to eliminate or reduce impediments that currently exist for responding appropriately to child sexual abuse and related matters in institutional contexts, including addressing failures in, and impediments to, reporting, investigating and responding to allegations and incidents of abuse;

d. what institutions and governments should do to address, or alleviate the impact of, past and future child sexual abuse and related matters in institutional contexts, including, in particular, in ensuring justice for victims through the provision of redress by institutions, processes for referral for investigation and prosecution and support services.

AND We direct you to make any recommendations arising out of your inquiry that you consider appropriate, including recommendations about any policy, legislative, administrative or structural reforms.

AND, without limiting the scope of your inquiry or the scope of any recommendations arising out of your inquiry that you may consider appropriate, We direct you, for the purposes of your inquiry and recommendations, to have regard to the following matters:

e. the experience of people directly or indirectly affected by child sexual abuse and related matters in institutional contexts, and the provision of opportunities for them to share their experiences in appropriate ways while recognising that many of them will be severely traumatised or will have special support needs;

f. the need to focus your inquiry and recommendations on systemic issues, recognising nevertheless that you will be informed by individual cases and may need to make referrals to appropriate authorities in individual cases;

g. the adequacy and appropriateness of the responses by institutions, and their officials, to reports and information about allegations, incidents or risks of child sexual abuse and related matters in institutional contexts;

h. changes to laws, policies, practices and systems that have improved over time the ability of institutions and governments to better protect against and respond to child sexual abuse and related matters in institutional contexts.
AND We further declare that you are not required by these Our Letters Patent to inquire, or to continue to inquire, into a particular matter to the extent that you are satisfied that the matter has been, is being, or will be, sufficiently and appropriately dealt with by another inquiry or investigation or a criminal or civil proceeding.

AND, without limiting the scope of your inquiry or the scope of any recommendations arising out of your inquiry that you may consider appropriate, We direct you, for the purposes of your inquiry and recommendations, to consider the following matters, and We authorise you to take (or refrain from taking) any action that you consider appropriate arising out of your consideration:

i. the need to establish mechanisms to facilitate the timely communication of information, or the furnishing of evidence, documents or things, in accordance with section 6P of the Royal Commissions Act 1902 or any other relevant law, including, for example, for the purpose of enabling the timely investigation and prosecution of offences;

j. the need to establish investigation units to support your inquiry;

k. the need to ensure that evidence that may be received by you that identifies particular individuals as having been involved in child sexual abuse or related matters is dealt with in a way that does not prejudice current or future criminal or civil proceedings or other contemporaneous inquiries;

l. the need to establish appropriate arrangements in relation to current and previous inquiries, in Australia and elsewhere, for evidence and information to be shared with you in ways consistent with relevant obligations so that the work of those inquiries, including, with any necessary consents, the testimony of witnesses, can be taken into account by you in a way that avoids unnecessary duplication, improves efficiency and avoids unnecessary trauma to witnesses;

m. the need to ensure that institutions and other parties are given a sufficient opportunity to respond to requests and requirements for information, documents and things, including, for example, having regard to any need to obtain archived material.

AND We appoint you, the Honourable Justice Peter David McClellan AM, to be the Chair of the Commission.

AND We declare that you are a relevant Commission for the purposes of sections 4 and 5 of the Royal Commissions Act 1902.

AND We declare that you are authorised to conduct your inquiry into any matter under these Our Letters Patent in combination with any inquiry into the same matter, or a matter related to that matter, that you are directed or authorised to conduct by any Commission, or under any order or appointment, made by any of Our Governors of the States or by the Government of any of Our Territories.

AND We declare that in these Our Letters Patent:


government means the Government of the Commonwealth or of a State or Territory, and includes any non-government institution that undertakes, or has undertaken, activities on behalf of a government.
institution means any public or private body, agency, association, club, institution, organisation or other entity or group of entities of any kind (whether incorporated or unincorporated), and however described, and:

i. includes, for example, an entity or group of entities (including an entity or group of entities that no longer exists) that provides, or has at any time provided, activities, facilities, programs or services of any kind that provide the means through which adults have contact with children, including through their families; and

ii. does not include the family.

institutional context: child sexual abuse happens in an institutional context if, for example:

i. it happens on premises of an institution, where activities of an institution take place, or in connection with the activities of an institution; or

ii. it is engaged in by an official of an institution in circumstances (including circumstances involving settings not directly controlled by the institution) where you consider that the institution has, or its activities have, created, facilitated, increased, or in any way contributed to, (whether by act or omission) the risk of child sexual abuse or the circumstances or conditions giving rise to that risk; or

iii. it happens in any other circumstances where you consider that an institution is, or should be treated as being, responsible for adults having contact with children.

law means a law of the Commonwealth or of a State or Territory.

official, of an institution, includes:

i. any representative (however described) of the institution or a related entity; and

ii. any member, officer, employee, associate, contractor or volunteer (however described) of the institution or a related entity; and

iii. any person, or any member, officer, employee, associate, contractor or volunteer (however described) of a body or other entity, who provides services to, or for, the institution or a related entity; and

iv. any other person who you consider is, or should be treated as if the person were, an official of the institution.

related matters means any unlawful or improper treatment of children that is, either generally or in any particular instance, connected or associated with child sexual abuse.

AND We:

n. require you to begin your inquiry as soon as practicable, and

o. require you to make your inquiry as expeditiously as possible; and

p. require you to submit to Our Governor-General:

i. first and as soon as possible, and in any event not later than 30 June 2014 (or such later date as Our Prime Minister may, by notice in the Gazette, fix on your recommendation), an initial report of the results of your inquiry, the recommendations for early consideration you may consider appropriate to make in this initial report, and your recommendation for the date, not later than 31 December 2015, to be fixed for the submission of your final report; and
then and as soon as possible, and in any event not later than the date Our Prime Minister may, by notice in the Gazette, fix on your recommendation, your final report of the results of your inquiry and your recommendations; and

q. authorise you to submit to Our Governor-General any additional interim reports that you consider appropriate.

IN WITNESS, We have caused these Our Letters to be made Patent.

WITNESS Quentin Bryce, Governor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia.

Dated 11th January 2013

Governor-General

By Her Excellency’s Command

Prime Minister

ELIZABETH THE SECOND, by the Grace of God Queen of Australia and Her other Realms and Territories, Head of the Commonwealth:

TO

The Honourable Justice Peter David McClellan AM,
Mr Robert Atkinson,
The Honourable Justice Jennifer Ann Coate,
Mr Robert William Fitzgerald AM,
Dr Helen Mary Milroy, and
Mr Andrew James Marshall Murray

GREETING

WHEREAS We, by Our Letters Patent issued in Our name by Our Governor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia, appointed you to be a Commission of inquiry, required and authorised you to inquire into certain matters, and required you to submit to Our Governor-General a report of the results of your inquiry, and your recommendations, not later than 31 December 2015.

AND it is desired to amend Our Letters Patent to require you to submit to Our Governor-General a report of the results of your inquiry, and your recommendations, not later than 15 December 2017.

NOW THEREFORE We do, by these Our Letters Patent issued in Our name by Our Governor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia on the advice of the Federal Executive Council and under the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, the Royal Commissions Act 1902 and every other enabling power, amend the Letters Patent issued to you by omitting from subparagraph (p)(i) of the Letters Patent “31 December 2015” and substituting “15 December 2017”.

IN WITNESS, We have caused these Our Letters to be made Patent.

WITNESS General the Honourable Sir Peter Cosgrove AK MC (Ret’d), Governor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia.

Dated 13th November 2014

Governor-General

By Her Excellency’s Command

Prime Minister
## APPENDIX B: Public Hearing

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| **Date of hearing** | 28 January 2014–7 February 2014, 10 February 2014 (9 days) |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Legislation</strong></th>
<th><em>Royal Commissions Act 1902 (Cth)</em></th>
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<tr>
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<td><em>Royal Commissions Act 1923 (NSW)</em></td>
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<td><em>Commissions of Inquiry Act 1950 (Qld)</em></td>
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<tr>
<th><strong>Leave to appear</strong></th>
<th>The State of Queensland</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The New South Wales Police Force</td>
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<td></td>
<td>The New South Wales Department of Family and Community Services</td>
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<td></td>
<td>The Salvation Army Australia Eastern Territory</td>
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<td></td>
<td>The Salvation Army (NSW) Property Trust</td>
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<td>The Salvation Army (Qld) Property Trust</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Commissioner Raymond James Condon, territorial commander of The Salvation Army</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Major Peter Farthing</td>
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<tr>
<th><strong>Legal representation</strong></th>
<th>S Beckett, Counsel Assisting the Royal Commission</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D Kent QC and T Keyes, instructed by M Zemek of Crown Law, appearing for the State of Queensland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>J Agius SC, and N Kelly, instructed by I Fraser, Acting Special Counsel of the Crown Solicitor, appearing for the New South Wales Police Force and the New South Wales Department of Family and Community Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>K Eastman SC, T McDonald SC and H Younan, instructed by L Geary of Salvos Legal, appearing for The Salvation Army (NSW) Property Trust, The Salvation Army (Qld) Property Trust</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Pages of transcript</strong></td>
<td>969 pages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Notices to produce issued</strong></td>
<td>7 notices to produce, producing 697 documents</td>
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<td><strong>under the Royal Commissions Act 1902 (Cth)</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Summons to attend under the Royal Commissions Act 1923 (NSW)</strong></td>
<td>25 summonses to attend, producing 29,297 documents</td>
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<td><strong>Requirements to produce under the Commissions of Inquiry Act 1950 (QLD)</strong></td>
<td>10 requirements to produce, producing 3,742 documents</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Number of exhibits</strong></td>
<td>65 exhibits consisting of 1106 documents tendered at the hearing</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Witnesses</strong></td>
<td>Raymond Carlile, Riverview resident</td>
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<td>Witness EG, Riverview resident</td>
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<td>Wallace McLeod, Riverview resident</td>
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<td>Witness FP, Riverview resident</td>
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<td>Witness EY, Riverview resident</td>
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<td>Witness EE, Riverview resident</td>
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<td>Witness ES, Riverview resident</td>
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<td>Witness FV, Bexley Resident</td>
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<td>Detective Inspector Cunningham, New South Wales Police Force</td>
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<td>Witness ET, Bexley Resident</td>
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<td>Kevin Marshall, Bexley Resident</td>
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<td>Witness GH, Gill Resident</td>
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<td>Mark Stiles, Gill Resident</td>
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<td>Witness EF, Indooroopilly resident</td>
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<td>Clifford Randall, The Salvation Army (retired)</td>
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<td>Marina Randall, The Salvation Army (retired)</td>
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<td>Detective Superintendent Harsley, Queensland Police</td>
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<td>David Jeffries, Queensland Police</td>
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<td>Roy Short, Retired, formerly of the Queensland Department of Children’s Services</td>
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<td>Janice Doyle, Retired, formerly of the Queensland Department of Children’s Services</td>
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Report of Case Study No. 5
Stephen Habermann, Queensland Department of Communities, Child Safety & Disability Services
Maree Walk, CEO, Community Services, a division of Department of Family & Community Services (NSW)
Detective Inspector Jacob, New South Wales Police Force
Major Peter Farthing, The Salvation Army
Commissioner James Condon, The Salvation Army
Endnotes

1 Exhibit 5-0005, STAT.0102.001.0001_M_R, Statement of EG at para 7; Exhibit 5-0004, STAT.0108.001.0001_M_R, Statement of Raymond Carlile at para 6; Exhibit 5-0007, STAT.0104.001.0001_M_R, Statement of FP at para 4.
2 Transcript of J Walk, 4587: 13-17 (Day 44).
3 Transcript of J Walk, 4588: 43-44 (Day 44).
4 Transcript of J Walk, 4586: 5-18 (Day 44).
5 Exhibit 5-0008, STAT.0103.001.0001_M_R, Statement of EY at para 9; See also Exhibit 5-0005, STAT.0102.001.0001_M_R, Statement of EG at para 9.
6 Exhibit 5-0005, STAT.0102.001.0001_M_R, Statement of EG at para 7; Exhibit 5-0004, STAT.0108.001.0001_M_R, Statement of Raymond Carlile at para 6; Exhibit 5-0007, STAT.0104.001.0001_M_R, Statement of FP at para 4.
7 Exhibit 5-0001, TEN.0003.001.0122, Document entitled “Appendix 2 - Survey on 62 Boys who attended Endeavour Training Farm School from August 1973 to March 1974”.
9 Exhibit 5-0017, STAT.0114.001.0001_M_R, Statement of ET at para 18 and 19.
17 Exhibit 5-0003, EXH.005.003.0001, document entitled “Attachment A - The Salvation Army Ranks”.
18 Exhibit 5-0001, TSAE.9100.01086.0356, Document entitled, “Salvation Army Territorial Social Services Organizational Chart 1966-1972”.
22 Transcript of R Short 4440: 23-36 (Day 43); see also Transcript 3866: 27-37 (Day 37).
23 Transcript of R Carlile, T3904: 6-17 (Day 37); Exhibit 5-0004, STAT.0108.001.0001_M_R, Statement of Raymond Carlile at para 6 and 10.
24 Transcript of R Carlile, T3903: 34-37 (Day 37).
25 Transcript of R Carlile, T3906: 34-37 (Day 37).
26 Transcript of R Carlile, T3906: 9-12 (Day 37).
27 Transcript of R Carlile, T3907: 37 (Day 37).
28 Transcript of R Carlile, T3907: 43-45 (Day 37).
29 Transcript of R Carlile, T3911: 11-45 (Day 37).
30 Exhibit 5-0004, STAT.0108.001.0001_M_R, Statement of Raymond Carlile at para 8 – 10.
31 Exhibit 5-0004, STAT.0108.001.0001_M_R, Statement of Raymond Carlile at para 8.
32 Transcript of R Carlile, T3909: 26-30 (Day 37), Transcript of R Carlile, T3917: 27-29 (Day 37).
33 Exhibit 5-0004, STAT.0108.001.0001_M_R, Statement of Raymond Carlile at para 10.
34 Transcript of R Carlile, T3915: 6-8 (Day 37).
35 Exhibit 5-0004, STAT.0108.001.0001_M_R, Statement of Raymond Carlile at para 11.
36 Transcript of R Carlile, T3915: 12-13 (Day 37); Exhibit 5-0004, STAT.0108.001.0001_M_R, Raymond Carlile, at RC1.
37 Exhibit 5-0005, STAT.0102.001.0001_M_R, Statement of EG at para 7.
38 Exhibit 5-0005, STAT.0102.001.0001_M_R, Statement of EG at para 11.
39 Exhibit 5-0005, STAT.0102.001.0001_M_R, Statement of EG at para 30; 32 and 35.
40 Exhibit 5-0005 STAT.0102.001.0001_M_R, Statement of EG at para 10; Transcript of EG, T3926: 35-38 (Day 37).
41 Transcript of EG, T3927: 19-20 (Day 37).
Transcript of EG, T3928: 8-13 (Day 37).

Exhibit 5-0005, STAT.0102.001.0001_M_R, Statement of EG at para 23; Transcript of EG, T3933: 25-32 (Day 37).

Exhibit 5-0005, STAT.0102.001.0001_M_R, Statement of EG at para 22.

Exhibit 5-0005, STAT.0102.001.0001_M_R, Statement of EG at para 22.

Exhibit 5-0005, STAT.0102.001.0001_M_R, Statement of EG at para 20.

Exhibit 5-0005, STAT.0102.001.0001_M_R, Statement of EG at para 21.

Exhibit 5-0005, STAT.0102.001.0001_M_R, Statement of EG at para 21; Transcript of EG, T3932: 26-39 (Day 37).

Transcript of EG, T3930: 31-43 (Day 37).

Exhibit 5-0005, STAT.0102.001.0001_M_R, Statement of EG at para 48.

Transcript of FP, T3978: 41-43 (Day 38).


Exhibit 5-0007, STAT.0104.001.0001_M_R, Statement of FP at para 17.

Transcript of FP, T3980: 15-18 (Day 38).

Transcript of FP, T3981: 39-45 (Day 38).

Transcript of FP, T3987: 35-46 (Day 38).

Transcript of FP, T3997: 47-T3998: 21 (Day 38); Exhibit 5-0007, STAT.0104.001.0001_M_R, Statement of FP at para 39.

Transcript of EY, T4001: 34-T4002: 2 (Day 38).

Transcript of EY, T4003: 5-9 (Day 38).

Transcript of EY, T4003: 19-34 (Day 38).

Transcript of EY, T4002: 24-28 (Day 38).

Transcript of EY, T4004: 37-46 (Day 38).

Transcript of EY, T4004: 11-43 (Day 38).

Transcript of EE, T4020: 33-34 (Day 38).

Transcript of EE, T4020: 34-T4021: 3 (Day 38).

Transcript of EE, T4024: 20-31 (Day 38).

Transcript of EE, T4024: 38-T4025: 6 (Day 38).

Transcript of EE, T4025: 46-T4026: 20 (Day 38).

Transcript of EE, T4028: 11-43 (Day 38).

Exhibit 5-0010, STAT.0106.001.0001_M_R, Statement of EE at para 62.

Transcript of EE, T4032: 31-40 (Day 38).

Transcript of EE, T4032: 31-40 (Day 38).

Exhibit 5-0010, STAT.0106.001.0001_M_R, Statement of EE at para 84-87; EE6.

Transcript of ES, T4036: 34-36; T4038: 24-26 (Day 38).

Transcript of ES, T4040: 7-10 (Day 38).


Transcript of ES, T4042: 43-45 (Day 38).

Transcript of ES, T4046: 27-30 (Day 38).

Transcript of ES, T4046: 30-32 (Day 38).

Transcript of ES, T4051: 13-16 (Day 38).


Transcript of ES, T4050: 16-18 (Day 38).

Exhibit 5-0027, TSAE.9100.01058.0176_R, document entitled “Letter from George Blair-West, Psychiatrist to EX” at TSAE.9100.01087.0180_R.

Transcript of ES, T4044: 7-10 (Day 38).

Transcript of ES, T4043: 39-44 (Day 38).

Transcript of ES, T4044: 34-37 (Day 38).


Transcript of ES, T4045: 1-6 (Day 38).

Transcript of ES, T4052: 5-7 (Day 38).

Exhibit 5-0014, TSAE.0002.001.1300_R, document entitled “Victim Impact Statement of HP”.

Exhibit 5-0014, TSAE.0002.001.1300_R, document entitled “Victim Impact Statement of HP”.

Exhibit 5-0001, TSAE.0002.001.1300_R, document entitled “Victim Impact Statement of HP” at TSAE.0002.001.1300-1301.

Exhibit 5-0001, TSAE.0002.001.1300_R, document entitled “Victim Impact Statement of HP” at TSAE.0002.001.1300-1301.

Exhibit 5-0009, TSAE.9100.01037.0025_R, document entitled “Victim Impact Statement of GK”.

Exhibit 5-0009, TSAE.9100.01037.0025_R, document entitled “Victim Impact Statement of GK”.

Exhibit 5-0012, TSAE.9100.01074.0055_E_R, document entitled “Victim Impact Statement of HQ” at TSAE.9100.01074.0056_E_R.

Exhibit 5-0012, TSAE.9100.01074.0055_E_R, document entitled “Victim Impact Statement of HQ” at TSAE.9100.01074.0056_E_R.

Exhibit 5-0012, TSAE.9100.01074.0055_E_R, document entitled “Victim Impact Statement of HQ” at TSAE.9100.01074.0056_E_R.

Exhibit 5-0006, STAT.0105.001.0001_M_R, Statement of Wallace Douglas McLeod at para 5-6; Transcript of W McLeod, T3955: 7-18 (Day 38).


Exhibit 5-0006, STAT.0105.001.0001_M_R, Statement of Wallace Douglas McLeod at para 12; Transcript of W McLeod, T3956: 9-18 (Day 38).

Exhibit 5-0006, STAT.0105.001.0001_M_R, Statement of Wallace Douglas McLeod at para 19; Transcript of W McLeod, T3960: 8-13 (Day 38).

Exhibit 5-0006, STAT.0105.001.0001_M_R, Statement of Wallace Douglas McLeod at para 19; Transcript of W McLeod, T3961: 13-21 (Day 38).
263 Exhibit 5-0017, STAT.0114.001.0001_M_R, Statement of ET at para 14, at STAT.0114.001.0003_M_R.
264 Exhibit 5-0017, STAT.0114.001.0001_M_R, Statement of ET at para 15, at STAT.0114.001.0003_M_R.
265 Exhibit 5-0017, STAT.0114.001.0001_M_R, Statement of ET at para 3, at STAT.0114.001.0004_M_R.
266 Exhibit 5-0017, STAT.0114.001.0001_M_R, Statement of ET at para 64.
267 Transcript of ET, T4165: 19-22 (Day 39).
268 Exhibit 5-0017, STAT.0114.001.0001_M_R, Statement of ET at para 67.
269 Exhibit 5-0017, STAT.0114.001.0001_M_R, Statement of ET at para 68.
270 Transcript of ET, T4148: 8-10 (Day 39).
271 Transcript of ET, T4151: 30-41; T4152: 46 - T4153: 8 (Day 39).
278 Transcript of K Marshall, T4187: 35-37 (Day 41).
279 Transcript of K Marshall, T4188: 44-46 (Day 41).
280 Transcript of K Marshall, T4188: 46-47 (Day 41).
281 Transcript of K Marshall, T4192: 27, T4193:0 (Day 41).
283 Transcript of K Marshall, T4192: 34-47 (Day 41).
284 Transcript of K Marshall, T4193: 11-27 (Day 41).
286 Transcript of K Marshall, T4192: 41-44 (Day 41).
297 Transcript of K Marshall, T4189: 11-31 (Day 41).
303 Transcript of K Marshall, T4202: 11-12 (Day 41).
304 Transcript of K Marshall, T4201: 42- T4202: 3 (Day 41).
305 Transcript of K Marshall, T4206: 30 - T4204: 23-26 (Day 41).
307 Transcript of K Marshall, T4206: 30 - T4207: 25 (Day 41).
Exhibit 5-0049, STAT.0111.001.0001_R, Statement of Major Peter Farthing at para 147.


Exhibit 5-0049, STAT.0111.001.0001_R, Statement of Major Peter Farthing at para 147-149.


Exhibit 5-001, TSAE.9100.01048.0283_R, document entitled “Supreme Court of New South Wales Terms of Settlement – EP v Lawrence Allan Wilson and The Salvation Army.”

Exhibit 5-0049, STAT.0111.001.0001_R, Statement of Major Peter Farthing at para 141-143.

Exhibit 5-0049, STAT.0111.001.0001_R, Statement of Major Peter Farthing at para 142.

Exhibit 5-0049, STAT.0111.001.0001_R, Statement of Major Peter Farthing at para 154.

Exhibit 5-0049, STAT.0111.001.0001_R, Statement of Major Peter Farthing at para 139-140.

Exhibit 5-0049, STAT.0111.001.0001_R, Statement of Major Peter Farthing at para 233-234.

Exhibit 5-0001, TSAE.0120.01005.0020_R, document entitled “Counselling Report prepared by Colleen Hirst, Psychologist re GA”.

Exhibit 5-0001, TSAE.0120.01005.0020_R, document entitled “Counselling Report prepared by Colleen Hirst, Psychologist re GA”.

Exhibit 5-0001, TSAE.0120.01005.0020_R, document entitled “Counselling Report prepared by Colleen Hirst, Psychologist re GA”.


Exhibit 5-0001, TSAE.9100.01030.0538_R, document entitled “NSW Police Statement – FT” at TSAE.9100.01030.0540_R.

Exhibit 5-0001, TSAE.9100.01030.0538_R, document entitled “NSW Police Statement – FT” at TSAE.9100.01030.0540_R.

Exhibit 5-001, TSAE.0010.001.0001_R, document entitled “Salvation Army Schedule amended by the Royal Commission”.

Exhibit 5-001, TEN.0003.001.0198, document entitled “Letter from A.G. Milton, City Administrator to Director, Department of Children’s Services”; and Exhibit 5-0001, TEN.0003.001.0211, document entitled “Memo from Resident Child Care Officer to The Director, Department of Children’s Services”.

Exhibit 5-0001, TEN.0003.001.0050, document entitled “Report prepared by L. Burgess, Senior Child Care Officer, Department of Children’s Services”.

Transcript of R Condon, T4795: 9-13 (Day 46).

Sections 56 and 57; Section 56(4) Child Welfare Act 1939 (NSW).

Section 56(6) Child Welfare Act 1939 (NSW).

Section 56(8) Child Welfare Act 1939 (NSW).

Section 56(9) Child Welfare Act 1939 (NSW).

Reg. 23(4) Children’s Services Regulations 1966 (Qld).

Reg. 23(5)(d) Children’s Services Regulations 1966 (Qld).

Reg. 23(5)(b) Children’s Services Regulations 1966 (Qld).

Reg. 23(5) Children’s Services Regulations 1966 (Qld).

Exhibit 5-0039, STAT.0120.001.0001_R, Statement of Maree Walk at para 55; Exhibit 5-0039; STAT.0120.001.0055_R C, document entitled “Alleged Ill-treatment/Abscondings” (Annexure J) at STAT.0120.001.0055_R.

Exhibit 5-0039, STAT.0120.001.0001_R, Statement of Maree Walk at para 56; Exhibit 5-0039, STAT.0120.001.0055_R, document entitled “Alleged Ill-treatment/Abscondings” (Annexure J) at STAT.0120.001.0057_R.

Exhibit 5-0039, STAT.0120.001.0001_R, Statement of Maree Walk at para 57; Exhibit 5-0039, STAT.0120.001.0055_R, document entitled “Alleged Ill-treatment/Abscondings” (Annexure J) at STAT.0120.001.0057_R.

Exhibit 5-0039, STAT.0120.001.0001_R, Statement of Maree Walk at para 58; Exhibit 5-0039, STAT.0120.001.0055_R, document entitled “Alleged Ill-treatment/Abscondings” (Annexure J) at STAT.0120.001.0057_R.

Exhibit 5-0039, STAT.0120.001.0001_R, Statement of Maree Walk at para 59; Exhibit 5-0039, STAT.0120.001.0055_R, document entitled “Alleged Ill-treatment/Abscondings” (Annexure J) at STAT.0120.001.0057_R.

348 Exhibit 5-0039, STAT.0120.001.0001_R, Statement of Maree Walk at para 62; Exhibit 5-0039, STAT.0120.001.0059_R, document entitled “Alleged Ill-Treatment Gill Memorial Home” (Annexure L) at STAT.0120.001.0059_R.

349 Exhibit 5-0039, STAT.0120.001.0001_R, Statement of Maree Walk at para 63; Exhibit 5-0039, STAT.0120.001.0059_R, document entitled “Alleged Ill-Treatment Gill Memorial Home” (Annexure L) at STAT.0120.001.0059_R.

350 Exhibit 5-0039, STAT.0120.001.0001_R, Statement of Maree Walk at para 64; Exhibit 5-0039, STAT.0120.001.0059_R, document entitled “Alleged Ill-Treatment Gill Memorial Home” (Annexure L) at STAT.0120.001.0059_R.

351 Exhibit 5-0039, STAT.0120.001.0001_R, Statement of Maree Walk at para 66; Exhibit 5-0039, STAT.0120.001.0059_R, document entitled “Alleged Ill-Treatment Gill Memorial Home” (Annexure L) at STAT.0120.001.0059_R.

352 Exhibit 5-0039, STAT.0120.001.0001_R, Statement of Maree Walk at para 67; Exhibit 5-0039, STAT.0120.001.0059_R, document entitled “Alleged Ill-Treatment Gill Memorial Home” (Annexure L) at STAT.0120.001.0059_R.

353 Exhibit 5-0039, STAT.0120.001.0001_R, Statement of Maree Walk at para 70; Exhibit 5-0039, STAT.0120.001.0061_R, document entitled “Handwritten Note of REDACTED” (Annexure M) at STAT.0120.001.0062_R.

354 Transcript of J Walk, T4608: 36-41 (Day 44).

355 Exhibit 5-0039, STAT.0120.001.0001_R, Statement of Maree Walk at para 76.

356 Exhibit 5-0001, TSAE.0008.001.0001, document entitled “Forde Inquiry – excerpts” at TSAE.0008.001.0036.

357 Exhibit 5-0035, STAT.0117.001.0079_R, document entitled “Department Minute Subject: Re: Alkira - Camp Carnarvon National Park December, 1975” at STAT.0117.001.0080_R.

358 Exhibit 5-0001, TSAE.0008.001.0001, document entitled “Forde Inquiry – excerpts” at TSAE.0008.001.0050.

359 Exhibit 5-0001, TSAE.0008.001.0001, document entitled “Forde Inquiry – excerpts” at TSAE.0008.001.0051.

360 Transcript of P Farthing, T4655: 14-15 (Day 45).

361 Transcript of P Farthing, T4661: 45-47 (Day 45).


363 Transcript of C Randall, T4303: 28-31 (Day 41).

364 See Transcript of P Farthing, T4684: 12 – 26; T4684: 37-44 (Day 45).

365 Exhibit 5-0049, STAT.0111.001.0001_R, Statement of Major Peter Farthing at para 72.

366 Exhibit 5-0049, STAT.0111.001.0001_R, Statement of Major Peter Farthing at para 72.

367 Transcript of P Farthing, T4661: 42 – T4662: 6 (Day 45).

368 Transcript of C Randall, T4303: 28-31 (Day 41).

369 Exhibit 5-0049, STAT.0111.001.0001_R, Statement of Major Peter Farthing at para 89, Submission of the Salvation Army in relation to Case Study 5 at para 289.

370 Exhibit 5-0049, STAT.0111.001.0001_R, Statement of Major Peter Farthing at para 89.

371 Exhibit 5-0049, STAT.0111.001.0001_R, Statement of Major Peter Farthing at para 90.

372 Exhibit 5-0049, STAT.0111.001.0001_R, Statement of Major Peter Farthing at para 90.

373 Exhibit 5-0049, STAT.0111.001.0001_R, Statement of Major Peter Farthing at para 97.

374 Transcript of P Farthing, T4679: 31-37 (Day 45).

375 Transcript of P Farthing, T4679: 37-39 (Day 45).

376 Exhibit 5-0049, STAT.0111.001.0001_R, Statement of Major Peter Farthing at para 89, Submission of the Salvation Army in relation to Case Study 5 at para 289.

377 Exhibit 5-0049, STAT.0111.001.0001_R, Statement of Major Peter Farthing at para 89.

378 Transcript of P Farthing, T4679: 31-37 (Day 45).

379 Transcript of P Farthing, T4679: 37-39 (Day 45).

380 Exhibit 5-0049, STAT.0111.001.0001_R, Statement of Major Peter Farthing at para 101- 103.


382 Exhibit 5-0001, TSAE.9100.01030.0001_R, document entitled “Letter from Divisional Commander to Lieutenant Colonel Goffin”.
383 Exhibit 5-0001, TSAE.9100.01030.0006, document entitled “Letter from Divisional Commander to Lieutenant Colonel Goffin”.

384 Exhibit 5-0001, TSAE.9100.01030.0390_R, document entitled “Reference Summary of Service of Lawrence Wilson and Faith Wilson”.

385 Transcript of P Farthing, T4683: 26-43 (Day 45).

386 Exhibit 5-0001, TSAE.9100.01030.0390, document entitled “Reference Summary of Service of Lawrence Wilson and Faith Wilson”.

387 Transcript of P Farthing, T4682: 13-37 (Day 45).

388 Transcript of P Farthing, T4683: 9-24 (Day 45).

389 Exhibit 5-0049, STAT.0111.001.0001, Statement of Major Peter Farthing at para 113.

390 Transcript of C Randall, T4284: 10-17 (Day 41).

391 Transcript of C Randall, T4284: 23-28 (Day 41).

392 Exhibit 5-0024, STAT.0109.001.0001_M, Statement of Clifford Randall at para 74.

393 Exhibit 5-0001, TSAE.9100.01030.0161, document entitled “Letter from Major Dudley Schoupp, Divisional Commander to Colonel Peterson, Field Secretary”.

394 Exhibit 5-0001, TSAE.9100.01030.0086, document entitled “Letter from Field Secretary to Colonel Cairns, Chief Secretary”.

395 Exhibit 5-0001, TSAE.9100.01030.0083, document entitled “Letter from Pindred, Territorial Commander to Colonel Peterson, Field Secretary”.

396 Exhibit 5-0001, TSAE.9100.01030.0235, document entitled “Letter from Major Dudley Schoupp, Divisional Commander to Colonel Peterson, Field Secretary”.

397 Exhibit 5-0001, TSAE.9100.01030.0129, document entitled “Letter from Chief Secretary to Lieutenant-Colonel Cutmore, Field Secretary”.

398 Exhibit 5-0001, TSAE.9100.01030.0176_R, document entitled “Letter from Lawrence Wilson to Lieutenant-Colonel Dudley Schoupp, Divisional Commander”.

399 Exhibit 5-0001, TSAE.9100.01030.0358_R, document entitled “Letter from Dunhill Madden Butler to Lieutenant-Colonel Derek Jessop, Secretary for Personnel”; Exhibit 5-0001, TSAE.9100.01030.0363_R, document entitled “Letter from Coleman & Greig to Commissioner John Gowans”; Exhibit 5-0013, STAT.0122.001.0515_R, document entitled “Annexure A - Copies of Indictments Against Mr Wilson” at STAT.0122.001.0515_R.

400 Exhibit 5-0001, TSAE.9100.01030.0176_R, document entitled “Letter from Peter Lucas, Financial Secretary to Dunhill Madden Butler Solicitors”.

401 Exhibit 5-0001, TSAE.9100.01030.0358_R, document entitled “Letter from Dunhill Madden Butler to Lieutenant-Colonel Dudley Schoupp, Divisional Commander”.

402 Exhibit 5-0001, TSAE.9100.01030.0358_R, document entitled “Letter from Dunhill Madden Butler to Lieutenant-Colonel Dudley Schoupp, Divisional Commander”.

403 Submission of the Salvation Army in relation to Case Study 5 at para 290.

404 Exhibit 5-0001, TSAE.9100.01030.0129, document entitled “Letter from Chief Secretary to Lieutenant-Colonel Cutmore, Field Secretary”.

405 Exhibit 5-0001, TSAE.9100.01030.0176_R, document entitled “Letter from Lawrence Wilson to Lieutenant-Colonel Dudley Schoupp, Divisional Commander”.

406 Exhibit 5-0001, TSAE.9100.01030.0358_R, document entitled “Letter from Dunhill Madden Butler to Lieutenant-Colonel Dudley Schoupp, Divisional Commander”.

407 Exhibit 5-0001, TSAE.9100.01030.0181, document entitled “Letter from Peter Lucas, Financial Secretary to Dunhill Madden Butler Solicitors”.

408 Exhibit 5-0001, TSAE.9100.01030.0358_R, document entitled “Letter from Coleman & Greig to Commissioner John Gowans”; Exhibit 5-0013, STAT.0122.001.0515_R, document entitled “Annexure A - Copies of Indictments Against Mr Wilson” at STAT.0122.001.0515_R.

409 Exhibit 5-0001, TSAE.9100.01030.0358_R, document entitled “Letter from Dunhill Madden Butler to Lieutenant-Colonel Dudley Jessop, Secretary for Personnel”; Exhibit 5-0001, TSAE.9100.01030.0363_R, document entitled “Letter from Coleman & Greig to Dunhill Madden Butler”; Exhibit 5-0013, STAT.0122.001.0145_R, document entitled “Annexure K - Fact Sheets and Charge Sheets relating to Captain Wilson” at STAT.0122.001.0145_R.

410 Exhibit 5-0001, TSAE.9100.01030.0181, document entitled “Letter from Peter Lucas, Financial Secretary to Dunhill Madden Butler Solicitors”.

411 Exhibit 5-0001, TSAE.9100.01030.0181, document entitled “Letter from Peter Lucas, Financial Secretary to Dunhill Madden Butler Solicitors”.

412 Exhibit 5-0001, TSAE.9100.01030.0358_R, document entitled “Letter from Dunhill Madden Butler to Lieutenant-Colonel Dudley Schoupp, Divisional Commander”.

413 Exhibit 5-0001, TSAE.9100.01030.0358_R, document entitled “Letter from Coleman & Greig to Commissioner John Gowans”; Exhibit 5-0013, STAT.0122.001.0515_R, document entitled “Annexure A - Copies of Indictments Against Mr Wilson” at STAT.0122.001.0515_R.

414 Exhibit 5-0001, TSAE.9100.01030.0358_R, document entitled “Letter from Peter Lucas, Financial Secretary to Dunhill Madden Butler Solicitors”.

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415 Exhibit 5-0001, TSAE.9100.01030.0568_R, document entitled “Notes for presentation – Wilson and The Salvation Army at Crompton” at TSAE.9100.01030.0571_R.
416 Exhibit 5-0001, TSAE.9100.01030.0568_R, document entitled “Notes for presentation – Wilson and The Salvation Army at Crompton” at TSAE.9100.01030.0569-0570.
417 Exhibit 5-0006, STAT.0105.001.0001_M_R, Statement of Wallace McLeod, WM7.
419 Exhibit 5-0001, TSAE.0010.001.0001_R, document entitled “Salvation Army Schedule amended by the Royal Commission”.
420 Exhibit 5-0049, STAT.0111.001.0001_R, Statement of Major Peter Farthing at para 137 – 140, 150.
421 Approximate year of sexual abuse.
422 Total amounts paid including ex-gratia payments and counselling fees or settled litigation (EP, ET, FV).
423 Exhibit 5-0049, STAT.0111.001.0167, document entitled “Letter from Neil McDonald to Lieut. Commissioner H. Williams” at STAT.0111.001.0167.
424 Exhibit 5-0049, STAT.0111.001.0166, document entitled “Letter from Colonel Harry Goffin to Colonel re: Captain Donald Schultz: Allegation by Lieutenant Neil McDonald” at STAT.0111.001.0166.
426 Exhibit 5-0049, STAT.0111.001.0001_R, Statement of Major Peter Farthing at para 180.
427 Exhibit 5-0049, STAT.0111.001.0001_R, Statement of Major Peter Farthing at para 180.
428 Exhibit 5-0049, STAT.0111.001.0170, document entitled “Department Minute titled Allegations made against Captain Schultz, Salvation Army Officer in the position of Housefather at Kangaroo Unit, Alkira”, (Annexure 4), at STAT.0111.001.0017_R.
429 Exhibit 5-0049, STAT.0111.001.0170, document entitled “Letter from Social Services Secretary to Colonel R. Holz”, at STAT.0111.001.0170; Exhibit 5-0035, STAT.0117.001.0014_R, document entitled “Department Minute titled Allegations made against Captain Schultz, Salvation Army Officer in the position of Housefather at Kangaroo Unit, Alkira” (Annexure 3), at STAT.0117.001.0018_R.
430 Exhibit 5-0035, STAT.0117.001.0014_R, document entitled “Department Minute titled Allegations made against Captain Schultz, Salvation Army Officer in the position of Housefather at Kangaroo Unit, Alkira” (Annexure 3), at STAT.0117.001.0019_R.
431 Transcript of J Doyle, T4501: 21 - T4502: 36 (Day 43); see Exhibit 5-0001, QLD.0005.001.0001_R, document entitled “Department of Children’s Services – Allegations Made Against Captain Schultz Salvation Army Officer in the Position of Housefather at Kangaroo Uni, Alkira”.
434 Transcript of J Doyle, T4502: 28-36 (Day 43).
438 Exhibit 5-0001, QLD.0003.001.0033_R, document entitled “Queensland Police Service Report re Donald Schultz”.
439 Exhibit 5-0001, TSAE.0010.001.0001_R, document entitled “Salvation Army Schedule amended by the Royal Commission” at TSAE.0010.001.0004_R.
440 Exhibit 5-0001, TSAE.0120.01008.0139_R, document entitled “Officer’s Career Card — John McIver”.
441 Exhibit 5-0024, STAT.0109.001.0001_M_R, Statement of Clifford Randall at para 57.
442 Exhibit 5-0024, STAT.0109.001.0001_M_R, Statement of Clifford Randall at para 61.
443 Exhibit 5-0024, STAT.0109.001.0001_M_R, Statement of Clifford Randall at para 65.
444 Transcript of C Randall, T4288: 2-17 (Day 41).
445 Exhibit 5-0024, STAT.0109.001.0001_M_R, Statement of Clifford Randall at para 79-80.
446 Transcript of C Randall, T4287: 2-13 (Day 41).
447 Transcript of C Randall, T4288: 19-27 (Day 41).
**Exhibit 5-0024, STAT.0109.001.0001_M_R, Statement of Clifford Randall at para 91; Transcript of C Randall, T4295: 46 - T4296: 11 (Day 41).**

**Exhibit 5-0024, STAT.0109.001.0001_M_R, Statement of Clifford Randall at para 92.**

**Transcript of C Randall, T4297: 33-39 (Day 41); Exhibit 5-0024, STAT.0109.001.0001_M_R, Statement of Clifford Randall at para 94.**

**Transcript of C Randall, T4297: 47 - T4298: 6 (Day 41).**

**Exhibit 5-0024, STAT.0109.001.0001_M_R, Statement of Clifford Randall at para 99.**

**Exhibit 5-0024, STAT.0109.001.0001_M_R, Statement of Clifford Randall at para 99-102; Transcript of C Randall, T4299: 28-45 (Day 41).**

**Transcript of M Randall, T4349: 8-18 (Day 42).**

**Transcript of C Randall, T4299: 33-35 (Day 41).**

**Transcript of C Randall, T4299: 36-38 (Day 41).**

**Transcript of C Randall, T4297: 47 - T4298: 6 (Day 41).**

**Exhibit 5-0049, STAT.0111.001.0001_R, Statement of Major Peter Farthing at para 242.**

**Exhibit 5-0035, STAT.0117.001.0028_R, document entitled “Department Minute Re: ES” (Annexure 7) at STAT.0117.001.0028_R.**

**Exhibit 5-0035, STAT.0117.001.0028_R, document entitled “Department Minute Re: ES” (Annexure 7) at STAT.0117.001.0028_R.**

**Exhibit 5-0035, STAT.0117.001.0028_R, document entitled “Department Minute Re: ES” (Annexure 7) at STAT.0117.001.0028_R.**

**Exhibit 5-0001, TEN.0003.001.0095_R, document entitled “Report prepared by J.M. Doyle, Supervising Child Care Officer re Alkira”.**

**Exhibit 5-0001, TEN.0003.001.0095_R, document entitled “Report prepared by J.M. Doyle, Supervising Child Care Officer re Alkira”.**

**Exhibit 5-0001, TEN.0003.001.0094, document entitled “Letter from Robert Plummer, Director to The Under Secretary, Department of Community and Welfare Services and Sport re Alkira”.**

**Exhibit 5-0035, STAT.0117.001.0001_R, Statement of Major Peter Farthing at para 246.**

**Exhibit 5-0035, STAT.0117.001.0001_R, document entitled “Department Memorandum Re: Alkira - Corporal Punishment” (Attachment 16), at STAT.0117.001.0001_R.**

**Exhibit 5-0063, EXH.005.063.0001_R, document entitled “Letter from Lieut-Colonel David Godkin to Major John McIver”; Exhibit 5-0064, EXH.005.064.0001_R, document entitled “Timeline re McIver”.**

**Exhibit 5-0064, EXH.005.064.0001_R, document entitled “Timeline re McIver”; Exhibit 5-0049, STAT.0111.001.0001_R, Statement of Major Peter Farthing at para 246.**

**Exhibit 5-0064, EXH.005.064.0001_R, document entitled “Timeline re McIver” at EXH.005.064.0002_R.**

**Transcript of R Condon, T4790: 38 – T4791: 6 (Day 46).**

**Exhibit 5-0001, TSAE.0010.001.0001_R, document entitled “Salvation Army Schedule amended by the Royal Commission” at TSAE.0010.001.0001_R; Exhibit 5-0001, TSAE.0010.001.0001_R, document entitled “Salvation Army Schedule amended by the Royal Commission” at TSAE.0010.001.0001_R; Exhibit 5-0001, TSAE.0010.001.0001_R, document entitled “Salvation Army Schedule amended by the Royal Commission” at TSAE.0010.001.0001_R.**

**Exhibit 5-0001, TSAE.9100.01029.0021_R and TSAE.9100.01029.0027_R, Officer’s career card.**

**Exhibit 5-0039, STAT.0120.001.0051_R, document entitled “Allegations against X17” (Annexure I), at STAT.0120.001.0051_R.**

**Exhibit 5-0039, STAT.0120.001.0051_R, document entitled “Allegations against X17” (Annexure I), at STAT.0120.001.0051_R.**

**Exhibit 5-0039, STAT.0120.001.0051_R, document entitled “Allegations against X17” (Annexure I), at STAT.0120.001.0051_R.**

**Exhibit 5-0039, STAT.0120.001.0051_R, document entitled “Allegations against X17” (Annexure I), at STAT.0120.001.0051_R.**

**Exhibit 5-0039, STAT.0120.001.0051_R, document entitled “Allegations against X17” (Annexure I), at STAT.0120.001.0051_R.**

**Exhibit 5-0039, STAT.0120.001.0051_R, document entitled “Allegations against X17” (Annexure I), at STAT.0120.001.0051_R.**

**Exhibit 5-0039, STAT.0120.001.0051_R, document entitled “Allegations against X17” (Annexure I), at STAT.0120.001.0051_R.**

**Exhibit 5-0039, STAT.0120.001.0051_R, document entitled “Allegations against X17” (Annexure I), at STAT.0120.001.0051_R.**

**Exhibit 5-0039, STAT.0120.001.0051_R, document entitled “Allegations against X17” (Annexure I), at STAT.0120.001.0051_R.**

**Exhibit 5-0039, STAT.0120.001.0051_R, document entitled “Allegations against X17” (Annexure I), at STAT.0120.001.0051_R.**
Exhibit 5-0001, TEN.0003.001.0315_R, document entitled “Police Criminal Record - X17”; Exhibit 5-0039, STAT.0120.001.0051_R, document entitled “Allegations against X17” (Annexure I), at STAT.0120.001.0051_R.

Exhibit 5-0001, TEN.0003.001.0315_R, document entitled “Police Criminal Record - X17”; Exhibit 5-0046, NSW.0012.001.0035_R, document entitled “Committal of X17 for Indecent assault Male”.

Exhibit 5-0001, TSAE.9100.01029.0051_R, document entitled “Letter from Social Services Secretary to Colonel Holz, Chief Secretary”.

Exhibit 5-0001, TSAE.9100.01029.0056_R, document entitled “Letter from Commissioner Harry Williams, Territorial Commander to The Hon. Maddison, NSW Minister of Justice.”

Exhibit 5-0001, TSAE.9100.01029.0056_R, document entitled “Letter from Commissioner Harry Williams, Territorial Commander to The Hon. Maddison, NSW Minister of Justice”.

Exhibit 5-0001, TSAE.9100.01029.0048_R, document entitled “Interview note by the Commission with X17”.

Exhibit 5-0001, TSAE.9100.01029.0012_R, document entitled “Letter from Commissioner Harry Williams, Territorial Commander to X17”.

Exhibit 5-0046, NSW.0012.001.0038_R, document entitled “Deposition of Witnesses” at NSW.0012.001.0039_R and see Exhibit 5-0001, TSAE.9100.01029.0039_R, document entitled “Letter from Chief Secretary to Colonel Gordon Peterson”; Exhibit 5-0046, NSW.0012.001.0026_R, document entitled “Subject: Regina v X17 Indecent Assault Male”.

Exhibit 5-0046, NSW.0012.001.0007_R, document entitled “Recognizance to be of Good Behavior and to Appear and Receive Sentence of X17”.

Exhibit 5-0001, TSAE.9100.01029.0034_R, document entitled “Letter from Social Services Secretary to Colonel Goffin”.

Exhibit 5-0001, TSAE.9100.01029.0025_R, document entitled “Letter from Chief Secretary to Colonel Lucas”; Exhibit 5-0001, TSAE.9100.01029.0029_R, document entitled “Letter from Field Secretary to Colonel Whitehouse”.

Exhibit 5-0013, STAT.0122.001.0001_R, Statement of Rick John Cunningham at para 32 - 33, Statement of Rick John Cunningham Annexure L.

Exhibit 5-0013, STAT.0122.001.0014_R, Statement of Rick John Cunningham Annexure L.

Exhibit 5-0049, STAT.0111.001.0001_R, Statement of Major Peter Farthing at para 21-22.


Exhibit 5-0049, STAT.0111.001.0001_R, Statement of Major Peter Farthing at para 34-35.

Exhibit 5-0049, STAT.0111.001.0001_R, Statement of Major Peter Farthing at para 36.

Exhibit 5-0049, STAT.0111.001.0001_R, Statement of Major Peter Farthing at para 39.

Exhibit 5-0049, STAT.0111.001.0001_R, Statement of Major Peter Farthing at para 53.

Exhibit 5-0049, STAT.0111.001.0001_R, Statement of Major Peter Farthing at para 56.

Exhibit 5-0049, STAT.0111.001.0001_R, Statement of Major Peter Farthing at para 58.

Exhibit 5-0049, STAT.0111.001.0001_R, Statement of Major Peter Farthing at para 61.

Exhibit 5-0049, STAT.0111.001.0001_R, Statement of Major Peter Farthing at para 68.

Exhibit 5-0049, STAT.0111.001.0001_R, Statement of Major Peter Farthing at para 227.

Exhibit 5-0049, STAT.0111.001.0001_R, Statement of Major Peter Farthing at para 228.

Exhibit 5-0049, STAT.0111.001.0001_R, Statement of Major Peter Farthing at para 222.

Exhibit 5-0049, STAT.0111.001.0001_R, Statement of Major Peter Farthing at para 199.

Exhibit 5-0049, STAT.0111.001.0001_R, Statement of Major Peter Farthing at para 201.

Exhibit 5-0049, STAT.0111.001.0001_R, Statement of Major Peter Farthing at para 218; Exhibit 5-0013, STAT.0122.001.0001_R, Statement of Rick Cunningham at para 21(d); Exhibit 5-0013, STAT.0122.001.0130_R, document entitled “Annexure I - NSWPF Statement of FV, 1996”.

Exhibit 5-0049, STAT.0111.001.0001_R, Statement of Major Peter Farthing at para 214.

Exhibit 5-0049, STAT.0111.001.0001_R, Statement of Major Peter Farthing at para 217.

Transcript of J Doyle, T4495: 4-19 (Day 43).

Exhibit 5-0001, TEN.0003.001.0100_R, document entitled “Memo prepared by R. Short, Child Care Officer to the Director”.

Transcript of R Short T4454: 4-7; T4452: 41 (Day 43).

Exhibit 5-0001, TEN.0003.001.0317_R, document entitled “Report of a case of inappropriate handling of the punishment of a small child of Alkira”.

Exhibit 5-0034, EXH.005.034.0001_R, document entitled “Article from the Courier Mail 'Missing Boy'”.

Exhibit 5-0030 STAT.0121.002.0001_R, document entitled “Criminal Records re HT”.

Transcript of J Doyle, T4531: 13-17 (Day 44).
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Exhibit 5-0039, STAT.0120.001.0001_R, Statement of Maree Walk at para 70; Exhibit 5-0039, STAT.0120.001.0061_R, document entitled “Handwritten Record of Incident” (Annexure M) at STAT.0120.001.0062_R.

Transcript of J Walk, T4608: 36-41 (Day 44).

Transcript of J Walk, T4605: 15-39 (Day 44).

Transcript of J Walk, T4606: 4-15 (Day 44).

Transcript of J Walk, T4606: 17-25 (Day 44).

Exhibit 5-0047, STAT.0126.001.0001_R, Statement of Paul Jacob at para 8.

Transcript of P Jacob, T4627: 39-46 (Day 45).

Transcript of P Jacob, T4628: 1-13; Exhibit 5-0047, STAT.0126.001.0001_R, Statement of Paul Jacob at para 9-10.

Transcript of P Jacob, T4629: 7-24 (Day 45); Exhibit 5-0047, STAT.0126.001.0001_R, Statement of Paul Jacob at para 13.

Transcript of P Jacob, T4629: 22-24 (Day 45).

Transcript of P Jacob, T4629: 26-29 (Day 45).

Exhibit 5-0047, STAT.0126.001.0007_R, document entitled “Letter from Peter Farthing to the Commissioner of Police NSW” at STAT.0126.001.0007; Exhibit 5-0047, STAT.0126.001.0008_R, document entitled “Letter from Peter Farthing to the Commissioner of Police Queensland” at STAT.0126.001.0008.

GK, EQ, EX, FI and GB

Exhibit 5-0047, STAT.0126.001.0007_R, document entitled “Letter from Peter Farthing to the Commissioner of Police NSW” at STAT.0126.001.0007; Exhibit 5-0047, STAT.0126.001.0008_R, document entitled “Letter from Peter Farthing to the Commissioner of Police Queensland” at STAT.0126.001.0008.

Transcript of P Farthing, T4723: 15-20 (Day 45); See also Exhibit 5-0053.

Transcript of P Farthing, T4637: 40-44 (Day 45).

Transcript of P Farthing, T4721: 3-6 (Day 45).

Exhibit 5-0047, STAT.0126.001.0001_R, Statement of Paul Jacob at para 21; Transcript of P Jacob, T4638: 22-30; 35-36 (Day 45).

Transcript of P Jacob, T4633: 43 - T4634: 5 (Day 45).

Exhibit 5-0066, STAT.0126.003.0001, Supplementary Statement of Detective Inspector Paul Jacob at para 8.

Exhibit 5-0055, STAT.0101.001.0001, Statement of Commissioner Raymond James Condon at para 67.

Exhibit 5-0055, STAT.0101.001.0273, document entitled “JC-11 - ‘Work Amongst Boys' extract from the Orders and Regulations for Social Work”.

Transcript of R Condon, T4793: 44 - T4794: 2 (Day 46).

Exhibit 5-0049, STAT.0111.001.0001_R, Statement of Major Peter Farthing at para 127.

Exhibit 5-0049, STAT.0111.001.0001_R, Statement of Major Peter Farthing at para 286.

Exhibit 5-0055, STAT.0101.001.0001, Statement of Commissioner Raymond James Condon at para 80.

Exhibit 5-0055, STAT.0101.001.0001, Statement of Commissioner Raymond James Condon at para 68; Exhibit 5-0055, STAT.0101.001.0242, document entitled “JC-8 - Principles of Organization Chapter XIV Inspection” at STAT.0101.001.0243; Transcript of R Condon, T4765: 12-19 (Day 46).

Exhibit 5-0055, STAT.0101.001.0273, document entitled “JC-11 - ‘Work Amongst Boys' extract from the Orders and Regulations for Social Work”.

Transcript of R Condon, T4793: 44 - T4794: 2 (Day 46).

Exhibit 5-0049, STAT.0111.001.0001_R, Statement of Major Peter Farthing at para 127.

Transcript of C Randall, T4269: 18-25 (Day 41); Transcript of ES, T4043: 39-44 (Day 38); Transcript of ET, T4153: 10-23 (Day 39); Exhibit 5-0022 Statement of EF at para 22.


Transcript of P Farthing, T4661: 8-24 (Day 45).

Transcript of P Farthing, T4661: 47 - T4662: 6 (Day 45).

Exhibit 5-0055, STAT.0101.001.0261, document entitled “JC-10 - 'Discipline' extract from the Orders and Regulations for Officers”; Transcript of P Farthing, T4664: 3-46 (Day 45); Transcript of C Randall, T4267: 34-43 (Day 41).

Transcript of P Farthing, T4665: 4-9 (Day 45).

Transcript of P Farthing, T4661: 42-47 (Day 45).

Transcript of R Condon, T4795: 9-13 (Day 46).

Transcript of R Condon, T4795: 25-29 (Day 46).

Exhibit 5-0055, STAT.0101.001.0242, document entitled “JC-8 - Principles of Organization Chapter XIV Inspection” at STAT.0101.001.0244; Transcript of R Condon, T4766: 37 - T4767: 2 (Day 46).

Exhibit 5-0055, STAT.0101.001.0001, Statement of Commissioner Raymond James Condon at para 88 - 90.
637 Exhibit 5-0049, STAT.0111.001.0001_R, Statement of Major Peter Farthing at para 289.
638 Transcript of P Farthing, T4665: 15-18 (Day 45).
639 Transcript of P Farthing, T4683: 17-24 (Day 45).
640 Exhibit 5-0055, STAT.0101.001.0024, document entitled “JC-8 - Principles of Organization Chapter XIV Inspection “at STAT.0101.001.0024.
641 Exhibit 5-0055, STAT.0101.001.0001, Statement of Commissioner Raymond James Condon at para 70; Transcript of R Condon, T4766: 1-5, (Day 46).
642 Transcript of R Condon, T4766: 19-35 (Day 46).
643 Exhibit 5-0055 STAT.0101.001.0001, Statement of Commissioner Raymond James Condon at para 89.
644 Exhibit 5-0049, STAT.0111.001.0001_R, Statement of Major Peter Farthing at para 289.
645 Transcript of R Condon, T4768: 20-31 (Day 46); Exhibit 5-0055, STAT.0101.001.0001, Statement of Commissioner Raymond James Condon at para 83.
646 Transcript of J Walk, T4618: 11-21 (Day 44).
647 Transcript of P Farthing, T4665: 40 - T4666: 11 (Day 45).
648 Transcript of P Farthing, T4666: 16-20 (Day 45).
649 And its predecessors. Exhibit 5-0049, STAT.0111.001.0001_R, Statement of Major Peter Farthing at para 281 Transcript of R Condon, T4699: 14-23 (Day 46); See Transcript of R Condon, T4799: 45 - T4800: 2 (Day 46).
650 Transcript of R Condon, T4769:35-44 (Day 46).
651 Exhibit 5-0001, IND.R-001331.PS.0057_R, document entitled “Caring for The Children – A history of institutional care provided by The Salvation Army for Australian children and youth (1893-1995) prepared by Dr Sharon Cleland” p 29.
652 Exhibit 5-0055, STAT.0101.001.0001, Statement of Commissioner Raymond James Condon at para 84, Transcript of R Condon, T4769: 35-44 (Day 46).
653 Submission of the Salvation Army in relation to Case Study 5 at para 53.
655 Exhibit 5-001, TSAE.0008.001.0001, document entitled “Forde Inquiry – excerpts” at TSAE.0008.001.0051.
656 Exhibit 5-0039, STAT.0120.001.0045_R, document entitled “Record of Meeting” (Annexure F).
657 Exhibit 5-0055, STAT.0101.001.0001, Statement of Commissioner Raymond James Condon at para 38.
658 Exhibit 5-0055, STAT.0101.001.0001, Statement of Commissioner Raymond James Condon at para 103; Transcript of R Condon, T4792: 25-29 (Day 46).
659 Transcript of P Farthing, T4729: 37-44 (Day 45).
660 Transcript of P Farthing, T4684: 8-10 (Day 45); See Exhibit 5-0049, STAT.0111.001.0001_R, Statement of Major Peter Farthing at para 24, 69, 96, 113, 155; Transcript of P Farthing, T4684: 23-27, 38-46 (Day 45).
661 Transcript of P Farthing, T4731: 37-45 (Day 45).
662 Transcript of P Farthing, T4731: 7-11 (Day 45).
663 Transcript of P Farthing, T4730: 22-24 (Day 45); The evidence set out above is that there were three occasions when The Salvation Army was told of concerns about Wilson sexually abusing children: in 1964-65 (Holley), in 1972 (Carpenter) and 1974-75 (Randalls).
664 Transcript of P Farthing, T4730: 37 (Day 45); See also Transcript of P Farthing T4731: 27-35; 42-45 (Day 45).
665 Transcript of P Farthing, T4649: 39; See also See Exhibit 5-0049, STAT.0111.001.0001_R, Statement of Major Peter Farthing at para 6-7; Transcript of R Condon, T4809: 28 (Day 46).
666 Transcript of P Farthing, T4649: 44-45; T4650: 2-5 (Day 45).
667 Transcript of P Farthing, T4650: 6 (Day 45).
668 Transcript of P Farthing, T4650: 32-39 (Day 45).
669 Exhibit 5-0055, STAT.0101.001.0001, Statement of Commissioner Raymond James Condon at para 11; See also Exhibit 5-0055, STAT.0101.001.0021, document entitled “JC-2 - A Little Truth and Reconciliation by Peter Farthing “at STAT.0101.001.0022.
670 Exhibit 5-0055 STAT.0101.001.0001, Statement of Commissioner Raymond James Condon at para 12.
671 Exhibit 5-0055, STAT.0101.001.0001, Statement of Commissioner Raymond James Condon at para 15; Exhibit 5-0055, STAT.0101.001.0029, document entitled “JC-3 - Apology by the General of the Salvation Army General Shaw Clifton, to care leavers of Salvation Army homes”; Transcript of R Condon, T4754: 26-43 (Day 46).
672 Exhibit 5-0055, STAT.0101.001.0029, document entitled “JC-3 - Apology by the General of the Salvation Army General Shaw Clifton, to care leavers of Salvation Army homes” at STAT.0101.001.0030.
673 Exhibit S-0055, STAT.0101.001.0001, Statement of Commissioner Raymond James Condon at para 15; Exhibit S-0055, STAT.0101.001.0029, document entitled “JC-3 - Apology by the General of the Salvation Army General Shaw Clifton, to care leavers of Salvation Army homes”, at STAT.0101.001.0030.


675 Transcript of R Condon, T4820: 30 - T4821: 21 (Day 46); Exhibit S-0061, EXH.005.061.0007, document titled “Letter from Andre Cox to Justice McClellan”.

676 Transcript of R Condon, T4796: 12-31 (Day 46).